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CHAPTJ~H 1 
"THE \J l::fY J\ND HOIJJ OF COLL E:C1.'1 VE 13ECUHI 'l'Y "1 
Fe•• terms are more popular today than "Collective 
security," <i.nd :fevJ aro used 1r1ith such d:i.verse Iueaning;s. 
The ;Collo<•ing tltatements by tli.:;h-ranl>.ing 11merican o:f.ficials 
are typical: 
The path of collective semuity is our only sure 
defense against the dangers that thr6aten us. 
(President Harry s. Truman; address of JYlay 7, HJ51.) 
••• thti prj.nciple o.f collective security • , , i<> 
the only principle that v:a ttllnk can cm:'ry us to peace. 
(;:?ecretary of Defense George c. Marshall; t<mtimcmy to 
the Sonata Armed Dervices and F·oreign Helations 
Commit tee, tJiay 12, 19 51. ) 
(The concept of collective sccurlty is) tlte most 
i.u.por·t;tc~nt single concept affocting international life. 
(Under Decreta:ry oi' state Jamtls !~. V;ebb; ado.Hws in 
Nontreal, l'iay z,l, 1951.) 
The core of our program this year is ac,«in collec-
tive security. 'c;e are concentrating on collective 
security becatl:oe it ll; tkle greatest Xliled of the ;;orld 
today •• , it is ttlo responsible and rsalistic road. 
to world peuce. (Jotm D. Hicl-cerson, 1M>si<;t1:mt ~~ecretary 
of State fox United Nutions ii1'fuirs; widress in i~e\·i 
York, uctobe:r 21, 1\il'il.) 
meeting uf the Sixth Gession of the General Mlsembly <)f' th•; 
------
lFrom the book by Joseph Huri;t Ball, Collective 
lli!£\:!t.:.h~: 1ili! ::ili;t and l!2!£!. (Boston: viorld pu:we F':unc!ation, 
194<.1). 
{Jnitad Nations on September 20, 1950. And 0 of' course, 
Secretary of state John JPostEJX Dulles had as trHJ main 
purpose in negoti~tting the soutt1east Asia Collective 
2 
Defense Treaty "to estublisll a collect;ive secm:ity <>:rran;;o-
ment for soutlleast L\sia and th" \.estern Pacific." 
(statem<lnt made by Gecretar.)l of .SiilitJ>_l,_ulles_b_t-lf_or_e_the _____ _ 
Op<ming session of ttle Coni'erence at Manila on Geptember 6, 
1954.) 
I • DEFINI l'ION 
'l'o assess the true significance and ponsibilit:Les o;e 
collective security in international affairs, the qu<Js tion 
must first be ans.vered: \ihat does "collective sacuri ty" 
mean? 
The concept uprears to be simple alii lHJlf-explanatory. 
It has been defined by Geoii:\ t3clxLvarz<Jnberc:,er as "machinery 
for joint act.ion in oxder to prevent or counter any attack 
against <U1 establl;,hed irrternational order. •• 2 It clearly 
implies collecltive m<Jasures for dealirt, with threats to 
peace. In a sem;e ErnE:JSt A. Gross, United states Deputy 
Representative to the united Nations. stuted a truism when 
2aeorg schvJar zenberger, PovJei Politics (N<fvJ York: 
Frederick A. Praegex, Inc., l95rr;-p. 494. -
he declared: "There is no alternative to collective action 
for the act1ievoment of security. The opposite of 
collective secu:r ity :l.s complete insecurity. "3 
But not ull collectivo action .Ls collectiv<:> security. 
F'o:r in reality • th.e concept .ts a CQlllpl~lX and elusive one. 
1'he very fev; ven tu:rcs in collective action have been limi i;ed 
by the vague and goneral natUHl of' tho commitments, and by 
the UUJ;Iillin.!;n<;ss of tho states concerned to take adequhte 
vigorous action. Collective security :Ls clearly incompat-
ible with neutrality o.nd with a balance of po>Ver policy, ns 
C;!uincy :• risht explains. 4 The decisive tests v;ould seem to 
be: First. 'loJbether the systerr.' is strong •:moue:;h. 
Collective secmrity '•1111 .never 1tJO:rk unless t'cll the n!lt:i.ons 
that take part in it are pr epured to ca:rry :Lt on to a 
de:t'initive concltlsion. The second test appE;ars ·to l.Je 
\lihethor tll<> states associatud in i·c abide by '!;heir obliga~ 
t1ons to the i\1llest extent necassa:ry in crisis si.tuatlons. 
As ProJessor Friedrn<:mn explains: 
A successful system of collective secul'i ty does not 
necassar:tly presuppose "'- complete abandonment of 
nationccl :Lnclepond.enoe or individuality. It do<Js, 
hovJever, require the submi<Js:ton of tile :i.nctividual 
3MdreSi3 at the Unive:rsity of Vi:rg1nia, ,July 1<5, 191:',1; 
in the l}epartme.n~ of Gtate Bulli_t:.,~11 1 XXV (July <)0, 1951), 
183. 
· 4Quinoy ! richt, ! stugz of ~ (Chil1ago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1942), II, p.~81. 
. 
.. 
4 
national 1dll to collective decisions ••• and in 
order to be ef'fectiv<> it requires the intHrnational 
control o:f. military forces <>nd vital weapons, '<Jhic!l is 
certainly not uossible Hit:hout a severe restriction of' 
nat .tonal saver eignty. 5 
Third, such a system must l)e fa.x more tl:ian an 
alliance. It must be open to tt1ose stt1tes wl1ici:l hie 
~~illing to accept 1 ts obllga tions in ,sood faith.. I_t_llJUsJ;, ____ _ 
not be directed against &.ny specific pmH;r or combinaticm 
consistent lvitll the Charter of t.rHl unit6d Nationf;. Also, 
especially <lo fer as collective security in southeast ,~sia 
is concerrlud ~ it must embody t;hose principle::; given by 
Laster B. Pm.J.nwn, canac1ian Minister fox n:xternal Aff'<t:l.rs: 
(1) it must contain no taint of coloniali.sru and im:wt not be 
dasi.,;ned to !JIOp up XGgime5, colonial or national, 1;ha:t; tu:J.Vc 
little o:r no populHr support; (2) since military .:·"ggression 
of the continental so:rt is not li!>:el.y to be tl1e main f'utu:re 
~anga:r so much as Conunun:tst :lnfilt:rati.on for exploi tat :ton 
of forces 1vithin a ste.te, no mere military agreement 1rJill 
be satisfactory; und (3) the solution cannot be a ptttely 
Western ona l:mt stwuld be b:rowny ba<H>d on the 1\Bia.n ° :; 
particlpation eith,:r actlvely or through their coopeiation 
ana advice. 6 
-------
5w. Friedmann, h.n ~.fillroc1uct:ton ~o t~ Politics 
(New York: l,~acmillan Comp,my, H5l), p. b7. 
1954; 
6naymotil DaniEll, dispatch f:rom Ottuv;a elated J[;ay 26, 
ill ttle N€1\11 X(>rk ',CimE:S, May L9, 1954 • 
. ----
5 
H. PHOVlSIOND OF :Cllrl UNXl'i',D I'IA'riONS CHAH1'i1H 
'l'he student of collective secu.:rity vlill p:rolJably say 
that it is a statement of perJ.action to argue tbat the 
p:rioe of thB .failm:e to provide oolleotiv~' security aftGl' 
order whicll would establish a ganu:l.ne peace and for an 
organization >vhictl vwuld preserve tha·t peace. 
At first glance lt seems thr:;t tile foundations \"Jete 
well laid.. Tho provisions of the Charter of thli Unitc;d 
Nations for collective action axe more extensive and 
appa:r en tly mo:rlil far-rlilachirli_, trmn those of the Covammt 
of' the; League of Nations. ,l<'I.U:th~irmore~ the United Nations 
system has been butt:rossed by regional a:nangements and 
agreements, <>ome of which~ notably those existl..ng :l.n 
\lleste:cn gurope, tilEl J.\tle.ntic Community, ancl the Vies tern 
Hemisphere,---il&tablish strol:li;; regional seolU:ity syst.ems 
Which are presumably consistent \<!ttl, and supplementary to, 
the United Nat:tons sy~:tem. 
Art.tcle I of the Gl:larter calls f'or "effecUve 
collective m~;asLues fol' th(~ prevention and removal of th.roats 
to the peace, and for the suppression of' ucts of agc;ression 
or other breacl1t1S of thB peace.•• C.:hapter VII of the 
6 
Charter poi.<lts olrt in ~reat detail ~illat thest:~ "·efi'actlve 
collective measures" may be. If 'the Semu:ity Gounci.l finds 
that an uct of abgresslon or other ttueat to th•; peace has 
such maasur es as the council Sh!:lll deem necessary, the 
United .Nations may call llpon tll8 nHil!ub<n· stateB to taltE:i Hny 
of a number of non-military and • if necessary, military 
Article 421 'novides timt 
' 
All members of the United ~lations , •• unc1ertal-ce to 
make available to the De cur i ty COill'lcil, Oil its <:!.ill or 
in accordance with a speoi<.tl agream<mt oJ: ae;reements, 
armed forces, assistance • and fa(~:lli ties • • • necessar: 
for the purpose of maintainin;, :l.nte:mattontcl poace and 
security. 
ArtJ.clo 45 stipulates tr1at "Mombers shall llold 
illllllediately available natiomU. air-force C<.m tingents for 
comb :tned interna Uonal enf'orc ement action." 
Article 47 provides for a Mili t•1ry staff Committ!J(J 
•• , to advise and a.ssist the Security Council on 
all questions relating to the security ConneLl •s 
military rtlquirements for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace ond secur;t ty • the> employment anCi command 
of forces placed at its disposul, ·th<J ret.;ulation of 
armaments • and poss j_ble disarmaments. 
Article 49 states that "'l'he i\>1embers of tile un1 ted 
Nations snall join in affording, mutual assistanc:e in 
carrying out oi1o meastlHJs decidod upon b,\' the Deou:ri ty 
CounciJ.." 
7 
Th.e famous A:rticl'l 51 specifically l'ccognizes "the 
inherent right of indi vidqal or collective self -de:f.'ense if 
<l.n armed attack occurs a,;a:!.nst u 1·\omber of th!J UnltHd 
Nations." but it also pla:l.nly stat.ad ttlht 
geasu:res tcJ.ken by Members in too exercise of hhl.s 
right ••• shal.l not in any \vay affect the authority 
and rospontJibility of the Cecu:rlty Council •• , to 
1--------·take-a t-(uJ.y tlme-su cf.!-a.ct:t-on-&s-1. t-u ees.ns !lid ces ~ary iu.------==== 
order to maintai-n or rccJsto.N:l lnt;e:rnc:,tiomil p(cJflCf.l and 
seouri ty. 
Chapter \HI oi' tbe Charter thus clearly envisions 
collective action of a i'ar-reachirJt<, natura, tmu the 
Members of tllH United Natiom;,by adher:i.il., to thf.l Cl1<u;ter, 
accepted a corm:nitment to abide by and e;:l.ve full suppo.rt to 
the decisions of' tl1f.l Security Council. 
Until the Korean crisis of 1950, the pote'.l tial.i t:l.ElS 
of' the United nations :for collective actlon against 
aggression ,,1ere untested. But because of the very nature 
it could. not become m1 ef'fective .ins.t:rument of collective 
security v•i thou t radical. rev j,s ion of the Crtar ter. 1\.ltiloL<t;h 
he supported and voted f'o.r the Jn;Lted Nations Charter. even 
Senator Hobe:rt A. Taft, for instance, confesses tru1t hfl 
;;as "never satisfied." \f.ihile at the same timo expressing 
his belief' in int;ernational la<~ as H basin 1\'r endu:r :ing 
I 
I 
peace, he contended t!mt the '1m to poi!Je:r in the secu:ri ty 
Council of the United Nations "completely dispels the idea 
that any syf;tem of universal law is b<Jir)b e:otalJlic:hed, for 
sur.ely nothing ':an be J.W;J if five of tho la:rg<;;st nat:i.ons 
can automaticCilly exempt th.emselvas f:r<llil its ap:licat:l.on." 7 
Because of ·ttw constant use of the veto by the 
Soviet Union th6 UnHed States and othm: mejo:r pmvers of 
the t.'estern ;.;o:rld are placing first cJmphs,sis on regional 
security p;r:oe;;:rwns and arrangements. They ~?,re relylns more 
defense and for r<ag:l.onnl measures for "individual or 
collective self'-defEmse," to use the langlwge o:f 11rticle 51 
of the United Nations Charter. than they are upon tho .mo:r·e 
<!,eneral sai'eguards provided ;for in trw 0t1artu:r.. In the 
field of security tilElY seem to attach more sigxlificance to 
individual anc\ regional than to collective secuxity in its 
true and broadax moaning. 8 
Port1aps thl" situation has developed because c:f th<l 
8carlos p. Homulo, "1'he United Nations is Dy1ng 1 " 
Collie:r.'t;, LXIV (JLllY 23, 1%4); ~?0-2 • 
.... --~ ~ 
9 
very nature and limitations of international la~J.9 
Whe:reaH :!.n~m:rwtional 1<1\v :represents (J. posj;tive at·tempt to 
build an into:rna ttonal le,;al Ol'der, ia tho absence of' wtlioh 
peace and san:U;y in the intarnal:.ioual G<lJI'll1H:<n:i.ty are in 
constant ji!opard.y, :Lnternati.onal J .. avJ "•Jill never play a 
really e.ffootiv<> part 1n international :relo:t;ions," u!L_.[,, _______ ==== 
L. Brierly, nn English autl1o:ri ty declares, "until it can 
annex. to its own !rpt.w:n~ some of the matte1~s which at pres-
ent lie ~~:!.thin the •ctoli'.estic ,iurisdictio.n' of' the sevt';:tal 
••• as X<lgt~:rds :i.ts irmtitlltions and procedures of 
adjustment the htlrl of nations has been £.. ,junc,l.u law 
imperfectly mrwl:lo:rated by a fragmentary nnd hesitant 
progress in the d i:rection of legal order .11 
l!ihile H .i.s true .that rules of pJ:ocedure called 
internatlonecl J.m.J h!i.Ve grm•n cons:lfterabJ.y durir•s the past 
fe;v hundred years, the modern \Vorld "' tlll is composed 
primarily of a group of polit:l.cally indHpendent, self-
governin~; statmJ each of \~hJ.ch clai.:m; ove:ry sovereign x igrtt. 
-------
Ssulo Eng<Jl 0 "On "cl.lo l>tatus of Internutiorwl Legis-
lation," .!tl!i ill[! eric~ ,Jotlt[J.a;l. of !fl!:.!nna t~on~ ;t,a~. XLIV (October, 19fi0) 11 '/39. 
~0,;. L. Brierly • ~ 1"av1 Q.f Nutiolli?_ (London: oxford 
UniversJ.ty Press, 1949) 9 pp.~-6. 
, lloowin D. Dlckens on • Lal'l .ill!Si. geaq§. ( P<mnsyl V<miu: 
university or Pennsylvania Pres", 1951), p. 76. 
10 
Consequently, tne resort 'Go :l.nt.e:rnat:l.cmU. law h~•s been 
purely voluntary. \\!tlen nr1t:i.onal honor, sec,.:u:ity, or ottlm: 
vital in'torest<J are at stake, nations have placed their 
particular· :l.nt;>J:ests above t:1e :restraints o.f lnte:rnational 
national polioy t:md cannot be l<'~ft out of account in any 
kind of lntG:matlonal xel:l tions. 
security in a lJitdly d:Lvided vJorld, :rq;:Lonu.l lo\J:r8.XlQeme.nt£J 
for co1l"ct:i.ve defense and for other pLtrpor:Hl£ 11ave become 
useful a.ncl even <~ssential. 'l'he Chartex of tlle.: United 
Nations, as pointc.d out. not only ClO<JS not place impedi-
ments :tn 1~il<> 1vay of' th.e J:'ormation of regional ulliances, 
but under i\rticl.;; f)l it actually mekos prov1s1on for the 
forming of regional groapings. The Goatheast Hsia 
Collective D6f0:nse T:rsaty, popl~larly known as B.'"ATO, or the 
~~anila Pact, is onH of severHl rogional arrangements set up 
There are some 1fiho holt! that rcg:i.onu1 security pacts 
add to international tensions, and may even hasten the 
catastrophe they are designed to prevent. It does not. 
follow, ho>•ever • tilat i'ailure to tako sac!'! steps may 
incttlase tb.e pro~Jpects of peace, In fact, failt:IH:l to 
. 
. 
.. 
... - . ·-
r 
11 
provide :reg:lonal security may add to ·t;lle dangers and, in 
addition, may gravely ,jeopa:rd:tze tile secu:r ity or even the 
national e1ziDtenc:e of tl1u statss 1rlh:lcti are so foolhardy as 
to trust c:l"t.;ocetl.wr "t;o tl"le lhivicen of p<i.aCt:;ful Bet·tJ.eriient 
in a \Jorld vvl:J.e:re even the fain"test sil:!,n of mo:ra.lH;~; and 
decmH:y 111:e cast aside by nati.on;;c, ~~llo u.re not scrupulo•Js as 
to thf.l mo"ttlods by \·Jhich ttleix matexial:l.stic sJ.tds are 
attained. Tho s4;n.Htor:l.<>S to sr:ATO :rega.rd their O:t't:Hniza-
tiOll a neoessit;. In t;tw :fa.oe of present dangers in 
SouthGast ftsia 'thE.iy soc no alt.e:o .."la t.:tve. 
CHAP'l'ER II 
\'lh.il;;; the SE:ATO sys tom of :r eg1on~;~l colla cti ve 
secu:ri ty in Asia is tt1e most recent, it tU:ts had several 
predecessors. Five of' these lrlill be discussed bri€lfly,_. • .__ ____ _ 
Japan appealed to the idoa of :regionalism Nh<m 
Nippon's leaders attempted to disguise their program of 
conquest in East Asi11 by declaring tt1ei:r objactiva was the 
creation of a "Greater 1~ast ilsi<; Co-Prosperity L3phere." 
Begun cautiously fifty~fi ve years ago v~hen Korea and 
Formosa <Jere detached from China. the process of turning 
tt'lis :rantustic scheme into reality proceeded systl.lllHiticully 
and >1itt1 increasilli;; rutl1lessness until it ent,ulf'ed most of 
China and soutrll.mstern Asia--an empire \vhicll .• at its cxest 0 
• • • spl'awlc:d over 3 0 000, ooo squrire miles, con-
trolled more than h~;lf' a billion people, and contained 
the \'lor ld •s best sources of' natural rubber and tin, us 
v•ell as rich resel'ves o.f arrtimotJy • tungsten. chrome l 
iron ore, coal. petroleum, vege'tablCJ oil, and l:leJap. 
-------
1
"Liqllidating Japan's Co-Prosperity 6pt1ere,•• 
Business V.'eelrl!. No. 1177 (August 15 • 194()), 18. 
' :,_ 
~----
13 
The program of' a Greater !!last Asia Co-Prosperity 
Spl;tera hHd been proclaimed in 1938 tvhen "Juptm 1s fasclsts" 
had succeeded in capturing control of the government. 2 
But it was not untn ,July 1940, that the Tojo cabinet 
.formulated the construction of a "N<M Order" in ii;at>t Asia 
as basic in Jap<>n's foreign policy. 'rrle "llletoJ Order" w:>s 
to comprise un area centered around Japan, China flfiU 
Manchuko and to incltlde the mandated islands, Fr enc!l Indo-
China, Ti:lailun6. llfiulaya, Borneo, Netherlands li:ast Indies, 
Australia, Ne" Zeala.'1d, !:lnd Ind.ia. '£he sphere was created 
to be an economically sHlf-sufflcient a:rea uncer Japanese 
"' political hegemony • ,) r·rofessor Francis C. ,Jones of 
Harvard Unlve:rsi ty explains Japan 1 s ''New Order" in tt1is 
manner: 
The general Japanese concept of G:reate:r East Asia 
was one in vJhicl1 Japan herself steM fol'th as ttle lGade:r 
in all walks of' life--military, political& economlc, 
and cultural. Aroulld her lve:re to be grouped the 
satellite States, varying in degree of political sub-
ordination to Tokyo, but all iu common looking to Jhpa}l 
a;, .t11e sup<lX io:r cotmtry • vJhcs e vi<>.ys they should. endeavon:r 
to imHut<J and With ~~hom they should ull f'aitn:tully 
cooperate. For the Japanese tt1e successftll establish-
ment of Greater Etl.st Asil:l meant not only tile attainment 
of tlla long-desired goal of ~:~conomic seli'•sufflcienoy 9 
0 . 
"'.Leland D. Bald~Jin, Uecent ilmeriCB{l History (New 
York: Ame:r :Lean Book Company, 1954), p, 321. 
~\.il.liam H. liJ.sb:ree, Japan's Hol<.:: in :Joutheast Asia 
Nationalist Movements, !21Q.-~ (BoS't"On:li.Urval'd University 
Press, 1953), p. 16, 
but also of somethirlib else which ~Jould satisfy a 
psychological craving--the recognition of Japan's 
ethical and cultural superiority, the acceptunce of 
~rapan at ller mm valuation as the o liGht of 1\sia. ' 
Indea(J • vihoth<>r consciously or not • tha Japanese 
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aspi:r: ad "to play th<i:l ra.rt wnicl:l ttle Chinaso nad once 
played :Ln 'GlHl g;rec.: t days of the Cales tial !.l:!ilpirtl 0 "hen 
t;tHJ Don of Heaven in Peking • swayed the \vide tvo:t:ld," 
and •>hen Ct1inu ~Vas regarded by J:wr ne.igl:J.bours as the 
exempla:r and fountainhead of' civilized lii'e.4 · 
Japanese occupation policies of the count:das o:f southeast 
Asiu or t;hc; contr:lbution of those policies to latar devel-
opments~ suffice it to say that tlleir tllinly veiled 
complete failur<l. This fact is novJ part of oontemport~:ry 
histol'Y• ;rupan 1'1d.lod because of the cruelty meted out to 
the native population ~Jl;on total. \!ollaboration has not 
fo:rthcom1ng 0 and because o:f tlle privation due to the 
economic <lislocilition M1ich a.ccompani<'ld '1:!18 vm:r. In t;he 
former, t;tle;:re \vera m.any instances i"ill<Jre tl:u::' Jupaneso 
:received oonsid6rably support from nationalisr!; parties and 
succeeded in attractinG U:lG cooperation, sometimes nomlno.l, 
but of'ten activ<> t of naticn<,,list leaders who E;r.urnecl (and 
war a s pu:rned by) tile previous colonial regime;;. HovJ<JVEl r, 
there neve:r devoloped a :real unity of :i.nte:re sts betweEm 
l 
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·the two par 'ties; there \-J!lS no ove:r\;belmill<s despair on th(l 
pa.rt of the Asiam: v.t; Japan •::. defeat, no feeling that they 
must have Japan's support to stand on trwir feet. lrl 
The idea of linking forces wi til the nati.onal movo~ 
ments \HlS a sound uno. It 111as by no means or igimil 
witlJ the Japanese but the ciroumsttmoes under \·Jh5.ctl 
they la,.mc:hed their effort gave them ll unique opportc;m-
ity. :rn''Y fumbled it. and one basic cause \•ias tt1oir 
mm .fat<lty conception of the nationali>:t movements in 
Asia. The v:i.e\v C<:Jme dangerously clo;;.e to bs J.r~:;; one 
accordint, to wt1ich the 11 nativo blolnas" IHJ.re givmi a 
.fe~; trappin~;;,s of autl10ri·ty :rcrth.:::r as pluythings to 
keep them aJnw.;ed wh.Ue the Japanose d<lVotet! tm;mselv<Js 
to essenti8l m&tters. The idea oi' Japanese suporiority 
v;as implic;i. t in tile ir actions dt.uir!Q the o ccu p~:<tion. 
The notiorJ of ,;qidance 1,11as 1.i!lv1ays tt1u t oi lendinb tJ 
li-ttle child by the hund. ti1ere l>as no inkling of 
r<Uutionship in which mutual probl<>ms viould be discussed 
on equ.ul terms , • • (After till) tho p:o ce:m b~ vJhich 
one nation t:ranc,mits to anotllor the !'ru:J:t s of its mm 
experience is 8l1 axceecl.tn1;ly compl<JX one, particularly 
if some respects must bi.i paid to elmm.mts of tile old 
society of tbe :recipient •••• 'l'he Japawase violated 
most of tile rudimentary principles of' su en u :r ela:t;ion-
ship. !!ley savJ 'Wf!Ht a WHlful j.ns t;:rument nationalism 
could be in ·~heir plans fox u co-P:rosperi ty .Sphere~ but 
tl'ley :failed to d:ravl all tho necesstuy consequences fnna 
this :reali:~:ation.5 
B:rie.fly then, because the Japanese fallecl to 
identify th~; int•J:rests of the p<>Oples of 3outtH>Us't ;,siu, <m 
attempt to Lmify a geographic portion of Ilsia unde:r thEi 
glJise of a "Co-P:ror; peri ty Sphere" t111.s fn:Ued. 
______ , 
At the end of' ·l'.it)Ild Viar II, as the \<J:I.nds of 
political <lnd social ctwn~:,e begun to blow over Asia the 
leaders of' many Asiatic countries have frequently voiced 
the commt.mity of interests cf all .. sian people"'• This is 
represents potentially the waste:r:y of t'>::te world in JI1an~ 
power and re<;ou:rces. 110 Of this <JVent, P. c. C.p<mder, 
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Australia's Minister :!.'or External .Relations, observed, 
"In all. mor<1 than one billion people have been cau@t up 
in political and economic tranef·ormation in Asi~t," moreover, 
••everyvll:l<~Ie t!11~ dynamic gxovlti1 of ne1> politicul and economic 
policies, and nm; institutions, "ill continue ctnder the 
impulse of the nationalist idea and the demand fox econom:lc 
and soci~:tl reform.••7 
Pe:r.haps the most concrete evidence of this tendency 
v1as the Asitm Hela tions Conference held in Ne1.v IJ(clhl :tn the 
spring of 1947. Delegates from tvJenty-ci;;b.t i\shm 
countries ,,nd uther pol.ttical entities~ such as some of trw 
6 Hobert Payne, I!le Hevolj! .Qf Mhli {Nelri Yorl': Joiln 
Day, 1947), p. 290. 
7p. c. Spender, "Partnership with M;io. 0 " !M~!im. 
#},f'fa1rs 1 XXVIII (~ramlm~y,l95J.), B05. 
1"/ 
Republics of the u.s.;;.n. • ati;ended tll:Ls histor1c confer-
ence. "\"!hen the hl~;tory of our pr esen·i; times is 1tJJ:i t ten," 
declared tr1e Prim<J .Mlnisto:r of' India ln his address of 
vlelcome B:t theopr:ming session, "thi.s event may WH11 stand 
out as a landmark .'~hich dj.v.tdes tr1e past of hSia f:rorn the 
future. '1 Tl1e Indian leader ·ctlUs exrrcssed tl1o lll<Janing of 
the nei~ era for Mlia: 
A change is comine; over t!Je scene no1r1 and Asia is 
again fincling herself. VH3 live in a t:r:>Jl<Hln<lot!S age 
of transition and already the next [.t"ge takes iciiluJJEi 
Vjbil n Asia tatces lw:r rightf11l pla.(Je wl th. ttw otno:r 
continents • • • • In this crisis in world llis tory 
Asia •i:l.ll .nace:lfHlXily play a vitnl r ,J.e. The countries 
of Asia can no longer be used as pawns by oth.er<:; tlu;y 8 are bound to l1ave their 011Jn JlOlicies in l>o:rld ai'fa:L:w. 
11ihile giving due credit to the ',vest for its contri• 
btltions to h:.mmn pro,,~:re~;s, ~1ohru al~:o pointed to the 
apparent inability of th•J Wentern lvcrld to prevent reounent 
<oars. Delegate after delegE;to follovled the Indian Prime 
:1/Jinister to t.h.<; rostrum to voice the identity of :i.nterests 
of tho countries of Asia and to emptmsize tho impoi tan co 
of close collabo:ratlon among them. After more than a 1;;~ok 
of' round ta.blc: discus;: ions t thc Gonfereru:J<j voted to establish 
an Asian Helutions O:rganiza:tion, to bs composed o:t' a Gena:ral 
Council ood non·governmental national units in each of tlH.l 
8,,/lsian Relations " A Henort of the l'xoccHldin"S and 
; - ---- _'# -Docum~;mtatiml .9! :!:ill.!!! First {l~;J.an l1DlatioruL ~&renee,~ 
Delhi, March~AritlJ..9 121.1 (Ne<l Delhi, India, 1H48), p. 19. 
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part:l.cipat:l.rl(,'; count:des. Uah:ru vias later chosen P.resid ent 
of th€; new Cot1ncil. 
The Organization. 111hich has nomiro.lly been in 
existenc<l since 1947 • j.s hardly more t;hnn <J. skeleton. It 
is a far cry from such olhbo:rate :reg:Lorml arrangements as 
the O.rzanization o.f American Stateu or th't North Atlantic 
Treaty O:rgttnh:atlon. True tl:lough this evaltlation might be. 
the :l.li<portance of it 1Jll is to be found in tl1e .role play<,Hl 
by the As:i.an I\Glations Conference :i.tseli'• part;icipa1;ed by 
no less than tt~enty-ei:.;l:lt Asian states, !W t.he first real 
experience :fo.r the nevily-i'raed count r ifl s of hSia to oonfa.r, 
coliimune, and oovi:>e on problems common to 1;t1em • 
.Ano·t;her confElrooce in .Ne111 J:l'e.lhi• held in January, 
1949, also.tw.d broo1d ililplications fox ftrclUG M>ian unity, 
tion. DGl'dt><'t·:>S :f'rom ninate(cln countrietl, mostly from ,'clcmtn 
and .Sottthnas·t t>sla b11t :i.ncllldlnt::. also .sus tralia • N!Hv ;"ea1and, 
and Ethiopia, called fo:r the v;i thdrmJal of Dutctl troops from 
the arcas under the control of th<J Indorwsian Hep1blic ancl 
.:Cor u t:.:nnsfe:r of sovereignty to a Unit~:;d states of Indones.i.a 
They decided not to establish a :_ --
permanent organization, but ug:uwd to consult mo:r e 
0 frequently and to cooperate more closely in ti1e f'uture.w 
i'\ resolut:l.on adopted ummimOltsly by the nirwteen 
stat<J~3 r.•spr.esfmted at th!l Gonfe:renco HJCOlrun<::rr.!ed trwt the 
pa:rticl.patin:;; rwtions e::r.ploJ.'e the pOSf>ilJHit :Los for 
:regionul arrang,vments Mlti'lin ·their areas, and tl1.at they 
establish appropriate machinery to carry out such an 
i.nvestigat:l.on. .since Austruli~J .• Ne•1 :~ealann, Ghiiw., and 
areas" vJas none t;oo clear. Prime Mini<; ·ter Noh:ru :revealed 
tions When, in a speech to the Indian Parliament on 
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We i.1aven 1 t ;vet d.ecided as to v;lw.t :region ttw.t 
coonerat:i.on shonld ;r (~late to. Ind ta is in·tero steJd in 
several regions of Asia and vlbether all of tiJEi so should 
be groLlped tor;ether or dElalt Hi tt1 soparatel~: i<l still 
to be (:ons5.L!erect.10 · 
At that t:l.me Neh:r:u L:.id do•Jn 11 t11o conditions for any kind 
9 "Delhi ConferE-mct'l o:f At;iutic Gountr i<1 s," Nation, 
CLVll (,Tanuary 29, 1949), 113. 
' 
... 
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(l) it must be ~Jttolly 'o'llthin the scope und spirit of the 
Charter of tllc: Unltod rJat.i,orw; ~md {2) it nmst be largely 
confined to consultation Bnd cooperation ;;ith "no blnding 
covenant in it." Obviom;J.y, fi J::(,;gional ttfJt:ociation 1t~hich 
fi.:tlf:il.lsd tl1d second of ttHiEO eonditlom; ia doomed to 
fo.ilu:re. 
1i~ilereas :lt i}; significant that lndta took tl;e 
initiative in calling tile Asian Relations Conf<:lrence of' 
1947 tmd tt1e Conference· 011 Indonesia of 1949, both of 1Jihicn 
leaders took a prmllinm1t part ir.\ th!:we conferences and 
obviously a~ta.ct1ed great in:.J:J;:\xtance to them, it is mora 
signi:l:'i<.H:lnt to note thut c·l though ImHa r,spire to leader-
champion cf iiSien caunes, she does not lQOk vJith. favor 
upon propo;::aJ .. s to establish a peX!Pllt1ont organization of 
iwiun states, iliiihru ho.s flatly refused to .Join or support 
tl:l~l proposal fox a Pacif'lc Pact. 
Th<l pro~;ram for t.he ~Jconomic development of south 
and Sou.thoast Asi<A j.nitiated by the gc:.vernrwonts of Great 
and. Ceylon, kno1:l!l as the Colombo Plan,. is described in a 
\~11itc, paper publl:>tl.B6 bj' the seven Gonw,on\vealth Govorrunents 
concerned. 1'he Plan J:w.s bean much ••rittan about and i'ts 
history is nm; lwown qui ta well. It poses blun·tly thtl 
question of how fax the Vltls tern peoples are ready to d.i vert 
their resources to a vast region o1' i\.sia. started in 191.)0 
as a bold new venture of tll<> British Common>:H:Hilth to 
Asia, its scope has since •~idened and the area or its 
operation includes most of :oouth Asia. ~l'o lts orit;inal 
Pakistan1 Ceylon, Nalaya~ and British Borneo--ot!Je:r coun-
tries ha.ve(•;been add<ld. The Uni tocl stat!w becruae a full 
Indonesia. Jupan. Thailand, and the Pl:lilippin<JS nave also 
joined, the last three only in 1954.11 
'Ctle Colombo ~erence. J~.mu<tr;u_, ~QQ. The 
Ccnferenoe itself, held at Colombo, Ceylon, Januar·y 9-1•>, 
l9bO, was unique in several respects. In the first place 
it oJas the first conference of all ti10 Commoll\18alth l'oreig;n 
Ministers convened for the expressed pcu:pose of revie>1ing 
"the international situation, including the broad economic 
aspects" of the region. Second, 
11Robert Ivlu:rphy, "The Defense of Asia," Department 
2f State Bullet:l.n, XXXI (November 29 0 1954) • 501. 
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• • • :i. t was tile :first occasion on Which represen-
tatives :from the IHM Asian Dominions of !ndia~ 
Pakistan ano Ceylon were admitted to th<~ inner (.:ouno:l.ls 
of thiil Comwon~rJetilth and given an oppot,tunit:>· to express 
trHlir _ vi(n>s on F'<tr gaster n problems .1:::: 
'l't1ird 1 the choice of meeting place I"JaS Si!;nif5.cnnt. Held 
in the capitaJ. city of' the youngest of tb.e independent;, 
self-governin!;'; Dom:l.nions, it ~Jas the fin;t Gommomvealth 
conf<ll:ence ever convenod ln i;sia. 
The main theme of the Colombo Confererwe Has probably 
ex·:cresscd by D. s. Senanaya.ke, then Prime V4in:i.ster of 
Ceylon, :i.n his kceynate address to the opening session. ~rt1e 
fundamental problem of Asia, he said, I<Jas a.conomic, not 
political. It was tl1erefore n<Jcessury that positl va steps 
be taken to attack 11sian poverty m:il improve tlw stt,ndt,rd 
] ,, of living • . a 
To be suro 1 several strategic and eoon01nic issues 
threatened any liltelillood o:r agreement on joint notion at 
the ini tia.l pil.B!HiS of th"' conf.enmce. ·rha diSIJtrte bet<ieen 
India tmd Pukil.!tan ovor Kashmir \vas one of many con trover-
sias among members of 1;he Ccmmlonwealth. The s11a:rp 
differences in outlook: on such issues as th<J recognition of 
l2John H. g, Cctr:t:-G.reg,~, '1'Jhe Colombo Plan." 
Internatlomq,. QoncUiat!sm.t No. 490 (January, 1951). 16. 
13Lo nd on TimeB • Jam:mry 10, 1950, 
the Mao T:HJ-tune; regime in China or th" Buo Dai government 
in Indochina showed ho>1 remota ware ·!;he possibilities of a 
more or lsss unified Commomvealth fo:reign policy. 
nu·t p:robalJly the most constructive :result to come 
J named after its sponsor, percy c. :Spender, Australia 1s TL_----~==~~~~~~~~~~~~~1~~~~~---------===== 
Minister f'or n;~te:rnal ilffairs, at thtl latter stages of the 
out of the Colombo meeting ~Jas t11e Spender nesolution, 
conference. In general, t,J-w Spende:r· nesolution :cecommende(, 
that the Corwnon•Jealth governments consider a pl'Oject of 
economic coordination >Vlloreby each contributing mewbex 1~ould 
provide material help to tne count;:r ies of t;outrwast Asia, 
and proposed thut a Gorll!lloWrJ(Hll th Consultative Cotmui ttee be 
set .. UP to \-Jo:rk out practical measures for the developmG.nt 
It has ooen allBged tlwt credit for takint, trw 
initiative 1;<,s due "almost entirely to tlll> 1\Ustralian 
Dep<ntmen t of 1 xte rnul Affairs at C:anberx a. tvl'lere ton ·t;a ti ve 
plans had l;eon formulated several months before the conf~>:r­
ence opened,"14 Ho,.eve:r, one of th<J very first proposals 
to renovate tha economic structure of the region came :from 
sarda:r K. M. Pa.nikka:r, Indiun dir,lomat. BGfore becoming 
------
~I'he Htei·A)J:f.itldttm. tHin .fQ;cv;ardad. b,',l' tJ;1e, Co.rru:1VtHJeo.lt;.t1 
,,Jnb~:tsii:\~;,don; to tl'll>i:r Govoxnm.onts us <t ;Joint p::cr·<lSill .. 
A copy vJas al.:;Cf sent. it:t.t'ormally to .flfllt.:olm l',fa(;dor~;zd,d t 
thi.:1 B:r ibiSt1 COI>l!t..iB.oiO!H>X G~!tlibl!<l. in iilir.l0 <1pO:l:£'i, t() 
unttblo nJ.m to disct~ss it. at au~ inructttHtlt. confa:r~n4't~ t..Jt:· 
th"' heads of British rdat:~ions wld.ch ~;as <lue to meet :!.n 
flinga::o:r'"· I ~>iat3 told 1at;r;,.r l>hat t!l&J 1·toT:osal.o in ·t;iH:l 
momo :i.'o:rm<Hl tl1~ bas:l.iJ of' disor.lssicms '"''hioh l.ed to thG G~) O"bO ,.,.l "f' 1,; v ~ ;i.tJ; ;r J:'., .. Q. ~It 
lG'.~LlOt!ld in Guy l;,int;, "Eot~tn hfrJ:l.&.: Unit~l o:t Vistmit~'•" 
Intg!_[)J'"t:iJ;,lw.l Gonc~JJ,~ction. No. \196 Ciovombe:t: • l\!b4) 9 17'/o 
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might involve poll tical strin.;s or oondi tions. But tilt; 
virtue of tt1::: ne~J plan v1as · that it c1id not envisuge simply 
two sides or a contract, consistir)6 of ttlOse \vho v1ould ;:,ive 
and of thosrcJ who vwuld recoiva. It. \•isely recognized the 
danger cf such <> rel,,tionstlip, Which sometimBB gives tile 
recipient coun·tr:tes a sense o:f humiliation and the aid ing _____ ---c==== 
countries a feeling th:c:t they are being exploited. Quite 
the contrary, the Australian proposal introC:t1oed the 
principle of mutual a:ld. 'rile aim t<as rathm:: to spret~d the 
finanoii:Ll bur dan amono all the inttJrested cotmt ri<Os. 
Finally • because the r eso LU:Cas !lHeded for tho 
development of the region tvere likely to be cons1del'ab1y 
moxe than ttJ.e Cotllfl!OmJealth itself could provide, th•> Spemder 
Resolution pointf.ld Ol.lt that it 1r1ould be necessary to seek 
the cooperation of otner atlvanc<:Jd industrial countries 
outside the Camliiom;ea1 th. '.rh:ls paved trw >·<ay for possible 
United states partic:lpation.l6 There vJas nothing exclu~live 
in the proposed plan. It contemplated from the outset that 
the non-ComB\On'<leal·ttl countries of BoutluHlS t Asia should also 
be invited to join in ;Jhatever project could be devised for 
joint action in the a:raa• 
16r.ondon Times, January 6 • 1950. 
i 
I 
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Viewed in the context of the entire Conference then. 
ttw Spender Hesolution stands out as an act of s t;atesman~ 
ship that is rare in con·temponu·y history. lind as for the 
Colombo meeti.ng; itself, an editor i.al comment of t11e J:LQ!!!,_ 
York :;t:imes revievJing tile Conteren;;:e at that time v1as 
reas sur i 11£ • "The N<H'~ Conmto n111 eal t; h, " it said ,,_'_.' i..,s.._.a .... n.._"'l'"n""t"er..._- _____ ==== 
member wants it to worlt ami because they all have common 
interests and ideaJ.D in spite of disputes·on spacific 
{ "'"' " " " 1 7 .,~...,)q.....,o,.;~. 
'£l:le Colombo deliberations themselves were nighly 
signiflcant f'or tt•o 1nain roasons; First, it :reco.;nized 
that '11\sie. is "'t the mo1;;en·t the main focus of into rest and 
an a:c ea of special urgency." iiocorctingly • th<• Colombo Plan 
~las evol VEld fox poolint;:; the resou:rc es of lllEmtber nut ions in 
a project of mutual aid in \1ihich each 11'JOt:tlt1 give according 
to its abil:l.ty. secondly, to support trLts aid project, H 
estublis hed e standing consultative n1echanism, the Plnn • s 
"Consultative Committee rep:cesenting ths Gommont'Hoalth 
Governments." This piece of international macilirwry, once 
dubbed "tllf3 pivotal body in the entire venturo," 
17~ York Time!!.• Ja!lU<il'Y 9. 1950. 
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• • • is a gathel·ing of representatives, sometimes 
ministers, sometimes officials, o:t: tho govermnents 
taking part in the Plan. It weets at irregular 
intervals 0 v;hanever the need f'o:c consultntion is i'elt, 
and :t·t su.rveys tlkJ prot.;r•>s1; in the area as a vJhole, 
discusses tllt~ relc.,tions of' one plan \'lith :,mothor 9 ani 
debates questions of' economic and politicul nntura tV!lich 
may be of interest to soma or all thEi oocmtries. It is 
a very use!'ul £1. ,lliJc body .18 
Government agreed to convene the f'ixst u.eeting of tl'le 
Cons Jl tu ti ve Gomrni ttee in Aus·trb-lia VJhen the :reconwmnda tions 
adopted at Colombo <Jere accepted by th<o~ c;ova:rruuents 
con.cerneil. 
COllimittee met in Sydney on May 16. 1950, · That t.ll<'l confer-
ence should te neld in i<llt>tralia vms appropr.il.> t:e. As ~Je 
h<rve seen. :tt •1JUS the Gpende:r Resolution at Golombo >vl'l:l.ch 
la\~nched the idea f'or joint act:ton in the region. 'f.ile 
l~ust:ralian Government llad "speci.nl· reasons fo:r t1lshi.n2; to 
preserve pl:la.ce anti_ sti:Cbili ty araong tt11:; co<mt:r:tes of' th.l.s 
area," In th6 f'irst pla.ce~ llustreliao;; long-tjerm :tndust:rittl 
expansion is closely linked 'lvith the future proqwn:.tlt.y of 
Southeast b.sia. Her natural markets a:r.e ti:J.ose close to 11ome, 
--------........ ----~-~· 
and as Petey Spender told the Austl'!';lian House of Repre-
sentativas • "no nation can escape its geography ... 19 
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Moreover, s:l.noe >:orltl War II, DUS t:ralia has em<Jrged as ·b.he 
most advanced indllstrial collntry :i.n t;tmt part of the 1tJo:r lu• 
anct her comme:rd.ul :r elutions 111ith Asiun countries lw.ve 
;['ar-:reaching st:rate.;;ic: inte;rosts in 'tile a;rea. During tiorld 
1:1'<1! II tho country \H:IS in mortal peril after tlle attack on 
Pearl Harbor. Sinca Bo!ltheast &sia is tl1'" '1frontier" of 
"a.bove all, :Lt is in Ollr interest to foster cmmnercial and 
oth<':r contacts" with neighbo:rtng Asian cmunt:ries and h~llp 
maintain "stable ciemocratj,c governments in povu;:r. • • 1~20 
The deliberations of tho Sydney conference fell into 
three parts: sl1.ort-te:rm aid; long·· term aid; Hnd technical 
assistance. 
that the p:robJ.enu; of the Commom<~oalth cot.1ntries :i.n :;;outtl-
east M;ia ~~ould no·t be considered apart; f;rom those of othsr 
countl'ies in til" area. 
19uc:u:r:rent Not;es on Interm.~tiom;l Aff'airs~" ~pa:rtme11t 
9J: Exte:rm:q,_ Affairs J?ubl:i.c<'tions $ No. ::, (CanboJrr a~ 
February, 19!:\0), lito. 
20~. 
oQ 
..,,, 
could bll made mora svJ if'tly :i.f tlle initial steps """re ·i;alHm 
by tllose ootmtries irJl1ich had a col1l!rwn bond and i:onm!on 
interests, lit the same tim.;; it v;as decided to invest:l.t;ate 
immediately the polH;ibility of' Nider collaboration, ani the 
committee therefore rocornmsnded trv,t 
!:,, _______ " A toxmul upp:roac!1 sl10t:tld be made to Governments of ' non.,.GommuJ<lartn cccm.trias ln sot1tl1 art! souttwast Iwi~ai".'---------cc=== 
informing 'cl1em of' ttHJ Committee • s dalibe:rat:tons and of 
the cotuse of action no1rJ contemplated • These Govern-
ments should be inf'ormed ttw.t their full association 
in the <mterur.ise woclld be welcomed by tho Cormncm:Joaltl'l 
Governments. <:;t 
Ttw:re v;as no time at Dydn<Jy to work out the deta:ns 
of sucil p.xojsct and proposals lflere Hmd tted to a standil'lb 
COI!Illlittee vlhich met in Colombo in July • 1950, 1'his meeting 
was attended by representati vas of' all Commom,eal th govern· 
ptupose 11Jas to plau practical rrH>IlSUXes t,o oa.r:r:y out a 
jll'Ol:)X!l.m for the tndning of ,,;:;ian toCJl1nicians in more 
advanced cotmtrier;, tl1a sanding of tochn:lcnl adv:tsers to 
Asia and tha oquipm<mt or endowment o.f Asien scientific 
and technical ins ti tq·t;ions. ~;2 
2L:uoted :tn th•;J ;!,.onq££ ~..!• W1y 20, 3.950. 
''2 . . 
'"' "Gm:rent, Notes on. International Af:i:'a:tl:sa" D<Jg~u:t-
!!!!!l!!. .2£ Ext•n'nal Affairs E.!aE1f~~. No. 7 (,July, 1 5o), 
485. . 
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T'h§. k'lll9.2Jl Q9nf.C!!~££.• ~:j,pten~. l9f&. On 
fleptomber 6• 1950, a team of expert;s f:rom d:l.r:eerent common-
wealth countries met :ln London to ntudy the 1ndlvidcWl 
stlitement;s ~.:ubm:i. t ted by the ~·,:outh !\nj.un government1; and 
aor:rela:to them :i.nto a slngle s:i.x-year p1•og:ram of develop-
mont. )Prom this comprGhensive data tl1o Nin:Lsten; of tho 
Cowmltative C:mnu1lttee t10Ulci determine hovu much of t.l1;s 
developmunt VJOX k cot~ld bo f'inancea by the i\d.ttn cocmt:ri<~ s 
from thoLr j_ntornal l'~>soLu:ees; how rru~etl £rom the ma.;jor 
Commonwealth countries; and hovJ much from count.rles outside 
the C'J!l4'1lonweal th or from inttJ:rest<ld .intetnaticnaJ. 1i(';(>nc:ls s. 
:fil6 f'lnal prod;rams 1·1e;re .frr>liKKi in the lic;b.t of t~Jo 
sets of consi.derations. The f':i.rst involved t,l:J12l hcUniHl an:l 
nw.tex iril pot <ontJ.l'lJ.i t:t<. s and tne second, the availatd.J.i ty of 
financial r<JciOLl.rces. 'Jlw other determining factors >1ere, 
first and foremost, thG available domestic :r<lt;ou.roes, then 
·tllfil sterlir.ig bulum.:es mi.i cont:ributi<lllS from the mon, 
highly developed Connnonwenlth coun-tries, end finally, 
probabhl 'Jxtenlctl f:lnance from pxivate, govexnmental, Bnd 
intez:gove:mmental SOlttces. !n this (;onnection, t>vo 
highly significant statenwnts voe:re nw.de, one by tiw 
J?re;;ident. of' t;£1<" International nnnk for Heconst:n~ction and 
Developm<mt, nue;ene Black, before the London Conferen(:e 
be<>an; and the other by the then Unit;ad i:Jtat<>s Gecretaxy ot 
State • D<lan G. Acheson, after the close of the eon:f'arence. 
I 
1 
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Eugene Black Ha£1 reported as :1aying on septombe:r 8 in Paris 
that the bank vw.s 11 vi tally interested" in the Comwon»ealth 
•>'3 program.'"" 
Cec:r<Jtary Aeheson pled,;ed full United staten; coop~Jr-
at.ion vlhBn ha spolte at 1.1. \-'lashington ne•~s conferance on 
October 11 1 1950. ·:r11e fo:rmer · .ecretary oi' state tvas 
reported as say:L'1g tl:wt the United states was in •1completEJ 
sympathy" >-Jith tl'Hl proposal :for a six~yea:r p:ros:raw.24 He 
ttlii; same objec-tive tn ScluthcH1St Asia s.nd expressed tlle 
hope ttw.t it; Nould bEl possible to dove~tan the eiTort:s of 
botll.25 
London mo0tir]c, had to base i1;s dec.tsions. One deals ~Jith 
technical as>::Lstance; the otffi r witr1 economic development. 
Both. are 5.nt<lrdspendent. For any major development in the 
Xl'lgion \•Jas likely to r<squi:rt': a very considerable arllOLUl'G of 
technical aid and tr1e:r: ,;foHl th<~ cooparati ve employment of 
teclmical abll:i.tiiJS vJould have t.o ple.y «n :lndispem;al:le 
part in tlH; over-tell prog:ram. TiHl formulation of' a 
23~choster Q:lardiau. September 9. 1950. 
24N.m:!. X£~ .:t!Jl!~, OctobGr 12, 1%0, 
2" 0 A similar sta ternent was made by George c. Iv!cGheo; 
in the Dera:rtm(:jnt of Stat<J Bulleti-n, XXIII (October ;::;o$ 
1950)~ 698-7or:--- --
:regional twon.om:tc pol:tcy f'o:r Douttwast; Asla >ms 1 the:refor e, 
ach:teved • 
. In tlHs last analysis • ·t11e Co1mllbo Plan created a 
bet\veen them and the WEwtern count:ties Ntl:l.cll can provi.dEl 
· capital o:r loam; vo:Ld o:f any poli t:i.<:<D- condi tlons. This 
would allay any f'oa:r that Western Gccnom:l.c aid v;a:J a means 
of :revlvins '·:"storn imperialism. Yet it meant also the 
imposing a political un:l.ty ''mong tl::td hm gover'.lmen·ts. 
''"monc, th.t: dif.ferllnt connt:r iGJS tu.J.dng pa:r t in tl'l.s plan, by 
sendin,1 /Wib.ns ub:roud for training, it cJ:eat<~d a supply or 
technic tans ~<litiJ. a comnopoli ·tan outlooh: who :l.n t;u:rn lJJill 
influanc<> publ:\.q opinion on partic1Har quest:!.ons 1.n tlwir 
respective cow11un.iti~::s. 
1'oo rnuo11 cannot be c.xpectec\ of the Colombo PJ.an, and 
the consoqcbncnr.l :i.n promol;iue::; a lastinb unity 1tJitl1in the 
re[S:l.on cnn he ex.r~t;c,exated. HovJcver • i.n the op1.nion of Guy 
Th<l sign:l:t'icant ach.tevement oi' th!5 Golowbo Plan has 
been to strem~.th'' n tlle count:r ie.s of the r. eg:ton 
indivldm:~.lly. He:nl, of course. it tmr:l had an effect 
upon trw stability of th~ vJl.1ole nrEJa. For the economic 
collapse of any Bin;_;le uount:ry, or revolutit>n iu any of 
them duo to economic cau:ccs, t<~ould have d<leply d.5.s·tu:rb~ 
ing consequences throtl(ShGUt ttte region. 'l'he 'Iagl:'f!S of' 
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success o.f the Plan ••• may decide wheth<:~r or not 
South !isia is to go Communist. The parcaption o.f this 
has led Communists every<ihere to attack the Plan 
bitterly.26 
activities of' ttle Unl ted Nut :lons, in scope, achievement • 
and perhaps ln Llltimt~te sit;rliflcance, are its operations in 
economic and social fields. As stated in k\rticle I of the 
Charter. the third um.jor purpose o.f the United Nations is 
the achievemont of' 
••• int;ernational cooperation in solving intel'na-
tional pxoblems oi' an economic, sociol • cultural, or 
humanitarian character • ana in promoting and encourag-
ing respect for human rigilts and fundamental freedoms. 
The Unitetl Nations ls thus concerned n()t only vlith the 
maintenance of peace but also vJi th promoting ·tl18 condi~ 
tions under 1rJilich genuine peace v<ill be possible. As c. 
Virt;ually all regional activity of.' ·the inte:rnld.tional 
agenci"s bears directly or indizactly upon the problem of 
planning for tr1e economic develOl)l!Hmt o:f the t(3gion of 
Southeast Asia. Indeed. in th6ir conferences and in 
the studies of their Bec:retariats. tt1ls is tl1e l1eart 
25v in t. !lli.. ill• • p. l<lO. 
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and marrow of their \~ork~-to arranoe for the exchange 
of vie>;,~i, i;o assemble information, to prepare analyses, 
the central Qbjeative of vJhich is to facilitate the 
planning for the econoinio development of th<:• region.27 
Accordingly then, .'•ith ''unprecedenten qnanimity," th~:; fifty-
nine me:ubers of Lilo United Nations approved • on November 16, 
1949, un "expanded pro;;ramme of t;;;ctmicul as~istance for 
l------a-eane-m-1-c-d-e-v-e-1o-pmen-t-o-f-'------u-nd-e-.r--d-ev-e:lo-p-ed-c-o-utrt:t.r-i-es-~!-th.r-ou6~h-------'- c==== 
the United N&tions and the specinl.ized ageno;i,es. This 
action by the General Assembly ~;as heralded by its P:nn;iden·t, 
carlos P. Romulo, as "one of the most constructive a<rts of 
international statesmanship ever undertak<m unde:r the 
auspices o.f the UnHed Nations."28 
Tho objective of tt1is program vJas mo6est and realistic. 
In a report prep1ued by the 13ecretary-Clenarru on teclmical 
assi:>tance to under-developed countries it said: ••The basic 
aim of outside technical assistance to under-developed coun-
tries must be to help themselves, am< to diminish tt1eir 
dependence on external a1ct.ot29 
'l'here are 'three advantages of a proo:am of technicul 
27G. Har Sclmaf, 11 Bconomic Coopera·tion in Asi& •" 
!gte:r national .iliill.~ilia tion 9 No. 4B9 (April; 1\'i50), 224. 
2BQuotocl in ••Technical As,.> is tunoe :!.'or Bconmuic D<lVel-
opment; P:ro,":ramme of' til.a United Nations and the ~lpooialized 
Agenc io s," :rntern<•.tio!!!1l, Conciliation, Ho. 489 (Jammry • 
1950)' 3. 
29uni ted Nations Docum<mi; B/1327 dat<~d ];Jay, UJ49. 
assistanc<J developed under .:.ntern<i'tiotwl auspices. :First, 
such a program allays the fears or unda:r,.developed coun-
tries tha.t attempts vJill be mnda to dominate them. There 
will exist • ttleiHfore, a receptive atmot>phare essential to 
accomplishment. A second reason is 1mccinctly expressed 
in the preamble to the Economic end Social Council Hesolu-
tion on EJconomic Development of Under-developed Cormtries: 
1\ so1.md ;ln terna tionel probrarrune of' this character 
must oombine and make use of tho experience of many 
nations .vith different soci'-'1 patterns und. cultural 
tradi ti<Jns and at different sta,;as of development, so 
as to facili ta:t;e proc_.ress in the less advanced coun-
tr i<lS and to help solve ·ttwi:r technical and <<~~orwmic 
p:ro bl0uu;. 30 
A thi1•d HHJ.son \why an inte:rnationt<l prot;;:ram may be more 
ef:tactiVti liss in the nature of meny of the problems 1n Vltliuh 
interm,tional action is essential. 
?pidemics and insect pes 'Cs • such as loeus ts • do not 
respect national frontiers. Th<lir control must be 
organized on an internat:lonal basis. sonHl otl1er 
problems are :regional. in character, traru.H:ending national 
lines us, :for example, tha technical control and use of' 
:rlve.-u; flovJing throug;h more tl:1an one country w1d the 
eftic:iant organization of' ce:t:tain transportation systems. 
In other fields inter national stand axdization and 
uniformity are :i.mpo:rtant • as for example, in the 
facilities and regulations of inte.rna tionv.l aix trans-
port and in th<J c;o11!i!9tion and classification of certain 
types of statistics."l. 
30"Technical Assistance for E:conomic Development," 
.!2£.. cit • 
31Ibi , 
_a_. 
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ECAFT:. A 1no:re determi.ooa. affo:ct to treat ttle south 
Economic Commission for AS:l.!i !ind tho Far East--S<lt up by 
r~cosoc Is \~or kind Group for aSi~:t and trw Far East mea tin;; 
at Lake i3ucaess in February, 194 7 • to parallel similar 
bodies for Bu.rop;a (EC!O and Lutin Au1erica (EGL!<). 
ECfiFI>, like the Consultative CoJ;;m:J.ttce of tile 
Colombo Plan, is interested in all plans for economic 
development in the area. •n· . n· tu- o·" ~.-. '•"'1'' '"' ·t .~.ne t:l . 1 e ._~,. .t'.;'...~J:'!...!' .-::. Mh.otS t 
ever, be understood. It is not an executive body. Its 
primary func t:t on is to g:!.ve counsel, to cond uc·t rosear cil, 
and to sugg<wt policies to goV<lrnments, but not t;o takB 
act:!.on. I.t cunnot itself execute >•Jhat j,t may :recow.llumd. 
It. is a llWX o iornml body tl1an t llo Com;ul t~;t ti ve 
Cormnittoe. !t possesses a permanent secr<;,ta;d.at, elabou,to 
!ind fairly otlstly, »hich ensures conti11uity of activity l'll'tl 
inte:r<;Ert, llecausa of the na turo c1f its very funcl;ion ECiiF!~ 
has cause\1 tl1e problems of tlle t<Jg:ton to be consicleted as a 
>·<hole. In 1949 ~ for exarnpl<> • EC.w::;, t.mde:r its Executive 
secretary, one P. u. Lokom•than, made u survey oi' the 
.f'aoto:r s and problems underlying post-1.~a:r econoro.ic develop-
ment of tho region. llli!. surve,Y,, a book of over five hundred 
pases pub15.tlhed on June ~17, 1 9•1~; • VJilich t;i ves a :f'Llll 
analysis of tile s:ti;uation in 1949• was pro-.luced in collabor-
ation amon.s ttlu 1!:CtiFE neoreta:riat at Bangkok, th<l 
I 
'· 
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Secxetariat :1t Lal;:e success, and the specialized agencies. 
Goverr'Jnents i.n the region supplied published mat<Jrial and 
some appointed correspondents to co-ordinat&l info:rmation. 
The ECAFh: necreta:riat visited most c:ount:rief; of the region 
to collect datH t~nd consult with i!,OVermnent :officers. Of 
Bulletin the follo>·iir)€; year carried an article l:Jt1:tctl hncl 
-. 
as its ttlesis and title: ugconomic nurvey of' 1\c>ia and ti:~<; 
Far E;ast Faces Healiti<:~s of' Hegional S:l.tt:tation,"Z>2 
It 1110 uld be foolish to under -rate the infltlence ol:' . 
ECAF'P~. lt c:reates a climate of opiniont and gove:rnmen'ts in 
their o1rJn actions havo; bean increasingly influ~mced by lt. 
It fosters a sense o:f :regional tlnity. ECJ\F.f has b<3eU 
called the "ecouomic }Ja.:rliament of Asltt." 
J:±l:ti• Though JJ;Ci\1'1~ :l.s .not an executive o:r gan • thG 
United NaUons does possese in the •rectmical l\S;>istance 
Board an executive a:rm. This too has been actlve in South 
Asia. Its ei'foxts nad been very much lilre thon" of the 
Colombo !?l1m. '!he individual ,:.;ove:rruuents have been aided. 
The nurnbel' of technicians in the area 11as b<HJU increased. 
"''" ;") w;;., gconomic Bu:rvey of' ASiH 
Realities of Hegional Situation," 
IX (July 0 1~150). 9-lO. 
and. ttw Far E:ast Faces 
United I'Jat:l.om1 nulletin 
;;.,;;;;;:.;.;;.;:;;; - ~----·-' 
' I 
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Ideas have b~en popuJ.a:r. :tzed. Ne>1 conct~pts have be~m 
in trod tw<;d. l\ntl the Board has helped in m: <Jatin[£ a new 
climate o.f' op:J.nion in I'Jllich all the countries of tile reg:l.on 
urgently demire to employ up-·to-date kno1riledge in tho 
solution of ~~i.l<lil' problems.. 'f.o tile extent that tl1o coun-
txies t1ave b<oGn encoi.J.:rag<cJd to believe ttw,t; the vJay to 
proe;res;; l:hls in thfiir wotl.(in;;, togetile:r, and to the extent 
that tt1e strel}6thEm:l.ng oi' ttwir economies has reduced dis-
factor. 
To be sure, the cmc\oxlying dit:"J:'icultier> oi' Elconomic 
cooperation are leg.l.on. But many of ttl'S dlff:tculties con-
.frontlne; eoonOJnic cooperation themselves oonta.in ml.tlcating 
or balancing :f'ac tors. outs tanding grounds for op tim.isrn ~&r~~: 
(1) th<~t problmns con.froni;:lng the region are quite similar 
from country to cotmtry. Since ~d.mil1u pioblems usually 
require similar solutions, tho countr:!.ofJ of th,, ragim~ 
will increa,;ingly ttu:n to ono anot.h,Jr i.n tl1<1 GVo1ution of 
concert<id ef:tor ts tov,,uxd zc;o(;nomic development. (i~) Of' 
even t;HiatGr. nisn:tficanc<l tl1.<l.l1 the poverty of I;s:ta is the 
fact that ti1e people of Asia are b<':lcomine:, avJar<J of :tt. 
FNerywtwre tlltiie is an awal;:en:i.ne:; to tl1H possibility of 
improvement. If r<Jg:l.onul. economic efforts to date 11ava 
uniformly been directed t;o'""rd tile problems of economic 
.' 
..... 
.. 
- -- -
... 
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unreasonable to suppose ttlut governments and people ~<Jill 
wish to incr <H:J.se and accelerate thBse cooper atJ.v<' ei'.fox ts. 
(3) The economies of' the .region are complem<Jt1ta:ry tvi tl:l one 
another, and complementary t:rade :l~J likeJ.y· to it1crease us 
industrializu tion procemds. Pos t-Har J~,pan, India» unci 
th"' countries of tho '<:estern pacHic cot).lt\ be o:<'Gstandln" 
examples. (4) the rise of' nationalJ,sm hau ud V<'ltlthg;es as 
tvell as ciic.adwmtHges. 1-unong the advmrt;a~ses is the 
probable impxovemt'lnt of goven1m<mt efficicmcy, notably ;Ln 
thoo e officall de~:tlint: ~lith :Lnt<l:tr!tltional and regtonal 
affairs. (5) Lvst but not least, the Un:tt.od N'J.t:i.ons and 
its :c;p,:; ci.nlized .a,:,eneies h<.wa been inc:r"asi.ng t(;ei:r 
emph<u>is on ec<Jnomic pxobl<'Jms in !lsia. the ix :regional 
<Jrgans pr<Jmot;ing rcJgio.nal me<Jtings and confe:Nmces 0 and 
their Secreturi<~ts 1snrvlng the coun·t;ries of til<;; a;rea. '£he 
result is tn.z,t countries of tlw region ~~hose rUre(lt 
relations are nlal'Ied by dist:ru.,;·t -and SUi:ipicion are m<Hlting 
at :r.egionl:ll coni\Jrences and di:;icuss ·~o tf16it mutual advan-
tage, common p:oblums upon 1rll1ici1 they vlot:tld not otlm :n11lse 
consult. 
The United Nations and th<J specialized agcncJ.es--
ECiiFR, ttl<::J Interno.t:i.on<ll Banl<: fox Hr1oons tn1otion and 
Development (.the Bank)» International Hei.'ugee Organization 
(!HO), thG :Food and Agricultural or,~anizatiun (FJ\0), the 
-~~------- -
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World Health O:rganization (1JIHO), Irrliermrtional L(-lbor 
Organization (lLO), International IifJonetary J!'und (the Fund), 
International C:!.vil Aviation Organization (CAO) & interna-
tional t:ra.inirw; centers provided UJJ,icex LJN,o;sco--in their 
regional organs and efforts, ,,;:, ,,, pOt>J€ll'ful force for 
economic cooperation. 
Since muHncipH tion in South liBia r:ame at a time 
¥ltl6ll economic conditions in most of the countries of ttH:l 
area \oiere worsening rath,lr than improving, t!Hll'e 111as bound 
to be d :tfJillusJ.onment about the ne\ll poli tloal institution:; 
111hich lvould tend to Jll~;:J,ke Goinmunism appear attractiVC'I to 
some. After ttl<; victo:rv of the Communists in China the 
• 
declaxed Under !C:ec:reta:r;y of Sta·te Hobert Nuxphy, "is the 
.faet that t;hG fall of China !.11MJ provided tho Collllmmist 
movemsnt throughout Asi&• for the first tim.e, oJlth a firm 
Asian base." ::0 All of South Asi>.1 • because of th<J des per at€ 
poverty of nm<:h of thu region, se<Jllled at that tim•' tc~ be 
.. 
41 
exposed to the Cowmunist advance. The Western potiers, 
thert3f'ore, in their. ovm interest, developed plans to 
increase their ass is tanco to th<J new governmen·ts o:i' LhiJ 
South Asia region and to J:wlp them in tile reform of their 
economic system. Besides their. participation in thB Colombo 
Plan and tho United Natj.ons agEmcles. Western gov"rnments 
have given considerable aid on a bilateral basis; otll<JI 
nations outside the area have also sought to participc' te 
in its economic developmE<nt. 
In his rnauglual. Address of J<:tnuary 20, 1949, 
President :rrum.:.n outlined four courses of il!lla:ricaxl foreign 
policy. l'hG fi.ts t course ill thd continued un.tal te ring 
support of l;i1u lJn1ted Nations und its :relf>ted agencie::;. 
The second course is tt1e continuinG. of programs for 1.io:t:1(1 
economic rscovory. The tr1ird is tbt': strengtheninG of 
;f';rer>dom-lovlng nations against tl1e dal'lgers of aggression "by 
providing mil:ll;a:ry (l.(lvice and eqtlipment to trwse nations 
VJhich v; ill 0oope:c ate vii th us in the maintenance of peace 
and security •" '£tie foLuth course of action is found in the 
portion of thu President 1 s Inuugural.hcld:ress co!llich reads: 
We mu"' t •am bark on a bold ne1rJ program for niUkit~g. the 
benefits of our scientific advances and our industrial 
proc;res:o available fo:r the .i.mprovement and ~:,:ro<Jth of 
under-developed a:reas • , • 1.ve should maJse available 
"to peace-lovin>G peoples ttl<> bGnt,fits of our store of 
technical lmowledge in ordex oo twl.p ttl<Jm :roaJ.ize 
their aspirations for a b<Ott<:~:r. 1Ue. And, in ccopexa-
tion "ith 0 t;ll<>r nat.ions, VJC should foe, ter c:api tal 
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investn1611t. in areas nc<c1aJ.ne, development. Our aim 
should be to help tho .free peuples o:f' too world, 
tluotlgh their mvn efforts, to pxod uc e more food 9 more 
clothing, more materials for housing. and more mecillin 
ical pmve:r 1;o lie;h ten their burdens. 
Apparently :ttH> chief reason for announcement of vJhat 
has siuce been knovm as the Point I•'oLu Proc;ram Mls ·t;J:lat the 
as the anHvHJr to a searcl1 for som<J dramatic highlie,ht. 
Certainly, it soon bacam<rJ clear that, as ,:rarnc;s Heston 
once said, "tht; speech pr<:cede6, the policy.••34 But 
President T:ruman•s call for a "bold new pr%:r~lllt" of aid 
to under-devolop<Jd areas aroused grc:a't interest and 
Gnthusiasm tl"u:ougl:w~ t tile non-Communist ~>'Orld. !laid 
on Point Fou:r Leg;ielation before the Fo:roign A.f'f'airs 
CoaunittoG: 
• • • the President • s ch~:,llon~ing pn;po1ml for 
h<Jlpj_ng trw masses of people of the world to improve 
ttteir livine; comil.tions nas aruused grE;at in·t<JJ:'i:Jst, 
great enthusi<lSl!l 1 and (·>reat hope throclghotlt thr.o vJorld. 
Ther<d already is evidence tbat mc,ny poopl~J in many 
countries l:wve been~Q.uiok to grasp its implications and 
its poteni;ialiti(>s.c'5 
35 
"Point 1rour l~eg1slation," ..Qj:lpartment:_ .£!.£ Stt;.ta 
Bulletin, )i:Y.I (October 10, 1949), 5:12. 
--~·------· - . 
!.11 a speech in New Yor !\. in ~Iay, l'iHSO$ George v. 
fl11an. Ml:;istLm·t Decreta:::y for Puhlio .Affaira in t!HJ :.it~:>.t.e 
1'be:r.t:~ J.?:as obv.i.oLtsl;! bott1 :-JfJl.:f'1!3hnBS~I ~-j.,n£1 Et.lt:ruin:m 1n 
~~r. ·rrmmm •t; TJropot\Sil. It \•iUS sel!ish boaau!:H'l • # • 
thfi p<mae of t~or1d <J.nd th1:1 :Jamu$.ty <>i' t.t<e Unit,ld 
c--------.:E_:-t-a:rt-~:r~_,:-tltJ]~·:-(:rntlS11J.fO:n-tl'1fi::-1.'H.'fl-1-i:rt·rlrl60f'-t:;11t) tffl1f<?rt ... tiT~VGli-; __ ;;--------===== 
op~ld naL.l'.ons. 
en tho t<;th-&;;r hhnd, tllis plan ltHi~.~ fJltrtli;~rti<t b<~oa.LlSG 
ttl<l unUod 3t<•tes .,,~;s not aoel>:1nt, tmy politV•al favors. 
It VHJS ~iski:ng no .I:Jl'i vilai._1eS for: imH~rric~t~n tn:uslnes~:. 
e;riilat~,;r Lli<JJl thosa accorded to bus1n.ess111en i'rorr1 any 
othGr CGtU1try~ And t-.l'H~ United St;att1S WUS VJll1iil,b to 
<:ont:d.buj;;~;J mox e tt-.;Jn :i. ts proport:Lom1 ta <lha.re in thi:.; 
].
·1¥1'"': ,-,.~, "'"'!} ,:JD 
.. .r..vqJ..<A .. u""• 
bv 
" 
said: 
~ It ~ JJJJ~t,tjc,x emx.J:&nsls 1~~ to be pltH.::ed upc.n th:U-3 ty})<i 
of ncl:iv5.t;y. \dhat hO.VB he<m th<.> scattcl!G(i ~>.ctivit:l.ldS 
of bm.iin<::;s nnd t,~ove:r.nmnnt ttl1B t«> bH br<H.1;c;ht tou;ethu: 
and m~dlli:l ,a me~lo.r pn:r·t <lf om: i'GXIidgn pol1c:1es. :tt is 
import~trJ'tt tc fttte.ek t.t .. tt:: p:robJ.·,·,:-u;. f~~J a \ihoJ~~~ ··:;.ncl tQ 
tlndnrf1ttuld ·that toohn1cn1 :;~s~·d .. st;nrH~I.3· c:;.nd O\l\1:XBBt.lS 
d(-3\i(tlc;nmt3nt~ vJllJ have. connttJ.ntly inc;rtoag1ng :lrn_po.rt.ancls 
for Jndiu:s to QtJltte,.'::S""/ 
Do iJ o G thr!d (auly 4, 
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• • • Hid tllu effor·t;s or thH peoples of economically 
unda:rdevelop~;d areas to develop their resources and 
improve tt1t1ir ;,;or kin:; (mel l:Lv:ln3 condi ti.ons by encour-
aging trH; exclmr~ge of technical kHOvlledge and slcills ali\ 
the floN of investmant o<:l]jit;(tl to count:r:ies \1ll1.ch 
provide conditions under vlW.oh such technical assistance 
&nCi C!.ipl tal can effectively and oonstructiv,sly eon tri-
bute to rais :l.ng standards of living, creatine nev; 
sour cas of' vJoal t h, incr· c;asing J,JXoduc tiv:t ty lJnd expand ... 
ing purchasing povH>r. 
laterul "technical cooperation" pro5rams, and dlrected the 
President to set up macl1inery for uiministre:t;.ion and 
coordination. including 1:irl advisOIJ' boar(l \~it, h :r.apresunta-
tives of' private indt~stry. 
In November, 1950 0 Gordon Gray, vJho had been aslwd by 
President Trumtifl "to study l;ho vJhole complex of' om: :foreign 
l'<lltJ tio:Js," I<upo:rted thut aid to under-developed 0lHlas \~as 
"more impo:ctant than ever to tho seom:ity and Vlell-beinb of 
"formulated some promising economic measures •1i til respect 
to these areas," they '1l1ave not been pressed 11ith the vigor 
th.at thG sttuHtion requires, arxl tl:wy have r!Ot yet been 
fused into a sufficlontly effecti.ve program. 1140 
President Trumar; next asked tha Internutional Develop-
40Goxdon Gray, !iGport to th" President on Foreign 
Economic Policies (I ashin,,:, ton, D.C. : Go vermuent Pr inti no 
Ofi'ice, 1950), PP• ti, 9. 
citizcms headed by Nelson Rockefeller, to consider G:ray•s 
proposal" "as its first task." In March, 1951. th0 :Board 
issued a s:l,;nii'immt repol't Which ;vas as bold in its con-
caption as tile Gray Heport and WcliCh Bpell~lll out its 
recO!lllllEmdations in much greater deta:tl, The Hockef'eJJ.er 
Board v;as careful to ernplu.owize that trw prot::;tarJ! of aid to 
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under-developed ar0as vms an ef;sential contribution to the 
promoti-on of LUOH:I stable economic conditions i.n t.ile 
vlorlct.4l 
of Senator Taft that it ;,iould become a kind of global \!Pi> 
pro,;:ram and "a pormunent policy of givln12, our X11oney a<,Jay. "42 
The Executive continued to tallo:r. its :requests fox }'oint 
Fou:r to the d lmG.nslons Ntllch Con.:s:r(>SS WOLUd tolerate. Both 
1>Jithtn am1 <Jith.out the Government there tms st:ron;;; feeli11g 
that the United BttJtes should raise its stghts in this area 
o.f' its foreign policy, bottl because I\merican na:tionel 
interests vwu1d btJSt bfJ served by a t:rr11y bold prot;ram oi' 
4l"PEtl:·tne:rs h1 Pro2,HlSo.;&" R8po:;:t o.f' M1o President 1 s 
Irrtern6.ti.onal LcveloplJlent Advisc;ry Board (l;astlington, D.C.; 
Gov,n•nment P:rintirg Office. l95l), p. 63. 
42~ York ',Ci!J!!lll, June e, 19fJO. 
43,JIJmes f, Vial'CUXg, Ji:Oint Four: Our Gllanca to itchieve 
Peace v:ithout Fear (\,·i&shingtoo_; D.c.: ilutllor 1s Publication, 
1949). p. 98. 
4'7 
:Foreign Holat:Lc:ns on tho Point Four Leg;:i.slat;ion, SccJ:etary 
of state Dean G. Acheson tee; tif:l.ed as follolh;; 
We c:re spending billlons :for military defense--
as vle must. ','Ja axe spend irJL other billions for econ-
omic reconstn<ction ln Europe a.tYc vl'tal po:.tnts in tl1e 
l"ar Bast-··as we must. v;e are or,;aniz:.tns jo1nt defense 
·through tlw North Atlatltic Treaty Organization Hnd the 
r--------ll1:t.L:tt-arp>ssist.unce J?:ro,;ram. l~e are organizinc:, jointo------c---==== 
action to removo trade barriers through ·tar:lfi' and 
.reclprocal trade aii;re<Jments and t;hroug;h thr.; Interna-
tional Trade Org<cnization. U3 Ul'll attempting to Xffi1tOVa 
the CG!UE,es of intsrnatton;,l friction and .misuuderstand-
Lng by playinc; <Ul active rol"' in thD United Nations. 
All thiJSs tl'linc,s >ve do a:r <:, in the lust; annlysiz • 
measure of nation~cl security ••• 
The legislation th!it ts before you, this ''Act fo:r 
Int.:.:u:nutionu.l DDvelopmentn has tl:.t.:J same b.road }.iU.tposo. 
In a very real sense, it lEi' a security mel;sure. And 
as a sect:t.rity maasn:re. it is un i.:J:nlenti::~l uru cf ou.:c 
foreit,n rctJlicy. • • 44 . 
Pres:i.den t •rruman, f'or ·his part, also declared in an 
address before the annuaJ. convention of the icllH.l! lean NevJs~ 
paper Gu:tld in \'Jashingtonf D. c,, on June ~.6. 1950: 
• , • >Ve must not b<> misled in't;o tl1inking tl:J.ut our 
only ta2:>l:t: ls to cteate de.fennrJ:~~ t:tt~uinst. a ... ;<~rasnlon. 
Our l·llwle ptupo~H:J in c:ceatillL a r:trong defonse is to 
ptirm:l.t o1S to carry on ti:Hl gr0at construct:tve tast-es of 
peace. Behind the shield of a strong dei'ense, we 
ml\st contimle to Norlc k bring aboqt battEn' living 
conclitlons in 'btle free nations •••• In a Norld dark 
111itll amu:etwnsion, th<J Po:tnt Fonr idea offers ne>J 
hope ,4!5" 
. CHAPTJm III 
"Asia is conscious of' herself, ~~nd the Asiatic 
Century h<J.s begun." Witti these t~ords Robert pay no, an 
.lims:r icun jourrwlis t and teacl1e:t, clot;es llis book on the 
Revolt .2[ i;slan an event vlhich he describes in 11j.s opening 
senten;;e as "the gr(;latest singlH event in hUman history. 111 
\rirites !,in Yutang in a book titl<ld, Bettveen I!!~ .!l:llii 
Laug,htor, "The enleXgence of i;sia--and I think of' Hussia 
as half-1\siatic--is the one gxeakst single fact of tllis 
tmr," a ph(>.nomenon tvhich rHl descrlbes as "simply iG£_ !i!Jl\1 
of tl1a ere of emperialism. Nothing is going to stop it. u2 
---- - ' 
HovieV<.>r much one may quo,;tion th"se am ottwr 
similar intc;rp:r:etations, tr& fact is, as OvJen Lattimore 
emphasized in .IB§. §ituatiou.J.!! ~. that the greatest of 
the continents is nm• "out of control, 110 Another Ilsian 
observer, ''lt appears to me, 11 decl<u:ed Pxime Minister 
Kotela~mla o.t' Ceylon in l9f>5 before the 'ilorlti Affairs Council 
·-----
lnotert Pa"ne, ·.rne nevolt of Asi~;~ (New York: Jbtln 
"' -- --Day, 1947), p, 1, 
2Lin Yutan.g, Betvw<m Tears ancl l,.aughte:r (NHifl York: 
John Day Company, 1943), p. 20. 
'7. . 
0 QvJen Lattimore, Ih!!. Situatio!) 1!1Mia (Ne\~ York: 
Little, .B:rown and Company, 1949), r p, 3-lz-:----
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of l\1orttl6Xn Californi<t, "that t!le social revolution in Asia 
has not s·till. been fully grasped by the majority of people. 
partioulDrly. may I submit. in this paxt of the world. , ,"4 
Asia is assuming a nevi ond more significant role in world 
politics. James A. M.iohana:r dasc:ribes the voice of Asia 1~• ___________ a~s------.--.--.--o_n_e __ <_lf---ti-l~--,-n_n_o_"_t __ s_i_g_·n_if _ i_c_a_n_t __ v_o_i_c_~-~s--5-.-n--th--e---------------====== 
~ l~orJ.d today. On \>hat happens in J",s:la rnay depend \>hat 
happens a fEnJ y<m:rs from no111 to p6ople in Frunce and 
So11th ilfrica and ttlc; United States.t> 
'l'tuJ "revolt of M:iia" llWl.Y provo t;o b€ ttH> most signi-
ficant event of tile t~amtieth century. F·or events and 
forces t~nich aro absorbing th<J at"t;ention of thB .:es·be:m 
tVorld tQday, 1r1tum compared in :retrospect, may c;ppear ·to 
British ilistorian [md cat~tions prophet, in nls monumental 
volu.m01 ventures the pn;diction that evcm the chullongo of 
Communism 
• • • may come to se0m a small af'.t'air t;hcm the 
proLu.bly far more potent civilizations of India and 
Cld.n"' respond in their tt1:rn to oLu Wes'cern challen._;e, 
--·-----
4!\ddre<Js of Sir John Kot€la\1aJ.a. Pl'ime Minist,er of 
Ceylon, before the Vio:rld Affairs Coum:il of Norttwrn 
Califonda; printed in 'J,'he Couno:ll Q.P.~li,~ht, (January, 
1 ,,,.,., . 4 
.:!.lO • .P• • 
5James 11. ~~lichsnex, l:lli! Voice.£!',~ (Ne\!J York: 
Bantam l'looks~ l95l)g P• l. 
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In the lol'JG .run tl:l<JY seem li::ely to produce much 
deeper effects on our \':estern life ghan Russia ann ever· 
hope to produce \vith h<:r Communism. 
After indicating in a brief and slretch.'· manner .the 
shlfting scene in M>ia, 1116 shall next conside:r the Mlian 
background of SE:iiTO starting with "The l\1ew H<lgionalism." 
I--------------~1 •. TIHi}-N-EV:-H-BGl-0N-;.tb-:X-8-Mi·- -------------==== 
There are both centrif'tlgal and centl'ipetal fo:rces 
to flsian regionalism. Of the centripetal forces--those 
that tend to facilitate cooperation among the countries of 
Southeast Afiia--particular note should be given to thG 
peculiarly St;tpra~nntional, almost non-national. character 
of nationalist movements in tt10se countries, th<> imperative 
of common action to obtain neces sa.ry outside ass is tnnce, 
someti1ing a]')J,lroaclling a common standard of living, the 
absence of a, singlc1 dominant po~Jer, and thEi rapid march of' 
totalitarianism. 
Pacific Union. Pe:rllaps tho clettl:est exalliple of _..._ __ _ 
r<1gionalisJJJ in the Pacif'ic area j,n the po~;rt-wa:r lrHiS ·tlw 
proposed Pacii'ic Union. Users of' tho te:rm "Pacific Union," 
6Arnold J. Toynbee, Civilizati£9. .QB Trial (London: 
Oxford Un:!.vers:tty Press, 1948) 0 p. 221. 
Unit-ed r:ttJ:.H;, 0 CHrl(-_;,da.D bustr.tJ.litlo N~.n~ z.stll\'j_!}d t tht~'i Philip...-
pines .• Great l'lr:tt6il1~ the !S.atb~Jlclt:ctldl'l• Jap<tt1 <md 'l'hn1l<HKl ... 7 
l:ums:lve treatwmrts o! t!K' pos<;ibiliti(Jf> of re,;i"m'l:!.s1;; ir; 
ttl.e Pacific L'<X<icla <mLi :tn !\mill i",Sl'le:r~llly .~:~ li. y,;. J.\,b(md tl{Jltls 
l;,s~-:~o,,i~:_tt~lcn of Nt~.t~ic~nr B n 
1~142)? 7l.,..H6. 
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desire to p:resent a more uni tod front to tl1~ gro~>Jing menace 
of Communi.sm in J\sia ~ to establish a common defanse plan Bnd 
organization, and to. associate the United .states in such an 
undertaking, This idea is suggestec\ in X6Jnt.otrks vJhich 
President Elpidio Quixino of the Philippines addressed to 
'the United States Senat,e on August 9• 1949: ~~~----------------===== 
• • • today the most urgent pxobl8lll thn t confronts 
the Ph1lipp:ines and the otl'lfJ!' free countries o.f ll.sia 
is the problmn of seou:rity •• , • No one ••ho realizes 
the extent of the ID€mace to v;hi.ch :isia is exposed ••• 
can ~Jell afford to :rest at ease no'" that tllo North 
Atlantlc Pact is in full force and affect. u.s:ta With 
its vo.st population ••• and ~rlith its l.ncalcula'ble 
resources, cannot and out not to be lost; t<J com;:,unism 
by default.lO 
1\>Jo other outstanding advocates of Pac1fit~ Union, 
obviO\~S reasons emphasized the importance of "Orgr;.nizincs 
the Pacific P"Wples in t!1eir fight agt"<inst commt.:misrh," to 
Zealand, 'l'twiland, and J apl:ln Jmve also favm: ed some ld.nd of 
a Pacific dBfense pact~ In July, J.9f)O, th~J comm:tttee on 
I''ore ign Affairs of tile United Btates House of Hepresenta-
tivas ~ in a volcuninous report on tbe Hlil1ta:ry assb tance 
program~ unanimously emoxsod proposals for a mut~:~l de.f<mse 
109.2fJ&r;:_ssional. flo cord --f3enate, .i,ugu st 9, 1949, 
p. 11032. 
~=~=~------ -- --
54 
pact for tl>:; Pacific area, patte:cnad after tile North 
Atlantic 'rreaty • in >~hioh 'l:h!:J United i3tates 'i!Jould partici-
pate .11 In Januax;y ~ 1952, Governor :l.'homas g. Dewey of Ne~J 
York, aftGr a tour of the Far ~East, publiul~' advocated "an 
agreement now vii th as many of the Paclf:l.c n.s. t}.ons aml our 
other allies ciS ~Vill join fer the mutm\l defense o:t' the far 
PacH'ic. nl2 
Southeast l>Sia Union. 
-------
The most specific and geo-
graphically tl1e most limited proposal i'or P<owific Union is 
for a Southeast _;,sia Union to promote tllr.J common political, 
economic. aud cul'!;ural interests of tho stat;cc;s of' th<:.'t; 
area. In 1946~ K. ::anth&nan wrote on "A H<Jgiont:.l Authority 
!'or 13outh-Eas t L1;;;ia 9 '' \vhloh Stt::,1;0st1ld an outline of' a 
regional organization for Sou the:ast llsia ,13 Presumably suctl 
a union >1oulc1 att(1mpt ·to assist the peopl!ls of. southeast 
Asi.a to bett<Jr their condit:i.ons of life and to prepare 
themselves f'oJ: greater f:r.eedonl and greater :responsibiliti.<Js, 
thereby, :lt is tloped. bolstEJ:ring thG :rogion alih:e t.gs.irwt 
--·-----
llN;:n~ Xorlt ':rilllHS, July 12, l%0. 
---
l3:tn K, 1•'l. Plmiklmr, et al. , Hegiowelinm ~ 
Securit;t (J"onilon: Oxford University Pross, 1949) 0 p. 25. 
-
-
... . .. 
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bottl the; menac<l of persistent colonialism and the threat of 
mountint& Communist pressures. 
Probably, the cl1ief' sponsor of a f}OllthGast Asia 
Union >·Jas President. Jllpidj.o quir :Lno of' the !?.hilippines, \'Jho 
~Jas also the Jl'ey mover in most otho:r projects relating to 
Pacific Union. He lost no opportunity to promote this idea. 
He entrusted G<>rlos p. Homulo with the tasll: of visiting th<> 
otll.,r countri<:s of South<>ast Asia to attempt to e;ain support 
for trw pxopo~;ed union. In the sruu6 address he made to the 
belief' that 
••• trw free countries of southeast hsia and the 
PacLfic must tt1emselves start ttw movemcmt for closer. 
cooperation in :t'urtl1<3rance of tllo:lJ: common interasts in 
the political. • economic • and cul ttual fields; 
but he is <.<lE;o stressed the need for outside encouragement 
and aid • spocif:tcally endorsing President TILlman'~' Point 
Four program and the United Nation•s p:ro,.;nun of' tecimic:al 
assi<' tance to under-deVE::loped c ount:r:ies ~ and expr <;ssing 
ttto hope t;he;t v;hen a paci:f'ic Union was orom:tzed• ''the 
United st;at<JS a nil tixl otho:r democracies sl:lotJld desire to 
offer such help as shotlld lie in their po\·Je:r to give." 
President Quirino also :l.nvited countries of souti1 Asia 
inte:reBtecl in formin_; <mch a union to a co.nfe:rence at Bae;uio 
Ci.ty to take "~I"ll> necessary first steps. 
I 
ti6 
Daguio Confer,moe. May, l:W• 'l'he :res>.:tlts of the 
Dabuio Conference held in the Philippines in lute Nay, 1950, 
Philippinas, t:no Thuil"'-nd--.ag:reed ou of r esolut:i.ons 
for r<.>g1ona1 coopel·ation in economic, soc:ial, and culttu•al 
. prog:ram:J, and exchanged vievJS informally in closed SI2S:oions 
on matters of mutual interest; but largely on the irlsis-
tenoe of India and Indonesia • the Conference avoided 
public decla:ratiorw or commitments of a political nature 
a1 togettlGl: .14 1'hus the :Saguio Conf<nence tends to confirm 
l1/oxner Levi 1 s assertion that the aim of the sta t';s :tn t.ilis 
area "has been to demonst;rate the degree of ;,\sian solida:r-
it.Y xattwr tt1an to point lAP ttlo many di1f:i.c11lties t>till 
cont.rontin2, "th6 establishment of an Asian Union.ul5 F'o:r 
political r<11asons no ofi'ioid represen·tatives from Indo-
China. Chine•• o:r Korea ~un:e invited to the Conference. 
:Bu:rma ace opted the invitation to at tend, but beet: use of 
cilli.ng<:w in th<J goVElrnment did not send a dele,;ation. Tile 
conferentJe J'uilod to accept a Philippine proposal fox a 
permanent o:rganiz~:.-tion; instBad, it cw:rely decided ttlB.t 
-------
(June 
14•t Sitting :tt ot~t; Baguio Confexence, •• .CoiUI£Omvsal, LI 
Hi.• 1950), 237. 
15vJe:ms:r Levi, "Union in Jwi<:~?" ~}~astern Surve:r:;, 
XIX (Augcwt 16, 1950) 1 148. 
- . 
I 
Carlos P. homulo• the President of the Conference and then 
Foreign l!!inister of tlc Pililippines, st1ould sxplore the 
ros,; ibiliti<J" of action of' this so:r t. 
President Quirino ntated in a press intexvh;VJ that 
I tl18 feoiin~ oi' t.he dslegat"s• :representing n part oi' the 
~~----------w_o~r_l_d __ w_h_1_.c_·r_l_v_Ja_s __ a_"1_r_e_-_c_tl_y~·-J_n_e_n_a_c_e_d __ b~y __ c_.o_m_w_·•u_r_li_s_m~•-'_"a_-__ s __ t_h_<,_t ______________ ======= 
"by getting to~;<,th.;;r <md cooperating in mu·tually improving 
economic <:Y.ld social condition!:> ''"' eontribute to solution 
of the Communist problems of 0aoh nation. ,;16 In his latest 
book, grusa.da J...u ~. I\OL1Ulo 1r1rota that the mee·titl£; closed 
\•lith the tldoption of t;his p:r inciple: 
That ln the conslderation of tile spGcinl probh;ms of 
foutheast Lsie ttw point of' vis<i of HJB peoples of thi.s 
area be p:romlmmtly kept in mind, by any ccnf<nences 
dealinG \·Jitll such problems, so ·ttJ.at better unde:rstanuin~> 
end eorc:U.&l relations may subsist between ·the cguntrios 
in the :reglon il.tKi ocher oountritJs of t.rle <JOrld.:t.'7 
In s urnmin,c; Llp tl1e results of the Baguio conferencli.l, a 
friencU:1 lunerican couespondent 1rJXote: 
Perhaps the most important aspect of t.llu Con:L'e:renoe 
was its m~H1ifest;ations of IE;gional solidarity and. its 
vaunting of ptueJ.y .1-ls:!.atj_c vi.et;s f;nc\ lntcJ:rests. 
-- ----
' 16quoted in the ~York Times, l\1ay 28, 1950. 
l7carlos P. Romulo, Cru~ in £;§.1!' (NeloJ Yorl-'c: 
John Day Company, 1955), Chapter VIIY. 
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Delegat;BS all emphasize that the free informaL closed 
session exchanges of opinion on many matters decic•ively 
promot.(>d mutual understanding and f'utllre cooperation.18 
Vlo:rld \:Jur II ended 111 itt! the compl Hte sliH,ina tion of' 
a groat povier alliance--thE• Thixd Heicil, Italy • and ,Japan-~ 
and. the serious ;;e<Jkening of components of anotner 0 notably 
Franca ami Great Britain. \:orld leadersnip thUs la.rgely 
devolved upon the United Dtatos and the Union of [;oviet 
Social:ts t H<apilblic s. \'Iittwut uttemptins 'the discustiion of 
that the very nature of' Soviet polic:!.es md st:rat~;gy. ~~hen 
consistently pu:rsuad~ 1•as largely respousiblG for bringing 
on the ''cold ••ar." Consequ<mtly • forms of cooperation in 
the international community of necessity began to take 
shape in agresm<mts and pacts of :regiorml nature. 
Pl.'obably more than any other, t;he man most instru-
mental in laying d.ovm thd ml~l :t.'oundatiorm of secuxity in 
southeast ,,s:ta is ttK' preSG!lt .Secretary of state--John 
Foster Dull<:Js. ~Chase efforts took him four y~;a:rs and f!is 
--·----
31, 
18Tillman Durdin. dispatch from btl.anila, da'ted Nay 
1950; in the t\fe"W York Times. June 1, 1950. 
- ' 
.. . 
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m:l.s,;ions 11 :l.nvolve<l. crossing the Pacific tvJelve times,ul9 
Concer nine; his efforts • Secretary Dulles has sait1 : 
The position of the United Btat~as tmw.:rd collective 
security in southtiast Asia has been knol•lt1 basi.c!illy for 
quite a 10116 <lhiJ.e. In fact, it really 6 oes back to 
the time VJ11(;Jn l t<fmt out to the Far E:ast in Janwuy, 
1951, on a mis:.-ion to try to c:reatt~ a collective 
c;ecur i ty pact in thht area. Ttlut ef':fvl: t fccd.lf:ld at trwt 
time in ctle Sf:lnse that vie vle.re not able to nut to.<:.ether 
,, -IC--------·a-co-1-1-e-c-t-1-Ve-s-ecu-r:_'l--t-v-a-r_:_l~at:t~emen-t-o-i~u-ny-1a-I,_g-e-px-opor--·-----=== 
tions e.nd we ended with a series of ~;eparate pacts, one 
with ,Japan, one vlith Australia and NEn> Zealand, and 
another lvith tkle Philippines.20 
On March 20, 1952, the Senate of tlliii United ~.>tates 
approved th" adherence of ttle UnHed Sta'tGS Governnwnt to 
f'Olll' treaties • namely: the :rroaty of Peace with Japan; 
Security 1'x eaty bet;vem1 tho UnJ.ted stat!ls and ,Japan; b·tltual 
Defense l'rc&ty bet1~een the United States and tiH,; Phi.lip-
pines; ~:rnd the becurity Treaty bet',Je<m Australia~ Ne>u 
Zealand, and the United .St<'<tes. These four 'treaties 
provide ttw ne.v i'oumations for seecu: ity ttuou.,,i:10ut an 
important sector of t.he free ••or ld cou~rn.unity. "They con-
----
l9m1dress of J'ohn Foster Dulles on 11 [lecurity in the 
Paoi:fic •" bef'or e th~a Los Anc;elrHJ v:orld Affairs Council, 
Los .1\ncolr>s, California, June 11, 19~)4; printed in trw 
Q!lnartmrmt, 2.£ State Publications No. 20 (\HiShington, D.C.: 
June, l954), p. 1. 
20Radio and television address to the nation o.f ,John 
Foster Dlllles on "TtHl Xc1anna pact m1d the Pacific Charter"; 
printed in ttw Department of St~:l't;e Illllletin, XXX (April 26, 
1 °"4) 8"'"' .,..,, t ~h)e 
important link in the collective secLtrity of the treG 
nations of southeast <Win and the Pacific. "21 They also • 
in the woxds of the ~lena te Committee on For ej.gn Helat:tons 
••• cormtitute an impoxtant contribution tovmrd 
clarifyina~ lihe position o.f the United states in the 
Pacific. They are logical and das:l.xable stGps in · 
liquid£rtirJg ttw old war and strengt;henirlii, th<J fabric 
.. 
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of pe~ce in the Far East against the dan6 er of a ne,; 
}----------"Jat-•-""2"' •.__------------~----------- ------==== 
:rhe four closely :related Pacif':i.c treaties are b'3tter 
understood if they are viovJed as one nmlt;ilate:ral peat1e 
settle!;H;nt and three supportinG. mutual d<J.fense p<,cts. The 
main ;..urpose of tre Japanese Peace Treaty c;<W, as thcl E'tiln<i 
,_Senate Gom .. mit.tee :repo:ct stated; 
• • , the; termination of' the ·•w:r in the J1'a:r Last tend 
·the restoration of Jar.lUn to th4 G t1;1tus of an ind€.pendant 
sovereiun nation, 'I:lla treaty contains prov:ts:i.ons for 
such matters as secux:tty and territorial au:.<:~.nbem.srrts, 
trade and CO!lllll<arce, :rephrations and pxopsrty rights •• 
• • i\ccompany:tne; the peace traaty are,' tJ:u:ee col.lM.te:ral 
racts 1·mich provide collect:!. ve SEHHlr ity a:c.rangements 
.for the Pacj.fic ••• 'l'll<1sa three pacts constitute an 
inte~ral part of' the peace settla1n<mt in the Far .:~ast. 
r·leusur ed aguinst the need for collective secr.u:tty 
throughout the vast areas of non-Gowmunist Asia, the 
security waasu:res wt1:tct1 accompanied the J'apancsa piWCe 
21LEJtter of transmit;tal of President J~isonhO\rler to 
the United States fl<mate on ti1<> Eoutheast Asiu Goll<H.:tive 
Defense Trc;aty. and th0 Protocol to SF:AGDT: :!.n tho lff:.P"tl-
~ .9£1?.~~ Bulloti.!h XXXI (November 29, 1954), '9. 
- b "'"'Qu.oted in "Background, 11 Department of St<:ite Pu ~ 
licationei, No. 4~)56 (ViashirJciton. JJ.c·.: April7""19t32), 2. 
txeaty are far from pexfeot. As Gec:wto.:ry Dulles .himself' 
stated, 
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, • • these treaties also recoJnize, and were cited, 
that they 1·1e:re only a beg:l.nntng-~only initial st<lpS 
toNard tho development of a more~.(!O!llprehensive system 
of' security in tiw Pacific a:rea.;;;.3 
And senator vialter F. George of Georgia, Chaiman of tho 
sentiiDent ~:hen llo declared in congressional debntes over 
the 'Whole ques1;ion oi' collect:!.ve security in 'trw pacific. 
that ttwse ·t.roaty &rrangoments ''rJere 11ot :ragaxded as dei'ini-
tive solutions of the racific defEHme problem." And <tdded, 
•
1'Xhey exp:nkc.;ly contempluted the dev&lopn!ent oi a moxa 
comp:rehens i ve collective· security sys t<Jru 11<hen d.rcl1mstances 
made that feasible."24 HO\iGVer~ these treaty a:rrange1nents 
g:reu tly ~;idoned tt1e area of united uction fo:r def<mse in the 
Pacific and u,av<1 rise to th•J hope that "they ~iill open the 
t•lay for a ne1r1 era in tho Pacific~" to Llf!e former necr otary 
'rhos story of vlhat trJElse ue;JCessities are 1 and hovJ 
these anan:.:,em<mts ihS~lt them, ls :revealed in ttw ~;volution 
of the four tre£t'ties anci a study of the lHM :relationships 
which VJil1 result f:rolll them. 
2-4cot1f:,r<Jssio!li\1 Eecord--Senate, February 1, 1955, 
P• 693. 
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Pacifio <;actui t:z and ,lliJ?an. 
Japan occLrpitiS a st.rntegiz;o pos tt:ton in the Far J:;&st; 
1 t has a large, energetic, and skilled pOpl.llation; it 
:J.s .tho only industrial rmt:con in tt1e F~:r E<ist; and it 
lias athM:t:r:t the />mexican defense line in the pacific. 
• • • A free, pxo spe:r:our:. ~ ~:md domoc:ra·t:tc Japcn (JOtlld 
exert un important stabil:tzirt.; influence in the Far 
B{lSi;~~~ 
So stated the Senate F'oreign Helatlons Commlttee to the main 
QM. body of the E;enate."'" "Russia \Jill Lose PoHer as Germany 
and Japan Gain," is tlw th<Jm<l of an r,dclress made by ;;snator 
with China fo:t' control of th,~ tvealth of Hanclmria 11 ; t!l<m 
\iill come the day 11 \·ihen our R11ssian f':r.lends ~<ill c;,o back. to 
will be :r.e-establisl1o<J a pm>er g:r.oup in th'" Far Et,si; ttwt 
Will ,:;iva somo stabi1lty to that a:rea~n26 In the eyes of a 
geopolitictan, ",Japan !101>\1 connt:ttutes tile las·!; link :tn the 
chain to be drawn around ttuJ Glliua and Giberian cou:o:ts ln 
- .. ---·-
25Qtwted in "Background •" !2£• cit. 
26t;ddress of' Senator Halter F. GE10rge on "Rus,,ia i!lill 
I,ose POVlSl' as Ge:nnany &'1d Japan Gain, 11 to tl1e Awe:r:l.can Society 
of New~;paper i!ilitors in I;Jash:l.ngton, D. G.; in the Jl!li.~ 
Stateo> Ne»s uml V.iorld ,Hc""o""n"'o:::.r.;;.t, XLIII (Wlay 6, 1955). 78, . 
-------- ., 
Japan the soviet Union ''iou.1d b.o ~nvincible. 
'I'he return of Japan to tho world community as u fxee 
:,.;;:,,:r···:, .. :. 
and sovereign nation 1ms an (W<imt \\ikich v;as long awaited. 
United statecl Government had begun to phm for th:: occupa-
tion of Japan.26 Even then the H:!:m of the Unit.ed States 
its full :r esponsiblli tics as a m<!imber of the commll.nity of 
natio'ns. Tho occupation plnns ~tJt,ue developed to facili.tate 
this aim.29 
tion mission l1t\d been la:r gely accouJplisherJ.. In i'!.!l:r cil~ lHL17 • 
·General l'll<"cArthur l:innounc;;d that it vias time fm: tl pGtHHJ 
treaty to Le uoncl•lded, 30 In the :mmu year the United 
Sto.tl:ls had propos ad a confe:rence to d iscm,s the prermration 
of a pea<:e settlern~mt vlitl1 Jap6.tl but tl'te proposal f£til<ld 
because of Sov:l.ot non-Gooperat:!.on. 31 
By S<lp't·amber, 1950 0 the pos:!.tion o.f the \Jn:Lted states 
in :regard to ttlB p:r Gposed treaty had been sati:,factorily 
established. Jol1n F'oro ter Dulles, ti1en consultant to ~he 
------
30Tb' Q 6"0 ~·~ p. o lit 
31~~~·• PP• 631-32. 
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secretary of ;;'tate, vJas place :i.n clla:rge of the project or 
negotiatinG a peace treaty ;;ith Japan. 
Tht' net;rJtiations that followed lire not wlth:ln tho 
scope of thi.s paper. But 14hat 15 of' interest Nill be the 
attitude of tho countries in the Pacific area--the fact 
that it vHiS natural i'or them to have :reserva.tions about 
Japanese seli'-def'ense privileges. The PhUippines xecallod 
vividly the t!u:ee long years or brutal occupation. 
Australia and Nevi Zealand had rw desire to rlsk. !'-gain the 
anxious moments of 1942 VJhen the1J: very existance as 
independent nations 111as in grav10 peril. lrihen th1> Dulles 
Nission visited th<Jse count:r.i<JS in £Elr1y 1951 0 tt1e concern 
over a possible rebirth o.f' a militaristic Japan lfJas fol:ce-
fully expressed to the l'liSfiion.3E It was at ttlis time 
fo:r1rJaru the Sc1~:>g<:H;tions \vllic t1 led to 'ttwi:r s10our 1 ty t:r eaty 
>vlttl 'tlle United Stutes. They sugges·ted to the Dulles 
Mh>sion that at1 ar:rangetu<.mt be made be tHe en th<>rli:Jel vos and 
the United states vJh<sreby each of th<J three nations t·wuld 
agree to act to meet any common dangox i.n the Pacific. •••:rtte 
~'l'Ofesso:r o:f Pol.i.tlc;; at the UnivE;rs:t ty of .Melbou:r.ne, and 
.. : 
---------
. 
..... 
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author of Nationalism and Communism 1!.! aast .!wi~.::., 
\;as then presented as a safeguard against tlw :risks 
inherent in tiw peace treaty w:tttl Japan. 11lh:Lch put no 
restrictions on l1er. armament. But bafo:re long ;t·t 
Nas rep:es!(lnted as a safeguard aga:i.nst Communist 
expanBion )$3 
:rt c;as ·the feelirJ;.;, of theee nations, expxossed at 
that time, tha'G their capacity to continuo to accept 
.... 
----------------------===== 
commitments f'o:r th;; preDervation of psace anywtun:e in t.rHJ 
world vJOuld necessarily be conditioned by the existence of 
rela tlonships in tile Pocif';Lc comwu.ni ty af.!:'o:rdsd by t.cw 
mnerg;ence of a ,Japan desi:rons of' assumtng u :responsible 
security r o1<1 in the area presented several oppolituni tics 
for arrangements i~tl ieh v;ould nultually benef'i t all nations 
summation, it cm•ld be conclllded i;htd; the '!;XtJttty of Peace 
-
- .. -
and tile United f>·tates, are at ·i;tw heart of tt1e EJJ::i:st.l.ng 
a:r:ran<,T,6lll0nts for th8 soclH 1ty of' tlle Pacific. 
-------
... . 
pacific .~ecul!ity ~ !h<:: Plll.liUJ?ines. "In the 
Philippines~" said President T.:ruman in his statement of 
April 18. lB51, on Pacific security, 
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• • • th6 United States is accorded certain mili tu:ry 
operating rights and .facilities pursuant to an agree-
ment w.:l.ttl the Qpverruu•mt of the Phllj,ppines, and tile 
whole ~JOl'ld knovJs that th<J United States recot;nizefi that 
an armed attack on the Philippines \Hmld be looked upon 
b,Y tho United st;atcJS as_d!J,XJ:,;:Iil:r_uus_to_its_o_\llU_p_eac_e_and _____ === !-------~safety and that--it-\"louid act accordingly.34 · 
l This is tlH' principle <Jhich >·Jas incorporated in the 
I new Imltual defense 'treaty bet\VE:H;n the t.vo Governments. In 
a sense, :i.t can be said i>hat i.l1e treuty m<J:rely formalizes 
a HJlationsh:lp that has been in existence for som<o tilua. 
After tt1e E;;oanish-American \Var of 18913 the United States 
established railita:r.y bases in th<J Pililipp:Lnes ~md, m1.de:r 
the terms of the Jvlil:Lta:ry ASt' is tancil Agreement; of 194/7 • 
contim1es to maintain t:hmn. :l'his concept was given formHl 
expr1assion on Aut;ust ~)0, 1\i'l'il., ~<it£1 tlle signing of tl.le 
•; r.· 
Mut;;l Defense '.l.'r ea ty bet111een thtJ ·t;~Jo coun tx i GS. "'J l"tl 
Eaol1 Party :recognizes ti:lat an armod attack in the 
Pacif:l.c area on eith<Or of tll<t parti<o:J 1:lot.!ld. be d<J.fl60:t'• 
ous to :J.ts ovm paace and safoty 1111d <'lc,clm:es that it 
----~ 
34statom<;nt o:· P:residcnt Truman on "Samuity in tho 
Paci:t'ic"; tn t;ne J2r:>r:::Jrtm.ent of ~3tL<tG lJUJ.ltltin, XXIV (April 
lt, 1951), '165. ----------
::;s'rhe text of' the .Hutual Dd'ense Treaty bot•o~een the 
Unlted S1:ates and the Pl1i11p;::incs is printed in th<J Qe•)Hrt-
!l!ent of state llli!ill!ll1 XKV (September 27, J.%1) • 464-f\5. 
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"10 :Jld act to !i\(1Gt l;[ll;l COllliL0!1 dlil!g<il::S :tn ·· HCGOXdmu:e 111 itl! 
its eon~>ti tut1,mn.1 lniOOli!oH><ilS. (.M:t.icla IV) • 
., (I ~ :n:;gaxdlr.tg tho 1n,;.pl~~u~-;.nt.tJ.'tit.).!l ~J..f:' t(J,1[1 t,);,~tzty 
and :cJhttksvz~x in tt1;:;1 cplnlon o::: c~:Lthe.r. o.t th~·er:~ thtJ 
tHX'Xi to:rt~).1 :tnt~~g;.r5." t.y ~ poli ttor:ll :trtd'l~prn~d$i106 cr t'JWCUI""" 
lty Cif o l tlt~.l1X of t~£1,:.} Pt~rt:t<j ~.~ ls t~h:r\~at~.;nud by ~:;:xtaJ:nul 
ax~ed ~::.ttc.c::h: in ·~tH-; l)6.ciflo$ (i~:,r-t.i.Gl~s ) G 
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established. "This group will EH:l.rve as t'l continuing body 
in cha.rge of the ove.r-all implementation of tho above~ 
mentioned pact," tile statement added.36 Tilis consUltation 
was in accord<d1Ce l·i.ith "'rticle III of tt1e J:kHlt Which called 
for such measures ••henever 11in the oplnion of ei.ttle:r of trlelil 
the tH:rritorial in·tog:rity, politicaJ. independence or 
sectuity of el.tt10r .of tt1e parties ir:: threatened by external 
armed attack in the Pacific.'' 
llt;;ain, on september '', 195<1 0 EJec:r.etary of State 
Dull.es declared that "if' trw Philippines vJore attacked• t;tle 
United Stutes t·;ould act immediately," He made tkw plede,e 
in a stat<lment at th€ opcmin;;; of United DtatHs-Fhilippine 
mutual defense tall<s in !vlanila, ••:r Hish to :;tate in most 
emphatic te.rms that the United Stnt.es Nill honor f'ully :l.ts 
commitments under· tho mutual defense treat;y." He added 
that the IJni ted ::;tates in tended to maintain nnd use Hs air 
and naval bases in th;; islands and 11 tlwse provide conc:r,~te 
evidence of the United States' abUity and intention to 
take count;er-weasuree." Tl~e Secretary pointed Oclt tl1t.t 
Pl'elsident !Usenhol!Jer held ordered t!11j United ~,ltut,,ls Seventl1 
Float to protect Fol'mosa from invasion by tho Communists. 
36~.!1 ::t;ork Times, May 26, 1954. 
"In th<i case of the Philippines, no bpeci:t'ic orders are 
required •" hu said • "Our forces vJould a~.rtomatically 
"'7 l'eaot ."0 
Pacif;!,c Secqr ity: Au!,jtralia .!Rill. New Zealand. The 
people of Australia and No111 Ze~;;land share vJi th Americans 
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side by side during the v;orlti ~;a:rs. Helations amof16 tlleir 
.nations have nl>m;ys been amicable. There could be little 
doubt in any quarter ttla'C a(l;!!;ression against eitJ:wr of 
them would seriously involved tlw United Stat<ss. 
It 1·1as, ttJS refore, deemed ur;eful to put trw vJorld 
on notiC<J of' 'Ctlis relationship by formaliz:i.ng it. Accord-
ingly, the ll!IXttlal defense security pact signed by Australia, 
Net1 zealanct, aml. the United ,states (J\NZ\H3).38 contains trw 
recognitioi.l of each pa:rty tl1at armed attack in the 
Pacific area on the to:rr'itories, a:cmoc1 forces, publio 
vessels, or aircraft of any of the pa:rt:ic s t~ould be dan.;;er-
oils to tile peace and security of all. E:ach purty pledges 
itself' to tal-co action in accordtmce with lt.s constitutional 
processes in ttl<l event of sucl1 a;ttaok. 
----·---
37~ York Times 0 S<'ptember 4, 1954. 
381'he t"xt of this treaty is printE;d in the DcJ?art-
l!!!ill1 2f Gtate Bulletin, Xx:l (JtllY 2Z•, 1951), 148 .. 49. 
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In liddit;ion, ttw parties are to establi&h "' council, 
cons is tin0 of their F·oreign Ministers, to cons1c:ter mattE>XS 
conce:rnint; ttle implementation of the; treaty. This councH 
is to be so ore,ctnlzed as to be able to meet at any time. 
The treaty provides that, 
Pendilli.~ the cievelopment of a moro comp:ehensivc 
t----------S(;~y-D-tem-of~IG-g-icn-al-s-acu;r-i-ty-1-n-tile-p~:rcd:f-rc-tr:r.-et.:r-a-nr.1-tl1.G 
development by thG United tiations of' more effective 
means to maintuin :tnterna tional peace and sectu;i ty, 
the Council • • • is authorized to maintain a consul ta-
t iva :relationship ;·;ith 1:1t11tes ~ Regional Associa·t;ions $ 
Ascwciations of" states, or other at;ttwritles in the 
Pac.:tfic <IX!8H in a position to furtl1ar the purposes of 
this treaty and. to oontribtJtH to the security of that 
area. 
Later$ in MELy, 195<1, Hich~ird G. casey, Hinl.st;er of 
Foreign Affairs, in ennouncirlfs Australi& 1 <> X<ladiness to 
Staff also had made an assessment of thG 1nilitary probl<Hns 
~nvolved)• saicl that bearing in mind th<> mtmr;oum:, resources, 
ami terri cor ial ambitions ol :ted Chinh, tt. vms doubtful 
that an inqividual sou'thc;ast dlian country could resist 
Comznunist ir1f:U tration and at;~];ression solely on 1 ts ot~n 
resources. ln th0 modern t>orld no country .myv;h<Yre can 
depend for its securit~· on its o>~n una:l.ded efforts, ile said. 
'1'h.is means the indep3ndenufl and liberty of' the ~loutheast 
Asian cotmt:ries ·w111 need to be supported and helped by 
' i 
otllGr free countries in position to do so 1 he added.39 
These bilatarul and t:rilo.teral troaties of mutual 
7l 
defense. born out of a post-war policy to :r<Jbu1ld and rearru 
Japan 1 vJere 11desie;rwd to serve as a point of depar·ture 
toward the devHlopluent of a more compx•ahensive system of 
secur1 ty in "thB P<H}ific area.'' ,1ohn Foster Dullos, th""c''---------c==== 
chtef arch:l.tect of these t:Vmlt:les, has said: 
'!'he four tnlatiGs do not, of course, ma:rk the 
outex bocmda;des of our concern in "sia and t!1e Pacific. 
'l'he United states has a deep interest in the peace, 
security and ,,;aJ.fare of many Asian nations \•Jtlich are 
not partiGS to thi.:i &ec~\rity t:reatiBs. :rna eed, each of 
the ·CHH:iti<lS indicat<JS the ~~X};octation of th0 pa:rtio::; 
that thero will be fu.rther d.avalopments. 
Tho stops for peace and security novi pr•oposed are 
only a beginning.. Thexe ~~ill l1e a continuil:J<;; need for 
the Unit<>d States, in coope:ration Viith otl:l>Jr f':ree 
nations, to sustain an ever-mounting initiutive in /H3LJ 
and to dave:Lop ever-grov1ine, fe:LlOI>~tlip vU.t11 t;he people£> 
of Asia who woLlld be free. It is • ho\Veve:r, necessary 
to consolidate our present position be;t'o:re \1e move on, 
and. ttlat 28nso1idat1on involves eni;1U'int; into ttlesc 
treatim>. 
------
'l'ho seige and fall of Dienbienphu caused u terrif'lc 
reaction against Communist expansion in 13outheast Asia. 
l!':rom thE•t moment ttw steps leadlng to the negotia:tions on 
SBA'rO came :l.n fairly xapid stJccession. 
I. lNDOCHUli~ 
~Phomas Barman. th<J B.B.C, diplomat;ic correspondent 
t1as stated in an article in T'ne Listener: 
---
1'he immediate cause to the discussions in Hanilu 
arose as a HJfJUlt of the; contirwed expans:Lon of 
Gommunis t potveJ: in southeast Asi.a a;.n6 esp<: c:l.ally in 
lndochl.na , •• rt tllreat \vtlich sec!cJta:cy of' ~>tate 
Dulles said, extended to the vi tal int<or fsts of' tile 
Philirpine~; • I\Ustntlic', anCl New zealand. 
Ctcrlos .P. Homulo in a .Ne,vember, 1954, article 
conceded th~tt, "Indochina gave CommL1nism its ~;:;reat~;;st dip~ 
<> loma tic victory since tho Bolshevik rovolut~.on.""' 
HoHever much one may qu<nltion ·tho va.lidlty of' these 
statements, it :remains that tl1e stakes in Indochina 21'8 
big--if the Commun:tsts 11:1n. Briefly, (1) once in command 
-·----·--· 
lThomas Harman, ''The Background to ti1H Discuss5.ons 
in Manila," :~r1e Listenei, LII (September 9, 1954), 380. 
2C<ll'los p. Romulo. "Three Ytoa:rs to 
Weak !vlagaz:l.w:l, (November 7 • l9tJ4) • p. 7. 
. 
. 
expuns1on \vest, south. and east. (2) Communist 11/est~:;a:rd 
drive \Wuld sCJbdtle 1'hailand and Btu•ma, bringing external 
Corrununia't expansion to ·t;he aide dor,:,r of' India and Pakistan, 
(3) soutmva:rd drive would &.xmex Halaya and Indonesia. 
(4) sastvw:rd drive 'd<mld be aimed at tlm Philippines, tied· 
in vJi th a pustl nor thl•lard from Indonesia, and ( 5) ,lhp<U1 9 
' . 7< 
stu:rmmded, mi;;l:lt falJ.. ,J lidded to those J.s the 
psychologicul effect of it all to 'Gilc people in tl.wt 
section of tile globe •~hexe "savin<c> fac.s" is a very 
important; factor in ttl+.: eold ws:r. :ct is becm1se of the 
big p:rize involved that the United :~tatas hns piclmd 
Indochina as the place t;o stop tho Communists in Southeast 
\~hat tJ.as been sat forth here is tho so-called 
"domino thao:rv. '1 P:r esident Els e.nil0\1e:r subscribed to the 
' 
"falling domino" principle on at least t\'iO occasicras in 
1954. In f'aat, he £;<.we that narne to the theory Ht his 
nevis conf<'rence of hpril 7, 1954, i·lllen he outlined his 
concep·t of Llvo strategic value of Indoei:llna. Fix,;t, lle 
said, there is the strategic value of tll(J cotmtry in terms 
of its mata:rials; then, the probl(;!Jl! of so ml'my additional 
- -
.. 
'""Stoi<es in IndoctJ.ina," United titates l'ic-,\'is and ~;o:rld 
- ... - ~-- --...,. --Re po :r!i, XX.XVIl (July 30, 1954), 21 • 
human beinc;s coming unde:r a dictatorship; !Uld, finally, 
ttle d'f'ects of the; "i'l:llling domino" principl6. He said 
that us th(;l last domino in a line fells inevitably :from 
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the topplir:e; of ·t;hcl first~ ttw loss of Inc\oGt1ina vJould lead 
to the loss of Du:rma • of Ttmilund, GrJC\ Indonesia; it 
vwuld turn th~l ;JO-called islund uefenses' ctJain o:f Japan, 
Fo····noo" ••,·oc' l-'1''· l)'t·lJ.·L' ·oDine" 
_ J.. !-.;,., ,_J C.!. t ~-' . ./. .t vi. \;~ . 1. ,r., • ,., J,; ,;:> 9 and to tt1e sotltrn;a:rd it 1rJould 
1\ga:l.n. a·t; the Gove:mo:r 's Conference i.n Seattle on 
lmgw>t 4, 19!l4, tne J?xecddent said that "s•;~ve:ral things 
peninsula, tl1'.3 last littlG bit of land Mng:lng out tr1ore 
( soqtha.rn 1'hailand and r.::alaya), vJOL1ld be "care ely defensible," 
tt1e Prcs:ki ent illfl! ned. And he added thc;t "Bu:rn1a v1ould be in 
Approx;tmately a yaa:r before 0 in .his "Peace in the 
vro:rld" addrGss on April 16, 1953, President Eisenho~Je:r 
ttucats to til<J ~~orld free comm.lm:tt;y to be met by uni·ced 
--~ 
4 
"President KKplains Value of J.ndocl1ina," Unit<J\!_ 
StatEJf;t NevJS fU'& World Heno:r1;_, XXlCITI (.April 16, 1954), 21. 
5 Qtloted in tho l:iro:!. xork _Iirues, May 12, 1954. 
actlon." 6 1'heu. on Mm:ol1 29, 1(154, after the seise of 
' 
Dienbi10nphu had begu::1, ::ecretary of St<J.ta Dulles, in a 
major foreign policy i-peech approved in advance by the 
President; for Ci eli very to th<3 Overseas Press Club of 
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America, Hll1eL·Jed President Eisenhovler •s proposal for 
~~----------"_u_n_i_t_e_d __ a_c_'t_i_o_·r_l_•_" ___ I_n __ w_h_a_t __ ~_·a_s_·_p_r_o_b_t_ol_)l_Y __ th_,_1 __ k_e_y __ p_e_.r_a_g_·r_e_.p_h _____________ ======= 
of t11at Dpeech. delivered in mea:::ured tcm:s and thrice 
punctuated by applause, Dulles declared: 
Ur~Jer the conditions of today, the imposition on 
Soutr1east l>sia of the political system of Cormmmist 
1'\ussia and its Chinese ally • by \vlwtever mtJails, Nould 
be a sxave ·~hr eat to tt1e \~hole fr-e·'.• cO!m!ll.mity. 'fhe 
United Eltat<.w feels that ti:lat poss:lbility should not 
be pas£;iv<lly aceepted, but should be mat by ctni'ted 
action. :J.'hls might have ser 1ous r ishs, Lut ttHJse risl~:s 
are fa:~.· lesc> tllan vJot:tld fuoo us a fevJ Jlioars from now • 
if we dare not be resolute today. 7 . 
In other portions of the speech, Dulles cited "that such a 
tragic event us the fall of Dienbienptm vJill llardel;l, and 
not v;eaken our rurpose t;o stay united," He also declal'ed 
Today the United States ami other countries immedi-
ately concerned a.:re givint; careful corts:i.c:e:rat~:i.ons to 
the establishment of a collective defense. Conversa-
tions are tuk:'i.n;;.; pluae among tr10m. • • • Tl1is common 
defense nmy involve serious commitments by us f~ll. 
Elrt; fH;e peoples vJUl never remain i'r<Je if they are not 
tv illing, if need be • to fight for thd:r vi tal interests. 
---- -
81\dd.:ress by President F;isenl:lolve:r on "Peace in the 
v:m:ld •" Vital 13peecl1EJS 0 XIX (May 1 9 195:-S), 420. 
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Furthermoret vit:al inter<1sts can 
tected merely by local defense. 
defense and the ll'ey to dete:r:r:l.l'lG 
vJith others fox mutuul d.efense. 
Uni.ted ~--tates seeks in Southeast 
not longer be pro-
The key to successful 
attack is association 
1'hat is wl1at the 
Asia. 
II. VIE\tiS OF PHE1iE;NT E:J:c3R~IHO\",;EH AF'l'JSH TliC GEi'ili!:\l[t 
~~· _________________________ c_o_N_F_li_.n_E_N_c_r_:_o_·~_l_K_·o_1_1J-~l_'_'_'l_~_'~:-L-Nu-''C_'_c_ii_l_N_.A------~----------------c====== I On Jul;y ~.o, 1054, i'G vJas annoLmced .from Gon<wa that 
a c:ease-fi:r.e in Indochina hud been ~::tgreed bet1·wen the 
reprE:senta·~i vos of the F'renctl ant! tlw CommuniF t Vie trnh1h 
fore es in terms thut l.e:f't CambcJdin and Laos as indeoend ent 
' 
stat\iS, and vJ:l.th V:l.etnum split into tvJo. '!.'he agreement; 
that convened AprH :?;6, 1954. 
E:ven >vh:l.le thtl negotiations :l.n (!,_,neva lflere still in 
progress .President Bim.mho•mr isstHld a w:ri tten statement on 
the Indochina situa.ti<)n. He said s in port: 
':rhe Un:lted stat<1s beli(wes in assurint; the p<>ace and 
.l.ntegrity of nationr; thr,ough collc1ctive action and, in 
pur suunee of th<~ Uni.ted Nat ions pr i.nc:lple, has entered 
into regional security agreements >~l.tl.1 other ne.t:lons. 
The Indochina phase of ttE Gonfer<mce :ts in p:rocess 
of being organized and the issues have not yet been 
clar if led. l\lieantoihile, plans are proceedi.n:;; for tb.G 
realizutio.l:'l of a Southeast i-1si~:•. security arran,;ement. 
This v1as publicly sugEasted by Secretary J)llles in his 
address o1' March 29. or co<..trlle, our p:rincipal allies 
were advised in advance. 
Ti.lis proposal of' the B<-Jc:r<Jta:ry of l:>tate vn~s not a 
nEn~ one; it 11as merely H r eaffi:rnw.tion of the pr inoiplet; 
that have consistently guided our post~irlal' foreign 
policy , • • and a remJ.nder to interested Asian 
fr:l.<mds that the Unlted Stottue vm.s prepared to join 
Viittl others in the anplication of tttese prlnclples to 
the ttu: eatened arEla. 8 
111t1en Prime Minister Churnhlll came to confer with 
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l·n t•1m C0](1 w~r 'l 'o4 r··t 
.. ""t u ~· ., •. a ... " ~., t.! ~ .t" Part II of 
\·Ie dir.-;cussed .Southcas·t Asia t:lnd, in i:n:·ll:tlcular, 
exam:med the situ:cetion l'ii:lici:l VJould c\I ise from the 
conclusion of" an agreement on Imioc: hina. rJe also 
consldered th,OJ sii;u:.ttion "11hi<:h vJould fo.llOiv :from 
fa:Llu:r<:J to reach fiUGh an ~1greement. 
1.o will press f'o.nmrd I•Jitl1 plans<fox collect;ive 
dafen::.e to mfu.Jt t;;~i't~tH'3:1: eventuality • .1 
ma;)or :Lmmodiate goal of his foreie,1:l policy.•tlO 
Irm:ued:lately after the cease--fire a.gr~wownts have 
occasion be: ~H:lld_ ~ 
8nv:hot R:isent:to·i!Jer Said ilbcut Il,dochinu in ;,;_,x:L\, '1 
UniteQ_ &_tat'l'i_ ~ iLll!:L \;or1d l\G)20rt, XXXVII (.July :'iO, 1954), 
21. 
9ustatement of F.:lsenhovier and Ctmrchill on viestexn 
Sl>rategy on t.he 1Cold ',:hlX, '" printed 5.n tl1<& .!m:lt\ld Qtatc::s 
flfevJS and l:orld Jl(~port. XXXVII (JuJ.y 9, 1%4). 57-B. 
--- -- ___ ,.,.,. - - ......- I' 
lONeal Stanford in the Ghristi<in §.clone~. J'-lonU.Qt. 
JViay t! , 1954 • 
~~ -
p-~-~~ 
, __ 
~ -
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'rhe United z;t,ut<Js has not bec-m a belll,;m:ant :!.11 this 
vmr. 1'he primary responsibility for the toettlement in 
Indochtna .rested w:lt.h thosG nations 1'J!lic:h participu.ted 
in l;hu i'lgtlting. Our role nt Geneva has been at all 
time» to try to be helpful vJhere desired and to aid 
France and Cambodia. Laos and Vietnam to obtain a ,just 
and honorBb1<3 settlemorrt 1rJll1ch viill ·take into f.!lH:ount 
the needs of tll€ intorestf:ld peopl~J ••• 
:rhe TJni'ted States is actively ptusuing disCLw:,ion 
with other fre(~ naM.ons Ni th a v:LevJ to the rapid orcan-
________ tz_;_·LtJo_n-of~~l-CO-l-1-e-c-t-i-vc-d-afens-H-i-n-sout-h.e~.tfrt-b:s1:;:;.-tn:------ c=== 
o:rrlo:r tc pl'CV<mt f'n:rtl1<n di:reot .o:c in<lirec'G Communist 
ag r0 Sc' ion in the t general area.l1 
Tho vie·v;s of Secretary DqllElS eoncexninc tt1a ludo-
china truce Ne:re contained in a s'GGt<:lmont ts:::uec1 by him or1 
July 23. :r.n thut s·tatoment he r;aid, ln part,: 
M'·te:r nearly ei?ollt years of vm:r the forces of the.;• 
J.i':r.ench Union i1ad lost cont:rol o:f nca:r.ly o.t1<:H1alf oX 
Vi•stnam, thd.r hold .. on tho balance ~;as precarious~ aru 
the Frenoll people did not dasixe to p:r.olong the cmr • 
Those basi(J 
n'·l1' '"'·• ·o'1''~'·' of X..l 1,~(.., ,l L .~,.,,.) ... ,
ment 1tJh:l.ch. as 
features Hhlcl:1 
facts in<Jv:ltubly dominated tile Indo• 
the Geneva Gonfel'enco and led to settle-
Presid•mt F;isenhol·Jer saicz, contain max\}~ 
we do not like • , • 
V'::l rrt·:-,·-~~111 !10\~':.t(""! )~:·e'!::-)'·-· ~-l'lC1 r:-n•1Al ..~,.,.1"1' 'l" o;,,nr~Q'"t't'';~nn~ 
,·>:;O ,,;lt;.•.i~ ,_, ,....::;,,, ti,,. __ ..,,,IJ~ '--- 1. ,_·a~u ,rl-, u, '~ ..!...4 <;;.<......,.._, J. .c._,~.;,vV 
VJlth the; Unl.ted Nations Gharter, we •Jo>.lld not seok by 
force to ove:cth:ro11: theix sGtt.J.CJHttant; • ~ " 
ThE> important tlll.ng from novJ on :Lcl not t;o l.llOLU:n the 
past bt~t to He:i.ze \;ilo futuro opportunity to prevent the 
loss in t-Jo.1:t.hon1 'l:l.totnn.;a from h1adlnt::; to t;tHJ 0Xter1~l~.on 
of Gommtmi:sm thJ:<l\J.[;hout ;:c.outheast Asia nn::I the Bouth-
tvest :t\::tc:Lfic., It1 ttt.ts effo:r·~ t::a.l oi' the fxee netlons 
concexnc>CI shoql.d p:rofii:; by the, losuJUS of. ttw past. 
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One lesson is that resistance to Communism nfleds 
popular s ilpport , • • the people s.hould feel that they 
are defending ·their own national institutions. , , , 
Prime Mini,;ter Menaes-France said yGsterduy that 
instructions had ll!.li:Ul given to the French representa-
tives in Vietnum to complete by ,J;Jly 30 precise pro-jects for the transfer of authority~ vJhich \~ill give 
reality to ttlliJ independence 1tihlch France had promised. 
• • • The <:volution from colonialism to national 
independence is thus about to be completed in Indo-
china, and t;he free govexrnnents of tt1is areH should 
.f--------:tr_oJn_n.oJrJ_o_n_be_able-to-<::I-t-11-i-:-'-t--the-1-o-ya-l-ty-of~tric-i-x--------==== 
people to maintaln tlleir indapendew:e as agaim;t 
Communist c:.:oloniul imn. 
A second leslJon "'t1ich ''hould be learned is that 
arrangements for <Jollectlva defense need to be made in 
advar1ce of aggression, not after it is uncier v1ay, The 
United States :for over a year advocated united action 
in tha area. but tl1:ls proved not to ba practicul under 
the cond 1 tions ~1.t1ich existed. V'ie beli<3Ve, hmvever, ttmt 
no1i'J it vJill be pr:actiu~:ll to bring about. coll<:Jctive 
arraflbG/Il<.;tlts to promote tll<' GeGur I ty of tJ1e free 
peoples of .souttH?ast As1H. Prompt <J"Ceps toJ:i.ll he ta.ltel'! 
in tt1is dinlction. In this connection we sl10uld bear 
in mind that. ·cl1e protllem is not merely one <lf' d{1t<Jrring 
open armed aggression, but of' preventing Communist 
subversion 1rJilich, tt1kin:;; H.dvantage of economic dis-
locations and social ln,justive, might \1eaken and finally 
overthrmi the non-Communist (!,overnrnents. 
If tiN f'ree nations vlhich have a stake in t;tlis area 
t-1111 nmv l'or!t to,,. ether to avail of present oppor tun-
i ties in the; light of )JBSt experience, th<m tbe loss ot· 
th<J prec;ent may lead to a gain for the futurG.l2 
'rhus • lndoohina and all tht' t lt slg;nif':l.ed brout;ht 
about an "aGonizirll!, .reapprais<>l," to usa diplomatic parlance 
recently made populal', o:t' the po1~er position in Asia. on 
------
12nvJhat /ill Sides ~'ay £\bout Indochin<± 1'ruca," lfnited 
~!.!..§. ~!i ang ~lOf#L ljeJX>It, XXXVII (July 30, 1954), 21. 
l 
80 
the one hand, Communists, once mo:r.e, are tak:!.ns over ne1• 
territories and are maneuvering into a position to get 
more territory, more people • more o1' everytning~ On the 
other hand, the United states r:md its allies <n:e m<:cl-cing 
one more e.ffor t to ralJ.y non-Communists in defense of >1lwt 
is ld't in Boutheast Asia~ 
Actual conversutions on the formulation of a 
collective defense treaty in the Pacific area began even 
before the Geneva Conforence ;vas evel' p:rojectod, At that 
time the CommLmist advance 1.n lndocilina 111as still 
proposed security treaty to come into e:rtect at once so 
that it could be invoked aga:lnr;i; t!HJ forces of Ho Ci:1:l-mint1 
in !ndocbin<'l. M: too ~ XQU. Times put it: 
fiecxetary of' State Dull!::lS wanted the ,sllies to 
"negotiate frol!l strength" at tho G<m~lva confiilHmce on 
Korea and Indochina. It 1r1as his idea tJ:la·t tlle l'jestern 
l1llies stwuld agree befOJ:e tho confexence s'Cartod on 
the ldnd of ••uni ted. ucUon" ~hey would tak~ to rt;otect 
southeast .llsla if tile Chmeva contorence i<nled ,lo 
At tr1e same time, President Eisenhovii:Jr again GtHted in l:l 
news conference that trw .Secreta:r.y had his "tmquulified 
support" :l.n thu iidminis.trution •s efforts to create a 
security axranbement for Southeast Asia.14 
To rally t;nu strength of collective security, 
Secretary Dulles t.lu:ougtwut the second ~veck: of April 
consulted <.;itl:l diplomatic repJ: :e;Hntati.ves of frien,Hy 
governments J.n both fJ;u:ror;e bnd M;ia.l5 The purp(.)$6 ~tlhen • 
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before going to London and P<::risa he had llis tulks 1c1ith a 
number of' h!!lbnssadors 1>1as twofold: to €;et some; colll!lJOn 
declarution f'rom tha governments di:rec·tly conoern0ci 1rii'ti1 
the Com~,un:i.st threat to Soctth<Jar;t Asia that 1/Ja•..:tld exp:es~· 
their solidarity in ternw \1hi.ch tho Ch.in~'se r::ommunists 
could not ml.stah12J; and to impress those gove:rn.ments ~Jith 'th<c 
sense of m::e;enoy ~:.~bout the P~'lip:!.n:~-mounted Vietminl1 
military act1on in Indochina that they did not yet saom to 
share with the Unlted States l:tt that timl!l. lt app•Jared 
obvious to Dulles tl1at the fury of trw Vietminh assault on 
Dienbienphu Vias a matHmver to strength<:n ttl<J posj.tion of 
Communist China vis-a-vis France nt the; Gomlng Geneve< 
con:fer<ance: it ;ws eqm.tlly obviom' that a strone; counter 
mamll1ve:r sl10tl.Ld be made by the non-Conmtmist m;tions before 
14,James Heston in the ~l£:tl!;_'l':i.nleS 0 Jvlay 6, l95t1. 
1 5vial tor H. ha6gon<:):r in th" N!!'''· X,Q.12Ji ,I~. April J.O, 
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th<l conference met. This should take tho form of some 
united decliiiHtion ~lith Whlch nc-.tions in the Far am 
vieste:rn .Pacific 1IJOUld !Je as:oociated. 
• 
In his \·Jashinz~ ton talks v;i th the h.rnbassado:rs t !>lr. 
Dulles rUd noi; issue an ult,imatl1Jn. ''His accent vms on a 
sho<J of unity in a :form ,,Jhich woulc1 be poli tiea11y possible 
for all tl1c signatories. "16 Vihen thE; nq::crts of' th; se 
conw;rs::.ttions by the Ambas;,ado:rs :reached th<i ~;md of the 
lo~; relay from. the (lecri':ltaxy to thl:i .Fc.rei.c;n Office ,,,.,, 
spokesman in London and Paris, tl1e "ultimatum" idea h:1cl 
rc:,jacticn in advance of formal p.ropo:All. ,,nd since stJch a 
declaration at nny time t>as impossible o:f survival in French 
politics, a similar leak- viaS muda in Paris fm: th" same 
"l""PO'' n 1 '1 1-'' 4-J. ' ,~. ~" 
'J?ha ole d avelopl!lents coni'ix med thfl gr ovJ ins bEl lief' of 
Dulles t;hat ttw genoral ideu c:ould not bEl vJorked out by 
relay bt1t must bro discussed at first htmd. And since Big 
Tlu:ee unity is by fa:r the most j,mportant factor in ·the 
16ttrthu:r Krock in the ~ Jo:rk ~tl• April 18, 1954, 
17,\feal s·tanf'ord in the Chris ti&n Science Monitor. 
------ '#' Apr i1 10. 1954. 
internationel tug-oi'-'""H, there v;as mwessi ty of •Jerking 
out a common attitude before they faced the Communist 
powers at GBneva. So Dulles f1e~1 to London &nd P<tris in 
mid -J>pr :l.l to explain to the foreign ministers and their 
most influerrt:iul advisers in persor! what h<! had in mind--
one ttling being that he i1ad no intention, as chareed 
abroad, t;o ·txy to "torpedo" the Geneva oonf<Honce in 
advance.l8 
In a stutem(mt read to mn>sman outside tho \~est \iing 
of th<> v;llito House, Dulles dowc:dbed such a unit,Jd front as 
••obviously deairable," 1'llis lei't little or no room for 
questionin,; the administrat:l.on 1c; decision t;o proceed as 
speedily as possible c.Ji tll 11 unit;ed action" in tt11.1 trueatened 
area. Before Dclllas could lGave Washington by plane this 
message VJas already in tho tk<tnds of the officials J1e VJas to 
meet in London and Pari". In his statemBnt t;he .'cec:r etary 
again called attention, as he and President l!:isenhovJer havG 
done at frequant intervals, to tll'.l threat o.f GoJrununist 
aggression to tho ••entire area" of Soutl1east Asia.. Hecall-
ing trw unity achieved by the th:rtHJ hestern powers at the 
July 11 summ:t t" conference in Berlin which l!,b.Ve birth to th0 
18chicattQ JJ§:ilOL: Tribune, September 1. 19f:i4. 
1--
a~:p!:lement for tlle Geneva meetin~& Ni th the Communists on 
Koxea and Indochina, Dulles declell'ed; 
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Now the t!l!fJe of us need to join otu stxength and add 
to it the strength of others in order to cr eats the 
ncndi tions needed to a::;cure that the conference lf.lill no-t 
lead to u loss of f.'reedom in .Southeast Atlia, but \-Jill 
preserve that freedom in peace and. justice. 
His trip to London and Paris • lw said, is ••a mission of 
pe£iC6 thro Uoh S trelliSth. nl9 
lit tlle conclusion of ttwir meetings in London on 
Mril 13~ secretary of State Dull<lS and B:rHisr1 Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden issued this joint statement: 
~le hawr had a full exchanse of vie1vs with ref~Jnmce 
to Souttwas t &dJia. v:e deplorol the fact tt~ t on the 
eve of the Geneva conference the Communist forces in 
Indocblnn ~ua :i.nc:roa~;ingly developing their activities 
into a large-scale \Val' against the forces of the 
French Union. They seek to ove:rtt1ra111 the la111f'ul an:I 
friendly government of V1Gtneul 0 111hich 1r1e recognize. and 
they have invaded Laos and. Cm!lbodia. 
·,.a J:.saJ.lze that. thuse !'lctivities not only thr0atBn 
those nmv directly :lnvolved. but also endanger the 
peace and EJeourity of the entire area of' Southeast Asia 
and tt10 Vlestern Pacific, where our two nations and 
other friendly Allied nations t1rlve vi tal interests, 
Accordine;ly t'ia are read.y to taka part ~Ji th thf:; 
otiler cotmtries primarily (10nce:med in an examination 
of tha poc;sl bili ty o:f ostabllstlin~:; a uolleetive 
defense within tile framevlork of thG Ghart~H of tb:; Unit<ld 
Nations Organi;mtion to assure thH peace, security and 
freedom of Southeast i>sia and the \~est;er n pa.cific. 
----·---
19quoted in the ~ Xo.rlr Times, Jlpr:U 10, l9fl4. 
8b 
• • • We believe that tlle prospect of es tabl5.sil.lng 
a unity of dei'<msiV<J purpose throughout souttH1ast Asia 
and thr; Vies tern Pacific will contribute to an t10norable 
peace in Indochina. 
Like1·1is.e • on lipr il 14, Secretary Dulles ani .Foreign 111nis-
ter (Jeorges Bidault of France i.SUHld a joint cormmmique in 
Par is; mccer pts from the text f'ollo": 
I<'or nearly tt>o centuries it 11as_hEJeD-the-'j:J:t:act.tce-------=== 
Jl---------.fo-r---x<rprfJSenM.tives of our tvw na tlons to meet to~ 
gether ·to dlsm~ss the grave lsc:.ues 1•htch from time to 
time i1ave confronted us. 
In p1XnJuance af' this custom, ~<hich ~'" t1.0pe to contirl~ 
ue for thr; benefit of ourselves and. others, ~Je have had 
an e.x<:tlcn1.ce of VievJ:;.- on Indoch:lna and ;:~out.h~;::ast i~eia" 
•. , • 
1
'ie deplore thG fact that on tl1G eve of tl1e 
Geneva conference this aggression has r>!la(:rwd a new 
clima;; in V:lutn&m, pc.rt:i.Gularly <.'.t .Dienbi<mpl1u, and 
h~;~.s been rene;;;ed in Laos and extended to Cambodia. 
The ind<Jpundem:e of the tttX'M As so cia tmi Gtates 
\d thin the }rench Union, Vll:.ictl ne'<i t'I.G,:r.eemmYts are to 
complete, is at stnkGI in these battles. l':e recognize 
that tc10 prolonge;tion oi' tlHi t;a:r ln I.ndoeh:tna • • • 
D.lso threatens thG entire area of' Sm:~theast hsiu und of 
·the U<lstern Pacific. In close arwociation ••ith other 
interestot! nations, t-ie will examlne tile posc>ibility of 
<JstablL~rll.ng, Vlithin tile frr:illHltwrk of tl:w United Nations 
Charter, <> collective defeuse to <U\\Sl!Xe the peace, 
secu.ri·t;y anu fxsedom of this nx·ea. 
111e recogni;:e that our basic ob;joctive at the (;,;n-:wa 
conference t1ill be to seek the re-establishment of a 
peace in Indoctlina vJhic;!l \·Jill ~:afegnard the freedom of 
its people and the independenee of the "ssoci.a ted 
states. 1'ie are ocmvincad tha-t the po~>sibHity of.' 
obtuintng th:l.::> obje1ctive depends l1pon our solidarity. 
Th<:; United states dalegation considered these a 
concrete 1ldvanee t01ntrd tl1'> oxgani.zation of tt defensive 
commun:!. ty in southeast 1\Eda. F'nrtl'l2 rmore • the prospect of' 
' 
,_ 
defensive unity in the ·c:roubled area "'as regarded by the 
United Dtatas as a contribution toc·:a:rd an 11 honorab1(>" 
peace settlement in Indochina becULlse it; pre~:or.ted to the 
Communbt bloc a "stronc; alternutive" to ttle failure of 
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1 himself said: 
1 returned well satisf'ied With "the :resL1lts of my 
trip •••• That ande:rstanding has been greatly 
enhnnced by tbe tallf;s >Villch I h<,vo l:Jnd in London '•<i th 
Prime HinistGr GhurohilJ. and For<dgn oec:reta:ry Eden 9 
am: thB tall{"; I have rlad in paris vii th Pr0micr Laniel 
Hnd F'orsign ~·1inister Bidault, our common pu:q:>oses tH;re 
""ll'"'"~•··~cl 'r. jo4l1'' c··rat· ""'t•·t''·•· '·I''~~~., '·'"' ·;c '-"'''<.\' on v ... :. . .>.~_..~,.').~'""· .t.~A .,..,.v ....,u '-'.HH-o~V.,J <L~.t.UJ. ijliv -.~•;;:.lV\'4 .\..I. 
Tuesday in London and ylisto:rday in Pa:ris.20 
HovJeve.r, there 1vas difficulty in reconciling the 
of:l.'iciul United s·tates interpretation with Eden's descrlp-
tion in tho House of Com1nons. For extilllplb, ~::~fto:r tr1e 
havinJ; told the left..:wine; Labo:rite leader, Jmuerin Bevan. 
that Be v~m vJould Lo "cornple te ly inaccu:n~ to" in CiHlil16 the 
ag:ree••H:mt "a defin:l.te commitment to trnc<B certain action in 
certain cir<:ums tances." 1'o th6 "' Qcompanlr;,ent of OppoEJi tion 
1954. 
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that the ag:ceoment ''Will be unive:rsally regarded as a 
.surrender to American pressure" and might "jeopardize all 
llopes of negotiatill(, 1111 th t.he Co.mrn<m1<st bloc and settlement 
in Korea and Indoc!llna." Eden's retort, it was reportedt 
v;as ·that he k.l1S1rl Dull0s vJould be criticized ''in the same 
terms as w:. Devan· has used <,;bout me.""' -~· 01 
·L. ----~~~~~~~~--~= 
'rtw UnHed litates attitude v·;as t;rmt the concexrc of 
Asian collective defense had been accepted in principle by 
the British. J.J<mce, it <Vas argued a working party could 
be set up irmaod:l.a.te1y in Viashington to cUscuss details for 
a more or lc1E;,s p~1xmanent Ol'ganization of' 'l;l:le ro tions of 
Southeast Ar:J.a. This I'Jork:ng party, :tt trJas sa:td. conld 
star·t its prooeedir""s durine; thEJ Geneva oonfercmcE:• appa.r-
ently on tho theory that ·trlis vJol.l.ld r eruind ·t;lle Comwunis t 
bloc nati.ons of tho conseql.l.ences of a fuilu:re to negotiate 
honestly. 
:Ch<':l United K:tngdom did not ~lhaxe 'Gn.Ht viaw.i~B 1'llo 
.British considered that the: organization of a defensive 
system must awl shouJd be a thorough 0nct detailed business. 
21Benjamin ':elles, dispatch from Lonaon dated 
April 14, 1954; in tt1.:1 Nev. Yo~r' Times, Ap:dl 15, 191)4. 
April 
2ZJoseph 
16, 1954. 
c. Harsch in th<J Ch:risti<:~n Dolence ~'i.Onitol'. 
----- ·- "' 
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••must mJait tiw rGe.ctions of the ot;lla:r interested countries 
before determining vJhat steps 1110 take next." Moreover, Eden 
told the House that Britain's main ob~)ective \;as "most 
emph!·rtichlly" to obtain vlh!.c t ~~ Labor qw;stionar called a 
peace "honorable to a_ll parti~c~s" at tho uonference rltlich 
vJas to open Apxil 26., 1954.23 Ftuthe:rmo:rs. as a B.Il.C. 
diplomatic correspondent contended; 
The United Kingdom Gove:r.nmen:t <lid not vmut to ente:r 
into any ne<J ar:ral'l,\;,mnents until tlH; results of the 
(kmeva conference v1ere known. lt ~ws argued i.n London 
that you COL!ld not draw a security line unless you 
first knet" \>here ttl6 sect.t:rity line in Indoc11ina 111as goinc; 
to be,24 
The ~§. of London voic1ed a ,~,eneral vi eM •Jh<m it said: 
So long as there is ground. for hoping that the 
Geneva conference may produce E\OilHJ r;:;sults, it 1;ould 
seem both premature and imprudent to m&ke a public 
declaration based on the expect(ition tbat 1t ~~ill 
fai1.25 
This 1-1as the British line of reasoning. Becatlse of 
SU(Jh an attitude, P:res:ld ant Eisenhcnver, in his nevis 
conference of May .Hi, 1954, hinted at an Asian alliance 
wi tt1out Bri tuin. <.:>k<~d I•Jhethu:r such a pact t:ould be 
fo3Ne'd_ Yofk 'l'imes, ilpril 14, 1954. 
25Quoted by Anne O'lltixe i•icCormick; in the ~ ~ 
~!h April 10, 1954. 
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effective without Britain •s support, tt1e President vJas 
reportt•d to have replisd in ai.'fect: (1) It must be remem-
bered that .hllstralia and Nevi zealand were the members of 
the British Couunon\~ealth t.hat "ere directly involved. (2) 
\•~itll the part;icipations of the proper i\f>iatic nations--and 
this participation he described as the first indispen;;:.able 
--H mi6 ht be possible to create an alliance that. •;nile not 
so b:road as one misht lil1::e • nevm~theles<>, coqld be 1>Jork-
C>6 
able."' The big factor, 1.1oVHlver, was tl1at tt1e Governmerrts 
of' 1\.ustralia and Ne1>J Zealand shared 'tile British vlevJpoint. 
In the past, ,~ustraliun sour cas have indica't<Jd that their 
government re;.~arded a Pacific allhmce as urgent.. As a 
mattE;r of' fact, Australia''; Fo:reign ~iinister • Richard G. 
G11sey, t'as NW of the very first to conceive of a "net~ plutl 
i;o d ef.end sou the as t l-;:,la. n27 But once the Geneva conference 
betan, 1\ustrttli.a agreed with Britain tll.Ht little could be 
done unti-l the talks on an Indocrlina settlement 1•ere 
completeo..2B Similarly. T. Clifton ('.:ebb of i\levJ Zealand 
served notice on liiay BO thBt hi<> country 1 s government 
1954. 
27Jiiohard G. Gasey, "Tela<< Plan to J)efe nd .sou the as t 
Asia," Unite9_ §.tates JLetvs l:m! \'Jorld Report, XXXVII (July 
16, 1954), [)0. 
1954. 
could not join a Southeast Asia alli<lnce unless Britain 
The cause o:f t,he difference in approaches bat111een 
the United StntHs and Great Brita:m ~e;as well explairwd by 
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President Eisenhov;er himself 1.n a nc;nvs conf'ererwe on May 51 
1954. neading from a formal statement the l?res;tdent se~ :Ld: 
It ·,.;as H:t:. Dl~LLes; t:lmino;, not his objective, that 
the British opr:osed. They agreed 11 southuast L;sia 
pact should riD ve the support of as many As:lan nations 
as possible. They insh,ted it Nould take time to l.et 
the consent of ti1ose nations an<1 such an agreement 
scaxoely could be negoti.ated by Gongres''• 
Besides • London argued, thG \'/estern pov1ers stlould not 
annourwe in adv;,.nca itJh<ot they we:re going to do militurily 
if :tt fulled, The r~Jsult of tt1is ;-;as that secretary 
Dulles did not get his united action policy ahead of 
GenevH and vms not able to negotiate f':rom strength 
there • • • 
vn,1a t is now clea:t:ly d eveloplnt.~ is a kind oi com-
promise. }~ri te.i.il did r:.ct •·mnt to negotiate a Southeast 
il.sia nact until ufte:r the Geneva conference and Ne lv<mted 
to ar1r1ounce at least t.he beginning of one before tho 
start of that conf'e:rence. Instead • the pact actually 
is i:>eine; negotiatedp or at lanst di;.,ctwsed during the 
Conference. 
The fact tl"J&t such an Ol:\,anization is in procesf; of 
.fornwtj.on co,Jl.d i1ave an imp or 'cant bearinb tlpon tvt1at 
happens at Gewwa dctring the Indocl1ina phase of the 
Conference.29 
Developments on th;s · other cnmp 1rH:Jl'e not all st:mny und 
bright, either. Diff'e:ren<:es in the political upproacl1 
------
29quotod in tho ~ XQ_rk Times, May 6, 1954. 
!_ 
91 
bet1r•een the Soviet and Chinese delegations to ttw confer-
ence v;ere described as "deeper than those now separatingn 
the Unit<Jd Btates, Britain and France over policy in Indo-
china and Korea. Stated a ct:Lspatch from Loudon in the ~ 
York Times: 
-1 A number of.' hints ~~ere dropped by soviet offlci.<Jls 
ll--11 -------,t,-;i:o;llic;-t~F~o=r~e':ign l'linisJ;_er_Mulo_to_v_&ncLnis-HdY-isor-s--'~!e-re-t;t'-y------c=== 
1
- ing to restrain the Gt1l.nese deleg<e.tion from imprudent 
__ · action at the conferonce tabl<J and elseWh<Jre. 
The :British ackno~>Jled,jJCl tho possibility that those 
l1ints 1:1ere circulated as part of' a Communist effort to 
I 
1 
I 
I 
uis courage l·iestern firmnes;; w:J. tt1 threat;> of resulting 
nggres!llon alsevlhere in A:c.ia. 
Our infoxm<>nt believed that trw Chinese 9 encouraged 
no dot~bt by the :recent d1Bpl<;y of it-! estern dis unity 
over air interventj.on in Indochina, no111 conslt\ (;red 
that by mainttdninb mlli tary prHssure Communi:3t forces 
could ;,Jin the entire country. 
Continued tho dis patch. 
The Htwsians • on tht; other hand, are said to talre 
the ·,teste:rn intention of ostablishing a syotam of 
collective defense in Sout.heest Asia much. more "' erioc1s 
than their Asian alliElS. But they tJ.:ro pictured as 
believitlio; that if the fie;ilting, but not ·t;he political 
infiltration of' ;rndochim; is ended nm~ plhns for the 
ree£;t;ablishment of a defense syutom 111i1l not set very 
far and • <>t tl:le ;,ame time, a 1•are: that mif:,ht become a 
starting JJoint for u l<orld uonflict l<~ould be <Jlimina-
ted.30 , 
'rile df.lveloping plans for the secuxity of' Southeast 
Asia ~JEJHl beginning to emphasize the need not only i'ol' 
30Drevl Middleton, dispatch from r..ondon dated May 7• 
1954; in the !:12. ;cork I~. May a. 1954. 
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military ,safeguards but in te:rms of economic devr>lopment as 
••ell. "~·Jith allied ano friendly nations consulting on 
prap, .. :rations for a prosp<lCtive southeast Asian conference," 
wrote ''<lltGr H. 'daggoner of the ~ Yox·k Times from 
Vlashington, D. c., "a three-point regional defense p:og:ram 
is taking shape hare." These points are; FirHt, the 
creation of an alliance of the ·,~estern polrJers and the fr.ee 
nations in Sout11oast Asia tind the Facif:!.c that >11ollld 
rEJspond in unison to milltary agg:rossion. B<'lGOfidp the 
strengthening of internal security forces to minimize the 
possibility of subversion or inf i1 t:ration. of free govern-
ments in tll;o threatened area. 'L'hi:rdly t xefl<loting tho 
need for a long~ran.:;e progra;r. fox combating Comraunism. 
would be th<l enccun;.geraent of economic development ftnd 
stubility to eliminate the conditlons on wJtlich Clommunism and 
oti}er subversive movements feed.3l As v;ill be noted shortly 
these points actually became the basis for the main provis-
ions of th<:-t 1'reaty. 
Although th<J essence of th.e Sl];ATO Pact 11as indicatet:i 
to the public almost from the p:rap~;:rHtion of the first 
l 
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tentative drai't~ no actual text was released in advance of 
the approval of the first draft by the governments of' tf1e 
original pro"pective member states. By 111ay of' explanation, 
the g<lne:ra.l public was given to understand that negotiations 
on tho treety were cond:1cted in official secrecy because. 
appa:Jlf,lntly, the 1id,sl'ws ~:u:ld interests of the proposed part-
f'--· -------cn"'e""· r"'s'-'· ~to the treaty needed to b<J understood and ft.tlly ~ considered prior to such commitment as 1t10uld be involved in 
1 the release of even a tm1tative draft. i>lso. there 
i appear<Jd to huve been a feelirlb that the les~; !mown by 
unfriendly po11HlJ:S of the proposed treaty content and the 
problems of nogotiation tho more effective the result mi.ght 
be. 
On Doptember 2, 1954, an advance woxkin£!., party that 
inolud ed all the ei;:;ht countries through th~Jir technical 
experts met in Manila in consultations on draft proposals. 
Nobody .vas goi~; to the confel'lmce "cold" or unprepared to 
cope with the bas.ic suggestions. MJ a me.tter of fact, the 
proposed treaty has already t<Jacrwd ;lts second or trd.rd 
draft as ttw resqlts of studies in Wast1ington concerning u 
Department •s exchanges of opinion i>J.'L th t.he other countries 
concerned. 
and London th<l <tgreE:ll'i objaotive vw.s to obtain a pact stu tint;; 
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the commitments of the :t-'flrticipants, re,tller than to set 
'7: ()-
up an organi.zation comparable to ttle North 1~tlantic Treaty.,),_, 
' Tile diplC~mats foresaw tlm main problem at the conference 
lvatJld be to define the commitments to be 'r;:;quir<.Jd of' each 
partie :I. pant. One possibl<l extreme would be a coro:mltrocnt 
l along 'thG Jines of the Brmssels treaty of ~~arch, 1945, 
!
1
:-. -------w,m.,ch reqLlill:d Britain, France, and the Benelux to go ·to 
! 
! ; 
111ar at.rto.mu.tic~'lly if anyon<a of them !.vas a·l;tacked. '.l'he 
United Stetos Constitution vJOuld noi; pexrnit such a coill.!Uit-
ment. l'he North ;,tluntic 'I'roaty contfd.ns a slit,rltly less 
p:t:Elcise ()OJUlllitment, It says an attack on one country shall 
be considered <m att~:wk on s.11, and ew.:h stwll tll<'.ll ·t;ake 
"s uctl mea sur ~;B &.b 1 t deems necessury, incle~di.ng the-; use of' 
fo:rc1o to restore und maint!iin "ecuri'ty in tile North 
AtlantJ.c area," Th<J ANZUS treaty a1nong thf,, United States, 
Australia und Now .;;,ealsnd is vague in that it; requires each 
country to ••act to meet the Communist darle_.er :i.n accordance 
with its constitutional processes." 
The Un1 ted st~J.tcs draft >rias accepted as tt:e bHSis for 
tbe discuss~lons at the first meeting of c;xperts attondine; 
t ' 1' j' " 'i 'X3 ·11e pre .lm .• laxy e>ess ons.'-' The tlu ee maln sect ions upon 
""<:>N v 1 '"i ' .· ·. t 1·" l<'"' ~"''lew .~.ox t i. mes J·•ll><US • ,.,14. 
---- ' ..... 
z,::J'l'il.lman Durdin, dispatch f':rom Nauilu datGd 
september 1, l9f;4; in the ~ York ·:r~, Beptembe:r 23, 19(.>4. 
\ 
l 
I 
which the experts had to attem] t to :reach the widest 
possibl(i measure of agreement on details before the top 
level representati-ves took over vJe:re: military commit-
ment, mutual aid a1;ainst subversion, aril mutual economic 
aict.34 
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On 1~1ue,ust 15, 1954 • it vJas announr;ed that a confer-
ence of tho United St<Ites and seven otl1er nations on t;he 
~formul<>tion ot a Southeast ll<;ian collective securit;y 
treaty vJill begin in Nanila September 6. 'l'he other coun-
tries to be repl'0Sented lcJere "Britain, l;'rlmce, J;ustralia, 
Nevi Zealand, Pakistan • the Ph:llippin<Js, and 'l'llnilans. 
Annotlncement of the conference was made simultaneously 
in th€ cai>itals of 'th<il partidpat.in~ countries. 
The United States State Department issued a circtllar 
that said briefly: 
Thu Government of the United t>tates has agl'<Jed v;ith 
other like-minded governments that thiJ situation ln 
southeast ,.f.;ia calls for t.he establishment or a col-
lective secu:r:Lty arran,~emont, in accordance 1riith the 
purposes and principles of thG Gh!ir te:r of t;he Un1ted 
Nations • to <i trengti:lcm the fabric of' peace in tile 
general area of' southeast ilcd.a and the southwest Paol;Cic. 
i\Cle.ms Llabmidt in the Ne~J York 'rirnE;s, 
--
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Accordingly • the Gover nm<Jnt of the Philippines 
ha vin(; offered facilities in Baguio, L,rater chanGed to 
Hanil~ tile f'meign ministers of 'the govorn.me.nts 
concerned hELVe agreed to meet there on September 6 to 
consider mt-Jasure~> to further their common objectives in 
trw ar(ol.l., This meetin~ follo"s consultations bet;veen 
the Uni tcJd sta tas Governmen·t ancl o tiler Gov<Jrnmen ts over 
the past four montt1s. 
"-----.~o-itli;~-c-n-e-oLJ-t-i.nUo-us-l~y'--s-inc-e--se c.r-t~ ta:ry--o;e--s t-a te--Dullatr ---------· -·------
r 
1 
I 
I 
first broached thG call for ••united action'' ln a speech on 
!!;arch 29, 19M, finally took on no\1 dimensions, 
VI. THl Mi\NILA CONF'EHJ£!NCE OF 1954 
'£h.ere vJas no question tlmt the foremost desire of 
:resnl ts and to pr<:;ser.ve. thra largest m<:;asu:~:e of' unity 
possible. l:lut tills did not ms an that the Conference was all 
sweetness and lit:ht. There \~ere debates, --plenty of them. 
One of the most controversial issues of the Confer-
ence centered on the nature of ·tne militaiy commitment. t~ 
number of cielegates, in :par·t;icular the Philippines and 
'Z5 Tl1ailand, '·' advocated tile conclusion of a pact providinG for 
m~tomr::.tic military action a~ainst pact m<Smbers "kw \Hlre 
victims of aggression, Sttci1 a prov:Ls:tcm ito contained in 
t 
I I' [ 
[ 
' 
] 
i 
i 
I 
J 
I 
i 
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the North iltlantic 'rreaty, In this l'egard, Herman Phleger, 
United .Stat<Js State Department advisor, explained the 
inabUlty of t.he United states Government to sign a 
commitment for automatic cu.:tion ut the meetin~ of technimll 
exp<>rts ~r;orking on the drai't. He shot1ed conference delegHtes 
that congressional sentiment had hardened. against f\trther ___ _ 
commitments of the NATO-type. He explaJ.neet that the Stat<fJ 
Depertm~mt va:ote the d:r:af't treaty that v1as used as a 
worldn<; document with congressional v5.e;.1s in minct.36 The 
draft provides i'or aotion agaj_n,;t aggressors only in 
acco:rd~:<noe 1rdth thcJ "constitutional p:roct~sses" of each 
pact slgnato:ry. 
lv!aanwhiJ.a~ the quastion of ivheth'l:r tr10J proposed 
treaty be protective spaciiicaJ.ly only ugtdnut Gomnumist 
aggression had upp€)ar ed as <!noti1ar conference issue. 'l'he 
article in the United states draft dealin;;; vJith sanctions 
againl't urm0d atttHJk mentions act:l.()!lS only ,,.gains t 
Colllmunist aggression. Most ottler delegations favored a 
mora general de.tiniti.on of aggression. Homnlo 9 in a 
public e;ddress in Mallila, Augus·t 30, wanted. to condemn 
· a&,ressive impel'lalism a!ld coloniali.sm ~Jlong vJi·th 
35.Benjamin ltiells, dis patch from Manila datod 
September z. 1954; itl th~; Ji'!Yl. Yorlr 11!!!2&, September 3, 1954. 
---
Communism. 37 ildvocates of a broude:r description of 
agg:ression. incllldj.ng the British CornmomJealth officials, 
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l :felt such a terminolo;;y <Jould 'be more palatable to Indian 
1
1 
flnd other mmtralist Asian opinion. The British, in 
particu1ur, had in mind the problem of lU<'lintainirl6 as much 
l 
1 C·:ammomvealth <Wlidarity vJith Indi~. as posdbl"· Both ti1a iL__ _____________ _ 
IT British and the Pald.stuni delegations took stron" stbnd on 
this question; the British contention bei.l16 tt1at to mune 
only Communist. agt,):'asslon 1r1ould be unduly p:rovocatj.ve to 
Hed China, l;o ~clhich government the Bx;tt:lsh 011e diplomatic 
recognition. :rho Unitt>d states, on the other hand • vms 
••• relc~etant to have ctle dascJ:iption of roiggress:lon 
so general that it '>Jould call. for United ctatGs 
actior:. in quarrels bet~;een non-Cmmnunist Asi<•n n<.<tiom>t 
for example, India and Paltdstan, (the latte:r a sie;na-
•;.;: ;l.i 
toxy), over .Kaslw1ir •"'"' 
In this connection 1 I<luhammed Zafrullatl Kl1an, Pakistani 
Foreig,"l Minister and head of his delegation, upon t;he 
conclusion of tru> conference said that Pakistan vwulcl h••lp 
ht;r neighbor India if lnd.i.a 11lere tlu:eatenod by any kind of 
danse r, includiw,c, a Communist at tack, J:l'ut h€ added ttr; t, 
snch support viOL1ld depend on <<he that India >·JOuld pend t 
---·--~--
LXIII, 
37 Quot<+Jd in t.tlG lli!!i XQ.!J£ :fimes, Aug;ust 31 0 1954, 
36" nou theast Asia; Cloud of Diff.i.cml ties~" 'J.:.illl<J ~, 
(SeptEimbe:r l~,, 1954). 32. 
.;-o 
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fmoth<:r controversy cantered around the questionoi' 
>>hethe:r tn\3 t:raaty should mention protection of Cambodia, 
Laos, and south Vietnam from ned aggNssion as its aim. 
Prince \,'an of' 'l'bailand supported thv Uni.ted Stat<as in 
urging th:d; ttl<a__J;rm;H3 __ §ta tel,lj:J_e_.l.11_c~gdeg_irl_lr!e __ ar,;a_-to 
l1e protact~rd, taking issc;e 1rJ:!.th British Corrm•on\Hilalth and 
Pllilippine delue;ntes ldllo 1.oanted no specific mention of 
protection for l;hz Indoci1ina territories. l'he Pe~ldstan 
pact a ptaely unti-Corwaunist one and against including 
speo:!.fic ;;m;1:rant<Je of Cambodia, Laos$ arlil free 1li0tnam. 
The reason for tt1is stand by Pakistan as "ell as a similar · 
stand tlJ' tl:le Philipp:tnes "seemingly lies in u :reluctance to 
guarantee areas that <>Ie ::rtill :to~,a:rded as colonial l"rench-
dominated rather than in any lack of' anti~Gommunist 
dete:rmina tion. u40 Only the UnHGd [;tr;tes and Tba:tland 
stood for S[Xicifically inclucUnc; tl1esa ·cnree states in th<1 
treaty area. 
----,.·---
39walter Simlll<ms, ct is patch .from han:I.la dated 
September 0• 1954; in the Ghica~ J:?ail.'l, l':r:lbune. tleptembe:r 
9 •. 1954. 
40Tillman Durdin. dlspatch from W>nilH dated SE>ptma-
be:r 7, 1954; in tile f.L~ ill!£ Time:;, boptember 7 • 1954. 
.. 
'., 
100 
Controversy over com1iu a ration of the article deaJ.-
it1g \V:i.th economic measures developed tov,ard tt1e final 
stages 0f t.hu Conference. The lis ian :r. epr esentat:!.vos s ou6 ht 
to .;et the \\'estern po~;ers committed to specific pro;;;rruns, 
wh<sreas the Unit4!d States, Britain, Australia, and N(t\>J 
Zeal<md --thc; ne:tion<J that would be provid il"JG I~ he economic 
----
assistance under tho pact--held o~>t for pilnrissive and 
gem•ral arnm,;:;ements. It ;·.Jas understood that Britain dld 
not lt.'ant to see the Colombo Plan, ~>hich operates vvith.in 
incorporatGd into ttv; economic machinery of.' the 8outhGast 
Asia pact, In a dispatch from Manna .sleamed in the 
Chi£!1}1;jO Qa~J,:,: l'l:ibune, ':ialter Simmons :r~::1p0r ts; 
Pakistan delogat•m :'Ho.id Britain had expressed con~ 
cern over Pakistan's participation in the r::anila 
Confererwa >>arning tt1e.n< ttlat India mi,_sht succeed in 
gettine; Pakistan kicked out of the eleven-nation 
Colombo bloc if she signed any defense c:o!flmi tm<mt at 
Manila ••• 
The report cont.inued, 
British concern ovar ttKI Colombo bloc ~rJas explained 
by the de Hire to pr 1went India from completely domin~ 
atirJc., tlH> group, , • , vii tll pukis tan out, the Hr it ish 
felt thut India ,,;;ould l:iield complete control over tne 
weaker nations.41 
-- -
4lvialt ex Sinu:wns, dispatch from Maniltc dated 
Sept~Hnber 7, 19M; in thH g_hic_£~0 Q§.;!Jz. :!,'!ibune, 
September 8, J.954. 
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The Asian delegates to the conference took the vie"' that 
the pact shoulc1 l:lring to them ,;peclal economic aid tile.t 
\>O'Jld not 1;,0 to nations outs:W e the pet ct. 'l'i1c fe.ct is that 
mL<tual economic assistance provides tlw United r;tates j;Jith 
an opportunity to exert its influel1ce in the realm in \'Jhictl 
.llmericuns particularly excel. 
The last important pxoblom involved in ccmrleting 
the pact that bound trw signers to r~::sist aggression in the 
pres or ibed area vJas reported settled in a cJo:.oci eonfexence 
session on the mon1ing of Sept ember s. \I'Jhat f'ollovm is the 
account given at th!cl last day of the con:fo:re.nc<il b;l Tillman 
New 
-
York Times. He said: 
- . 
Tl1e morning session vJS.O not terminated t.mtil 1:15 
.P.M. • rno:re tllun i'cu.r hou.rs after it had began. A round 
of c:lappins vJas hcoard fl'Clil the c:losec\ conference twll 
before dele,;ates emerged stniling ani x ernarked: "It 1 s 
all ovex." 
lt i:; understood that purely technical details of 
draftinb took a t;!<Jat d<lal of tim<l after basic agree-
ment rwd boen r'mched on Otltstancl111i·, quesi;ions. All 
other Wlljor obstael(.;s to the conclusion of the treaty 
vJere :resolved at ti>O intensiv!J, three hour closed 
sessions of tho treaty conference delegates ye&terday 
morn:lns and afternoon. (Daptember 7). Difi'lcL<lties 
1i<eNl :reported to have developed on a number of' points. 
But compxomises were reached and mos·t dettdls ~>Jerel 
settled f'or a paet that >Vill not differ greatly from 
the t:rettty proposals the United states sqbmitted as a 
.vo:rkinc; dxaft to exrerts of the e~,, ht. po.vers c;ho assem-
ble(! to produce a comnos :its docmnent he.,ro last 1rleek.42 
---·---
42'J?Hlman Durdin, cUr;patch from Manila dated ceptem-
ber ~.>, l9b4; in th<> ~York.£~, September e, 1954. 
. 
• 
102 
To wrap up the Conference succet,sfully • it became 
necessary that compromises be made. The Un:Ltcd Statos 
compromi<>ed on the insistrmce that tt1e pact be exclusivtlly 
tm anti-CmrllllUtli~\1; one. It vJas agrowd to state tl1at us far 
as the United states vJas concerned ttHJ pact arplied only 
to Collllllunist augrassion. In return, John :FcltltEi.1.' Dt:ILLes 
conceded tho omission of thG vmrd "Communism" ln :reforence 
to agg;ression in tlH; operative I!Iticle of thEl treaty. 
Advocacy o:t:' a. NA'.i?O-type claut;<'! deemil:li~ an attack on one 
an assault on all. especially by nale~;;ates of the 
assertedly ilu.d maintained that a proposed caluHa in the 
Southeast Asia i;reaty provi6lng for action against 
aggression aocordtn;;e; to constitutional processes \~as not 
v;aake:r than tl1e Atlantic pact provisions. ln deciding 
that ttw erea of the treaty would be "tl1e general area of 
Southeast; i\Sla, includinr::; the <mtire ter:rito:ries of ttle 
Asian membG:rS of the pact and the South1.¥est Pacific," but 
"not· includ ine; the Pacific area nor til o:f 21 dcgre<ls 30 
minut<HJ north," tile United r>tat<>s a.nd Britain actually 
compromised since tl1is line .excltldes both Hon6 Kor),;s anu 
Jl"ormosa. Thailand and the United St~o1tes 0 advocates of 
havtng the operative articltl of the ·t;reaty specifically 
state thL<t CL~rnbodia, Laos 1 and South Vietnam be protected~ 
agreed to a J!'rench prc;posal that mention of tiul thxee StatEm 
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be made in a protocol. <Jllich is included as a part of Li1e 
treaty documento/ lt was deemed inadvisable to include any 
spec:!.f'ic montion of Vietnam in the op<lrative a.:rticl(' of 
the southHI:lst As.ia treaty ln v.l.evJ of 'theJ ~f:lase-fire agree· 
ments prol.J.ibiting eitrHli of tha tvJo Vietnams from enteninb 
into any !find. of mili ta:ry pa.ct untH ~~lections a:re held 
in 19bti. ;Lho, it l<;ft the proe,rams aud instrumentalities 
for econorn.ic assistance mainly d lscretl.ona:ry. 
'rhe e.l.ght si tJ;nato:rieo to the ~louttleast hsia Colloc-
tl.ve Defense Troaty, as the pact became on'icla.l.y desig-
nated, as lis·ted in tile of.ftcial directory of the 
Ims tralin: 
. . ' 
Ji'rn.nco: 
Pakistan: 
Philipp:tnes: 
Richard G. Ga.sey • Minister of 
fl:xternal Lf'fain> • 
T. Clifton V!ebb, J•!;inister of 
Exter n,.l Af:t'airs. 
Chaudh:r i Hullwmn<l1 ZafJ: tllla JJ1<H1~ 
M5.nis tc:r fo:r. Fou:llc,n f>.i'l'airs !:llld 
C:ol!ll~oni-Jeal th Hela tions. 
Carlos P. Garcia, Vico Presiden·t 
and concurrently Secretary o.f 
Foreign Affal.rs. 
Prince \-'.ian V!aith~J.yakon, iJiinisttn of 
Ji'or<~4,n AHe.:lrs. 
UnUed Ktngdoru of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 
United Stutes: 
Marquess of Reading, Minister of 
State, Foreign Office, 
,John FoE te:r Dulles, Secretary of 
State; U. D, senators H. i!J.exander 
Smith { Hep. N.J.), and F1ichael J. 
Mansfield {Dem. Ntont.) 
CHitPTEH V 
PROVJ:SIOND OF 1'HE 'THl(,<i'l'Y 
The t:r eaty text sp<1lls out in broad terms the extent 
to c~hicll. ttle United States f'ind s it expedient to under take 9 
under its Constitution, to define its oblit-;.ations am thoHe 
-------- ---- ---- -------- -- --------- ---- --------
of otilb:r pc<.:rticipating na-t;ions in the inte:res t of ti1eir 
common security. It is u brief and simple docmneut and., as 
has been pointed out in a vJhi te paper issued by tho 
Department of Stat<-l• its· pov;e:rf'ul impact on world affairs 
cle.rives frolll t.l1ese three factors: the stature f1nd s·tren<oth 
_of the states support in,~ the arrangement; the prec.mr:l.ous 
security situ~:~tion in souttwast Mia and th:: lt.Jestfo.tn Pacinc 
to which it :i.B Cie:sie;ned to bring collective defense aeainst 
open armed a_,"':ression as well as defense against subvorston; 
and the improvmnent of economic and social conditions 
throue:;h cooperative pro:::;ranw for the &dvancement of' the 
peoples of the areu.l 
I, l'iiiiiN PHOVISIONS 
continuing i'ai th of the sigrw tory members in tl:10 pur poses 
lu;.nsVJ0rs and Questions on the Ei:inila pact 
pacific Charter,•• pepartmer!.!;, 2£ .~tate Publication 
No. 8 (Viaslllne;ton~ D.C.: February, l>JD:)), 1, 2. 
I __ _ 
lOb 
and principles of the United Nations Charter >'lllich embody 
their desire to live in peace and amity 11li th all peoples 
and governments; desires to promote stability and well• 
being in the t:reuty area, strengtl1en peace and uphold 
demooxatic principles; promote economic development; 
and ttmt the members vli11 coordinate ti1e:lx e:ffoxts for 
collective defense; recognition that all nations in 
Sot~theast "sia are entitled to self determination. 
Since the CMrter of the United Nations r;et forth 
in de tBi1 thcJ mn cllinery and the p:ro cedu:r as availB bl"' for 
th<> settlem~ent of lnte:rnational disputes by peaceful means. 
there was no need to outline n~ll; machinexy or procedures 
ln the tr<:~aty. Hov1e11e:r, the signatories d:id assume certain 
definite oblit;;at.ions. They are as f.ollovJs; 
Ar·Ucle I calls :Cor settl.i~, internat:i.onal disputb8 
by peaceful means under t\1e United Natio.rw Chetrter. 
{lrticle II says member nat ions by self-help and 
mutual aid ltJill maintain a C<lpaci ty 11 to resist armed at'thck 
and to puv1.mt <HK\ overcome subversive activity d:irectcd 
from w i tho tlt. " 
promote economic stabill ty and social well being. '1 
Article IV agrees that each party vJill meet the 
"common dant,e:r:" of armed attack in thcl treaty area o:r 
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against any member "in accordance ·with its consti tlltional 
processes"; in case oi' aggression members 111111 "consult 
immediately :ln order to agree to measures v;hic:h sr10ulcl be 
taken .for common defense"; aid >11111 te sent to an attaclwd 
nation only on reque<;t. 
'I'he rsouth<:H:tst Asia Collective Def'ell_s_e_'.l'l'iiJa_tJI__i§. __ not 
~------------------
unique among treatiem of alliance. It provides that any 
armed attack and all measures taken in com;equence shall 
be reported to t!1c secLuity council of the United Nations 
and trvJt suGh atlts s l1all be broue,ht t(l an end ''lhen the 
cecur i ty GoqrH:il has taken septs to res to:r e and maintain 
int<Ornntional p<laoe and securit.y. tBy virtue of Article VI). 
i'~o:reov,,r, it dO<.iS not nffect in any »ay th<l rights anti 
obligations tl!'l..de:r the Charter oi' the partio<> which are 
members of tr1c United Nations nor does it conflict witt1 other 
existing treaties. 
II. FUR'rHER PR01/I8IO\I!S 
Geog:raphim•.lly spi.H>kin,,;, the 'freaty dELsignates as 
"the t:r(;laty ;;;.:rea" thu <~genera~ area of Southeust Jisla, in-
cluding also the entire territories of the AEian Parties," 
and "the general area of the Southitiest pacific not lncludiu.; 
the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north 
latitude,'' (Article VIII) At the time o:C treaty signint;!; 
the state~> agreeing t.o become members of' the pact wore 
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those eight coLmt:ries already listed above. The txBat 
text provides also that the merubar parties may, by 
unanimous at;:reement, invit'" any othur "state in a position 
to furthor the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute 
to the socm:ity of the Area" to becom<l a member of the 
pact. (Article VII) 
With respect to o:rganizution, the treaty provides, 
under Arti clo V, for the es tablisl1.llHmt of a Council on 
\•J:1ich each of the pa:rties will be repl'e.' en't<>d and directs 
that this sllall be so constituted as to be able to meet 
promptly at any ttme to consider matters concerning the 
implementation of the treaty. 
Other details of organization and procedure are not 
specified in ttle treaty; they are t;o be ~Jorkec: out on the 
basis of practical experience. It is evident that a 
considexable degree of flexibility in the application of 
·the treaty v;as intended by tl1ose who draft<>d it ann this 
vdll make it all thG more adaptabl<l to unforeseeable 
~lituations ~•hie!'! may arise. 
The Treaty shall enter into force botl•een 'tl'le States 
Which. have ratified it as soon as the irmt:ruments of 
ratification of a majority of the signuto:ries t>h<--11 have 
deposited, lmd shall come lnto effect viitil respect to 
sach other State on the dat(J of ti1EJ deposit of its 
instrument of ratification. (Article IX, :Sect1 on 3.) 
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Article X states the treaty is to endure 1rJi thout 
time limit, •>i.th any party able to loi.thdl'!l.\11 by c;iving one 
year's no~lce. 
Article XI say~1 that lmg.lish ls the official lang-
uage of the treaty. 
i------------------oi-1~1:---.--BJ:-G,\JJ:-F!-cJrNT--1rr£A'1\j}l1~8--------- ---------------------
Th~Jre is considerable evidence o:t' a remarkable 
degree of 1111kemindedness'' among the members of the several 
governments respecting both the content of the treaty and 
<) 
the form it should take under the UnHcod Nat ions Char tGr."' 
Since there etas no doubt in arzy qu;:,.rter that without thu 
full vlillir..gness of the United States to be a party to the 
pact its promotion 1vould be useless, the pr J.ucipal and 
probably the extremely s i;snificant question vJtlich arose 
du:ri.ng discussions of thcJ txeat draft pertained to t;hethGX 
the United States could under its Constitution take action 
involving th<J tlse of armed fo:rce in an emergency. ('rhougll 
Secretary Dulles rAid make clear' on sever<tl occtJsions in the 
past "that one of the conditions which 1tJ6 have aJ..ways ;3tood 
on is tl:'lf.1t there mqst be congressional sanction to any such 
2Robert Tr~Ambull, dispatch from Manila dated Septem-
be 9, 1954; in the Ne>v XQ.!.!£ Times, S<Jptember 9, 1954. 
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action.'' )3 
United States. !!J!il.)!ary £Q.~i tment ~illl.lh. The 
answer to this question 1;as found in a fornmla tvhich tile 
Secretary of Stato presented, first to the delsga.tes at 
the Manila Conf'<JrencG and at;ain to the first CounoJ.l meet~ 
23-2fi, 1955. Of the nrs1; instance. he said: 
We consider<..>d a.t ~.Janna lw~J to 1mplemen t 'l':he treaty. 
One possibility lrJas to create a joint military force, 
However • I explained that the United Gtates' respon-
sibili ti<> s were so vast and so fa:r-flun~~ tb.l~ t 1~e 
believed that '~>le would serve bast P not by earmarking 
!'orcas for particular areas of th(j l~'ar r~ust. but by 
devalopinc:, the daterx ent of mobile striking povier, plus 
str:ategically placed reserves. 
This via11Jpoint l>as accerted. Thus, ·t11e treaty l•Ji11 
not requirE~ us to make mb.terial changes in our milita:r;y 
plans. These plan,, already cF.lll fox our maint;aining at 
all times powerful ntwal antl air forces in the liestern 
Pacific capable of st.riJdng at any ug;:;ressol' by means 
and at; places of our choosing. 'l"he dete:rrent po>>er 
we thu.s creats c~;m protect m~my, &s GffectiV<Jly as it 
protects one. 
At the Bangkok meeting ot thH Council, Mx. Dulles 
unda:rtoolc to give a mox e detailed analysis of ·~he si tu.ation: 
,, 
0 John Foster Dulles, "United states Policy on rarti-
cipa tion :l.n Collective Defense," ~lepa;r:~! of g;~~ Bulle-Uno XXX (June 7, l9t-l4), 66~'>. 
4F1eprinted in the Q.£!'le~ressiona1 ll.§.~--Genate • 
.November 9, 1954, p. 14753. 
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, • • for military purpose~;; 9 the Chinese C:orrum:mist 
f'ront tlhotll.d be :t'B,saxdad as <Ul entirety bt'Hwuse it the 
Ctd.nese Communists enG;age in open lotrltad uggresflion this 
t-;ould probably me~m that ttlt'ly have decict<'d en g<!tH;rel 
~~~1:r in Asia. '£twy t~ould then l1ave to taiw into vacount 
th·s .mLrtuvJ. def,;ns.t; tretttliBH of tl1~;; Unit~a :st,at(is v~ith 
the RopubJ.J.c of Koren and this l':epublin of Cl>im, .• and tl1e 
for c~~s rm:d.ntrJ.ine·;ct t.:H.'lde:c th<~m Q 1!i'lus gBner a1 Wtt.r ~ ... u,uld 
confront tho Gbimlse conllmmir;t" i¥5.th tasts ut :;llH 
D:-\Jt:tth 1 eent(1r HX'id Noxth, ta.sks vttl:tch "'v:JQqJ.d strain t~J.eir 
1tlbdGqua te mr:,anB of' transp<>:tt~~~9~_! _ 
---------------------
'l'he United tltat<Ja in pr21:r ticulu:r l:li'xs sea <m.d aLe 
fox <J•SS 1.1()\:o eqtd.pr:·ed \<1 th ne·vi und pcY\,€l:Cfql vwupom; of 
p:reois ion. tihitHl mm tJtt<;Xly des tro~1 lll1lithl'Y tn:r g~;tll 
t1:1.thwllt <:ndml(:\erine,; uru Glatud cJ:l.Viliun c<:mtHr::;;. 
oux ~r.rs::.:~~lty Cr.,P~-~lcilfl <'~J'tex t:~·PJ-·-tv.i::it1>.:: .. thG .mili·tcary 
!ac'tox s • oonolt:~ded ttw.t the avu:Uabl(; mil:i;~ary J'OI•ar 
Of ''<'""'"' ''''l'li', '"'Y''·' c)"'' ''''t•··•'"'"; ·-,_. o_-,•-'.'.·''1 •:t·no.v' '"'''''""'"O'l J..uo~oW'-'t :..~ ... .,) .,..__ :>,.}V 1.'"»>~ - .,t .. ..\.'14 '-'..;....,_..,~4,;;- > .\: ~ ~""•'-""~'"'<,.~; "'QW<l•t •. ,o;.·;~,..,.,.~ i, 
agaim>t tklto txoaty aroa. 
In onie:r to b:rlr~; our povn.'lr to a oonct~:r tC~d pitctl, 
,~.,~ •ui ·; i1··we; '•('"'i'·"'"''~- "~ ''' ,,,.,troi,· "'t··.>·t· .. ,.• ">··"'" '•V·J""' ,.~"""" .;t.,..-,._ .;,~'"·~ ;;.;; .. .\v ..,,.- ....... -..~ '·"'·"" ""''J>~~Il:.'ll:~-·- ~..,....,c.._,~.,.,.~~ ~"~ ... -o-~ ~ ...... ~.= .. 
to6(~-t-tlc:r. :C·t J.::; expt"){!tea tho.t anoth~jx military J:c:acetine 
\·Jill be lwld f.1t. :·.e.nUa rwxt montl'l (l.•pli:L, l~ll!5). In 
·thi.s \iay irlfonM> tion I• ill be axcl1!1tJgnd (lbout tho 
t··orces idht~Hl cOLll.D- b:0 uaae av~:-iil~~tla~ tJJld st.t~l'tGgi.~t3 
can be H(Steed upon. Also out of' i;hHSI:l JGE!(lting;:, mny como 
!)) , w• "' f'," ., .• ., .. ,,), 1 "·') rl '''ill '" , "', ,, ""'"' " 1 q .,,, b >l .. o..'.!.>t..._. .,..-,,lJ. "'''#"'-'A~-..--.,.,,. ·u-~ •. ,IAW·.d...,_'Y UJ~o>;;::...,'i..i,...,,;~;:.:.:.;(.;1-$ 
!, -
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'the Philippines propN>ad the paci;fic Chax·te r as a means 
of maldnt it clGar that the nations at the Manila Coni'er~ 
ence are dedicated to sedcinc:, the "el.fure of th<J "-si<>n 
people and \"ill .!1£.1! promote colonialism. It viill probably 
bH both rHlevant and interestin6 to nota at tllis point 
-----------
the editorial comments of Life ma~;azine on tl1ls narticular 
--- .. -
subject. It reads; 
Moreover, a declaration of the r:l.,ghtn of all Asian 
nations to freedom and ~;el.f-cloterm:t.nutj_on vms cvatc:recl 
do"n by colony-consc:l.ous Britain. It v.;as the A<d.an 
memb,1xs of l\li\NPAC (f'or HB,nilb .rnct), led by ttw 
Philip nines' far-sighted Pxesident Ramon l0o.gsaysay--
vigo:rously supportec! by Dullos-··Who drov<:J through a 
separate P<lcific Charter assexting thHse ~iims, t-ihich 
all tl:le pm•lBl'S F igned. Thi.s Charter may prove moxe 
pmverfu1 than the treaty in taldnti, the onus of colon-
ialism from th<:J \Vast.''; desire to <.a.ve fxeedom. JTi t-
tingly anolli_,tl H came !'.rom th(;l f:reely elected leader 
of a forf:;er colony liltlich Amerioa voluntarily set on 
its own~ 
Dulles explained tr.1e importance of' tt~<l Pacific Clmrtor 
iu trl<Ose wo rd s : 
In my openine_; address to the conference, I empnas-
ized thc:·t:. one of tho mo~. t ef:f'ecti V<:l vwapotlS of col!llnlll~­
ism \vas -~o pretend that the Western pov•ers were seekine .. 
to impose colonialism on t;l1e t\sitm peoples. I said v<e 
mllst mal><> :i.t abundantly clear that 111e tnt<md to inVii:-
orate lndependenc.a. "Only then can t!'JB i-:es't b.nL\ the 
East "OXlt to,",eth1.Jr in true fellowsl1ip." 
------
6)J:d:!.t.orial 0 "II Treaty 1s Meanin£; for hsia,•• l:,J£§!. 0 
X',.-', ·x'"I 1 r -·· ,_ b ~oo 1""' 4 ) •· " • · v , >c•<IIJ"G0Ii.i er '-.. , ;y;j 0 O:lfl• 
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TrliS Ivlanilu Conference raced up to that issue. It 
was the f'i:cst Conference 1r1b.ure :rHprasentative nations 
of' .Asia end of the !:lest sat dmvn together to work out 
a prog,:ram of' mutual security, 'fhe result 1;as thid 
Pacific Chu:r ta :r, uJllich, in ringing tel'lllS, dedic<Jtes all 
tt1e signa tor j,es to uphold tl:lkl principles of sGlf'-
determinat :Lon, self- govor nrMmt • and inl ependonce f'o:r 
all countries whose peoples desire :tt and are able to 
undertake Us :rasponsibilit:les. 
\ihenever there a:r :l[JEIS in i>Sia a povJer that•,;~:~nt_s __ t_o.__ __ 
-------,ccrnq•.rBx--uure-x-s>it-<iCtoptT1ttie -mot to;-- -,, .1\iila -foi the 
AsiHns." Tl:ie Japanese, ~o;hen ttwy were dominated by tile 
war lol'ds, used that slogan. Today, trJB sov5.et and 
Chinese Ccrnmun:l.l;s i1eve adop1;ed it. ThEiy v1ant to pre-
vent !;he free count:ries of' Asia f1•om gettir)6 the help 
they need to preserve their tndep•3ndenoa. 
The Pacific Ch<lrter, on •~t1l.ct1 tht,; li:ast and the \: o";t 
did meet 1nay ~JeJ.l prova to be tho rnor:;t raonmntou.s 
product of the conference. 7 
In the eyc)S of other Asian <~ollntries then, the-> 
pacific Char·l;er st;ands as a pooJerful refutation of Comumnist 
appraisals of \/estern motives. 
In a colorful ceremony on ,,september 8, 1954 9 the 
secretary·~me:ral of the Conference announced that, in 
accordance ~>li.ttl the decision of the Gonf~>z:ence, "the Pleni-
potentia:ry Hepresantative or H<:Jpresentatlves of oacl:l State 
, 7 Address of Secretary Dulle<> deli vexed to th<il nation 
over radio ancl telovision on September 15, 195tl, on the 
11Manila Pac·c nnd the Pacific Cha:rtex," in the QeJ~'t! 2f 
State Bgll~rt;ith XXXI (Sopt f.ill! b•9I 27 0 1954) • 432-~')3. 
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as cand the :ros t:rum to sign the th.ree documents." Shortly 
a!'terwa:rd a certified copy of tllo si6 ned docuumnt ;vas 
placed in tl1<: r11:mds of President l\i.senholier for t:ransmission 
••witil a vievJ to l'ocoiving tl1e edvice nnd consent." of tl1e 
senate of the United Sl;ates to ratification. Other copies 
111ere being transmitted a_t _ t!1_e __ ~>ll.l!lf>_~j_n)_e __ t;() J;M otll<n _sig;na .. _______ .. ~=== 
tory states to be submitted to ttwi:r :rospectiv{; ratification 
pro cad ur es. According to t;rea ty ter·n1s, tl'lo pact ~;as to be 
officially in existence "as soon ns tlHl iD..si;xumonts of r;Jt-
if1cat1on of' a majority of the signatories shall have been 
deposited Nittt the Government oi:' the Hepublic of the 
Pl1ilippinos. '' Th(:J:r(iUPlltl thd <i.ll.lance \'us to be I'eady to 
function. 
I'i;; appea:red tl11-'t th(lcie tlho drafted til•> t:tc.HJ.ty text 
h.ad consida:rabl: con;fidence the,t, once sii;;n<?.d by the foreign 
m.inistcu s oi the J:Jar ticlp11 t irli;; staJ~ .. ~fi, J.t, v.iot:!lil be ratified 
lvithout aruendment by the C:>OVerr;ment,s tnvolv<ld. SEN!.'O 'ias 
ratif'ied, to use 1)G(;Ietary Dul1<Hl 1 11<iOH1s • "promptly and >·lith 
virtual urr:inimity. '' !t v1as submi ttt~d by a Rop::;blican 
J?:rasident to a Democ.:ratic-co ntrollac\ body • aloUt; 11:1. th a 
simila tre2ty Hith Nationalist China and a :reqU<iS'C for 
congrassion~;;l au tt1or :tty to use thcJ armed fo rc<>s of the 
United States :i.n the JSbrmo:;a area. J1ll treaties 1r1ere rati• 
fied and the coni&l'essional authority grant,CJd dsspite tlw.t 
poli tic~;l di viB ion. 
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The treaty, l<i th the exception of one vote cast 
again">t it by Senator :·.illirn;, Langer, a congenital dis<Ji-
8 favor able action on January 24, 1955. The :report re-
ct::pitulated essent;ially all of the arguments advancetl in 
r-------f-'a_v_o_l_· _o_1_'_t_·rw allirHlCG. ili'ter much ca:r:efl).l Gt_el_~b":r_a:ti_or~, ___ _ 
the Senate, ty a vot" of 82 to one appxoved ths resolution 
of' rutific<ltion on February 1, 1955.9 Then ln a press 
:release on the f.l5th, the State Dape.:rt.ment s tatEld that 
"The Treaty enter<:d into force Febx•uury 19, l\Hi5, i'ollovJing 
ttte depos:U; of thu inst:ruman'Gtlliti<:w o:t' :rat.i.fit;fl·c:i.on \·d.th 
~ile t;;ove:rnment o:f tll·2 he public o::'' tho i:'tlHippines • .,J.O 
O.:f the £>p0ed 1tJi th \'Jhicb. SEA~~\) \:;as :r:ntif:t~:d by ths 
Congress, D\llles said~ 
These events demonstrate a capacity for action rJhich 
is certainly ne(j(.1ed in che "o:rld t.od~'Y• Too often 
rep:resontutiva p:rocessec> lend t;o nucLt pa:rtisnnsb.:Lp and 
such consequent delay:c; tt111t ho::.til~J foraes an; encour-
aged to tJGliovo that ttlo democn,ci.os ani inhe:cently 
ineffective. 1'ho Government of thr; United Statos has 
shovm the contrary. )'a:rtisarwl1j.p w<w uholly subor-
dinated ·to the natlon~~J. good, so that action of great 
importance could tJe talten vJ;t ttl del:tberatlona, 'bLlt c·Jith 
decisivenesrJ. 
BQQ_ng:ressiona:},.~£2!.9.:--Senate. Janut;ry 2<1,1955, 
P• 514. 
9c:or~:ress:i.':2..!:lal Pecorg_--r.enete, FBb:r;nuy 1, 1955, 
pp. 891-92. 
lO"Hesults of Meeti!Jb oi' Council or Eot:rtlaeast hSian 
Pact," llit12.ar~msnt g,t :?:tate .Dlllillin, XXXVII (I•iarch 7, 195b), 
371. 
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For this the nation can be grateful to the leooer• 
ship and to th<:~ general membership of both purties in 
tb.e Corli;,ress. And I know that tney >;ould v~tmt me to 
pay special tribute to Wal te:r :F. George, toJho • as 
chainn&i.1 of' the Denate Foreign Helations Committe<:~, 
carried tllu heaviest agg:re.,ate burden of HlSponsib-
ility.ll 
LIMITS Oli' ~rHT<. DEFENSE A REA 
'Xhe tiu:ee ,·;estern Pot<ers, tt1e countries of ttw 
>festern Pacific. and their Pacific allies--thHse nations form 
the core of' any feasible plan for coll€lctive seouri ty in 
L----------- - ---- ------------- -- ------ - -
Southeast i·ltiia. The i:r in t<Jxest in a pol :!.tical pact desil.;,ned 
to give safety :Lu the long run from un"a.rran t<Jd external 
attt>ck needs no c>pellil1G out. Undoubtedly tl1ey believe in 
a Sou the us t !ltoia pact as the most practical means of 
achieving a measure of collective security in the fac<:l of 
intensified Communist activitil:ls in that part of the WOl'ld, 
and of making head~Jay toward the objectives outlined in the 
Charta r of the_ United Nat ions. 
Beginninc; in mid-April 111hen Dulles left London and 
Paris to confer on the establi,;tlment of a security anang<;-
ment in the Pacific area, thexa was a good deal of 
discussion and sp<JC<.ll& tion as to the logical extent and 
11lllits of JUI:ltnbership in the alliance. Vlhile it is txue 
that an (-mlarged group of states wie,;ht represent J;reuter 
weight tmd prestige, thid more numerous tlle component phrts 
the e,reatl:lr >vould be tlle likelihood of internal disagree-
ment and weakened common purpose. 
I 
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I, EXCEP'l'IONS TO THE: (}l;<;,QGRiiPHICloL HOLE 
The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Tr~;;aty as 
si~;;ned on SGptember o, l9f)4, applied--at lc:mst potentially 
--to tbe >1bole of Southeast 1\<Jia and the \iestern Pacific. 
li'or one r.tiason or another, however • not all of the states 
el igi bl e for in q;L_tlSion_£r om--~e og:r a.ph-ic al--point·s------or--vi-av; 
have been or are lik<llY to be embraced by the treaty. 
India. Burma, Ceylon, ~~!'!.· Arart from 
Pakistan the remaining foul' of tho uo-called Colombo po>11e:rs 
--India, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia--have indicated 
varying degr<ws of unvJillirJGness to joln the anti-Communist 
bloc in il<ia. India has consistently opposed the S'outheast 
Asia defense plun, or any other collective security p£1ct for 
that mHtter. Indone~da, 1oh:Lch usually aligns herself with 
Indian policy, has t&ken virtuu.lly the S<itrr!e lim. Burma and 
Ceylond tlave been 11 less" opporJed to the idea o:f' a south<>ast 
Asian defense organization but neither hus shoirm a desire 
to join it outright. This cooln<.,ss on tll<l part of fou:r of 
the five Colombo pm<ers (so-called because their PI ime 
Ministers met at Colombo in l~:>te f1I'r1l, 1954 to concert a 
joint policy between the Communist and the anti-Conununist 
forces in Asia), has come as a disappointment to the 
!''estern Gover.nmentH • especially 13ritain. 
---
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From the start of th<:~ Geneva Conference on i~pr il 
26, l9fi4, l1nthony Eden, then British Foreign Secretary, 
has follo>•ed a consistent pol1cy with r<Jgard to creating 
a stable Boc<theast Asia. This policy has had three main 
1'acets: (1) to help stop the "hot vmr" in Indochina; 
(2) to as<>od.ate the Colombo pmHns, and other friendly 
nations, 11Jith an Indochinese armif'tice; !H1d (3) to persuade 
them to join Britain and the United Stat<lS in an !:l.ff'ective 
de:fense alliance to ht'llt furthGr Conununist aggression.l 
·rne .first t'wO elements of this policy have all eady been 
realized. An Armistice has been <~ttained in Indochina. 
On August 10, the :five Colombo po111ers, lad by Sir ,John 
Kotela<Jalu, Pr :Una Minister of Ceylon, formally associated 
themselves with the armistice agxeenmnt end expressed their 
hope that no pa:r ties to the pact 1r1ould breach it. '.l.11e third 
part of the British <•im, llOI<aver • has not been achieved, 
though Bri. tuin !:las never entertained higl'l hopes that lndia 
--and 1;tv~ smaller Asian poto~ers arounc1 her--lvould join a 
proposed t3outheast treaty organization. At the same timEl 
British r;tatesmen have maintained that there could be no 
successful system of eolleotive defense in Southeast Asia 
1)3enjarnin Vielles, 6ispatetl .from I,ondon dated 
Aur;>ust 6, 1954; in the ~Xork 'rimes. AUgust 7,1954. 
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unless th<> count:r:l.ss of the area ·t;helllselves took part in it 
11Jllol~~heartedJ.y Hnd effectively. British policy makers 
"still re",a.rd India and Burrw..t as the tvJc most important 
links in the chain of Communist containmEJnt that mu~'t be 
forged ln Southeast Asia.,::. and British policy ~cJill prob-
ably continue to attempt to attract t.hes.:i t>•Jo p0111ers 
gradually into the collective security fold. 
I·JO\•Jeve r, "Nehru has consistently ru:gued that 
collective secnrity pacts tend to nullify peace efforts by 
promoting •tansion 1 " 3 and com;iders ·the ne,; Souttleast Asia 
pact "most unfor t01na te. "'* 'l'he .fact is that the IrJdians 
have gone much :further. '.I.'hey have been wo:rkinl;l; on 
influential Bxitons to take a more indapendant a·ttituue 
tovoard the Unit oct states hl Asian affai:rs. 'J:J:Iti influential 
;c1me~ .£!:. India said editorially on April 15 1 1954, thut 
Britain's acquiescence in the \'iashington program "is dan-
gerously near a spineless appeasBment of an impoxtunate 
5 all;,•." li. predominant measure of Indian newspaper opinion 
2tondon dispatch dated August 14, 1954; in the ~ 
Iork !!!lJ£.§., Augnst 15, 1954• 
3Nev; York :rim<JS. April 16, l9b4,. 
-----1' 
4ctlristian science IVIonitor • [36p.tembe:r <1 1954. ~~~~~ ------- ~~ 
5Quoted in the lli!.! :{or!£ .:gimes, April 16, 19t54. 
' I 
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sa1r1 the propoc.,ed Southeast Ashm alliance as "a ne\11 attempt 
by the \1!estern powers to re-impose foreign domination•• in 
countries ne1rJly free or struggling to ba free of colonial 
:rule.0 
In a clpGech before the lov1e:r Chamber of' Parliament l on Aagust 15, 1954, Nehru declared that the forthcorJlill6 talks 
,:-, --------- .---·-------- ----------- - --'----
[ j 
I 
in the Philippines 1rier<J ''lilcely t;o reverse tt1e t:wnct of 
conciliation released by the Indocl:lin.a settlement." 
Collectj,ve aecurity can come only by 
••• resolving vJorld tensions and developing a 
pattern of' coll<~ctive peace •••• IF:e are appreherw:lve, 
th0refore, that the. propm1ed t>out11east il:sian collective 
organization, ~Jill in tl'lP present uo more harm than 
any good that it may hope to do in the fLlture. 
He added that his recent talks v1ith Chou En··ll.d., Chinese 
Communist Prmnier awl Foreign IUnister, had bxought about 
••greatex tmde:rstandilli::;" betvJeen the t•~o c:mmt1·ie::;; tha·t; the 
ChimH%l ltJader 1f; visit to lndia appeared to have helped 
him to understand non-Chinese Asia aml to appreciate the 
"evolving soutlwa~:t Asia pattern of collective pcace."7 
·rne visit r<lfer:red to occ•nrec, on .;rune 26 at lrJtlicl1 time 
1-. 
India 1 s Nehru antl Hed China's 9ou <Jxchane:,ed toasts. On 
----------------
6quoted in the ~ ~ 'rim§!!, April 16, 19bt1. 
"7D:tr:>patch from Nev; Delhi, dated AL'IGI~st 25, 1964; in 
the ~ York Tim'E.§..• Auoust 26, 1954. 
'_, __ _ 
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that oucasion Nehru sa:i.t:t: 
Our great lEiader JVJahatma Gandtti led us by peacet'Ul 
methods throubh travail and many bitter experi<mces to 
freedom. China 1 s catlbe was diffe:nmtly fash:toned. 
Both our countries placed Cbe ~;:;ood of the collllllon man 
before them and a:NJ almine; in tlleir different ways to 
raise the millions tllho suffered so much in the 
past ••• 
j Destiny beckons our count;ries and l hope neither of 
1l---------·tl.i:.,;;m-wi~J:1-be-fouud-wanting at thi-s--g:reaXmonletlt :ttfilis-
I. 
to:ry. I nope our two countries ~>ill stand for p<;ace 
and will live amicably together a net co ope rate in the 
cause of peace and human advancement as tt1ey tl~ve dona 
through the past 2, 000 years of human history • l:i 
The other point ~:Jell nott1d in Nehru'::; sp<Hlch in the 
lower Chamber "as th<> particular empha!l:l.s tr.a t the lnd:tan 
leader laj.d on U1e joint declaration hD had lsstled ;;ii;h 
Chou 1rJhich accepted the pr:tnctples of peaceful co-ex1stence 
and non-interference. He CJXpreDsed tile hope that the five 
principles "contained the nuclen<J of the pattern of (:ollec-
ti ve pHace, t!w only altar native to 1var prepliiE>dnes:o and ·c11e 
only substantit;l approach to I<oal secur:!.ty." 1'lle f'ive 
principles are: mutual respoct f'or each other • s tc;r:ri tor iul / 
/ integ:ri t;;' and sove:reit,nty, non-aggress:i.on, non-inte:rf'e:r ence ·' 
in each othD:r •s lnte:rnal affairs, equality and mutqal / 
benefit, ano peaceful co~existBnce. 
5'l'extual exoercts from Prime Mini,;te:r Nehru • s re-
mark.s made in exchange wl th Premier Ct1ou En-lai '"'t Ne~J 
Delhi, India; JunH 26. 1954; in tlle lli!!!. ,Xo:r]i Times, ,June 
1954. 
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In his speech in t;iHJ l.lpper Chamber of Parliament 
the follot>iin<;; day, Al.lgust 16, Nehru want further in si1arply 
criticizing the United States and European povJars over 
their approach to k\":tan probl6rM>. He said th0ir nout-of'-
place and cut-cf-.data" policies ignore Asia. Ha rccalled 
that al ttwu;;h tile Genewl con1'erenca on lnilocrlina toolr. h.rto 
----
account th<:. realitiHs of til(J situat:l.on in.;,utc:, neverthe-
lass it 11as a eonference on Asian problems iHJld in Europe 
and "chiefly domlnated by Europeons am] t\mer icans." He 
expressed thG l1op<J that V!estern powers v<ould not pursue 
sucl1 a policy in thB futu:r e. In a s tatem<mt t>i.xrdlar to 
the one he made in the lowe.r house a day before, the 
P:rime Minlst<H spol:ee of the imperative necellsity to accept 
the principle of "peaceful co~~n:lstence," clnimlng that if 
co-existence fJ.mone; nations ;.;as not pos:oibl<l the only altex-
grievance: India, he said, imd gr<w.t respect for the United 
states and ocher nations ln Burope but that ''ull the honor 
and respect in the tv.orld for th<Jm doos not; make tll<, :::light-
est dUf'erenc<l to our ded:s.ton tb.ut t%1 nmst have f;t say in 
Otlr destlny and in Jwia•s destiny • " • • Fully :c oalizing 
that Asian probl<mJs were of the deepest interest to the 
United Stat1as and I:iurope, "~Jhat I ''JOuld venture to submit 
as completely out-of-place and out-o.f'-dace todny is for 
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problems to b<e considered by certain Ji:Lu:opean o:r American 
po•••ns, forgettirl;;!. or i(::;noring Asia, especially luhGn 
0 
tho,; e pro blenw are !.is ian, u Nehru said.·' 
grzc;at lene;ttl India's opposition to ~h<J forl!HJ.tion of any 
kind of collG cti ve Ci of'ense ~lji;i;.\~~-Z!;l ti().!~ _11~ Asia_,_y_i<O\;I_incs 
the meetiQ., in the l?llil:!.ppines for this pllrpou';! as "un-
fortunatG.'' Villile acknol~ledgin<> ttJat the countries >·Jiw 
hEl felt ttllit tlle Geneva settlement had brousht a sense of' 
hand, he ccmt<mds ttlat tt1e approach adopted in tho 
Philippines conference \.JOtlld revive i'<Hl.XS and suBpicions 
giving rise to 5,nsecltri'ty; l;h'ltlle:r we agree or not, this 
111as Nehru •s vie\vpoint. 
Illl.rma has consistently remained ">vary" throushou t 
the lrJhole necc,otiation voxiod on tl1<l Souttlea!;t Asian pact. 
In an interv:tewt U Nu, Prime i'~linister, vms quo·ced as ~Jaying 
that his country ~c;ould not join SJl:ATO because "'.'le do not 
stop at; non-involvement; "e do our utmost to ::snun any 
activit;y ~Jhich. is likely to create misunderstanding in any 
------
9Dispatch from New Delhi datEJd At~e:;ust 26, 1954; in 
the Nev; Yo:rlc 'l.'imes, "ugust 27, 1~)54. 
---
124 
qu<1rter. ulO '£ho Economist, a London-publ:l.shecl magazine, has 
regarded Burma "a pa:rticLllarly v:l. tal test case" in the 
task of' the \i:i.plomats of tJ:w .SEATO powers to convince their 
neighbors ttla t '"oha tevGr Gl1ina • r; aims, collective security ] 
t is r oally more likely to lcw.d to pGace tt1an a field wide 
T ~:------o_p_e_n_t_o_J_Jie ce meal ag8.t et;_·t;_:!_.o:1s ~ 1~---
rl ~ 
~ 
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Ceylon's of:l:'ioial att1t•lde and intentions i;;O~Ja:rd 
invite an atornio "Pearl Harbor•• if shG of'ffJHJd herself ~Hi a 
mili ta:ry base. Ho s.lso oontended that the United ,c;t~;'CGS vJas 
trying ·to promot,;, a Dot\tllea.st l!s:ian defense pact 
••irraflpective d' 'chc ultimate decistons at th'·' G·enuva 
conf.'srence, '' of the neutra11.st conclusions of tho :roc<mt 
fivo-na·tion Asian Premier'" conference, and "even the 
conflenslls of Corrmlonwaal th oplnion." :'3enanayake made t1is 
t.; tatGment t;o ~'llq, 'rimes of Ceylon. "If' \ole \vould offer GeyJ.on 
"~wuld 1!Hl not be lnvi ti.ns attacln If uucll an attack came 
-----·~·-· 
lOJJi<Jpat(~h from 
in the New Yo:rk Times 
--··--- ........ ' 
nangoon, Bttrma datod M~cy £1, 19b4; 
May BiZ, l9f)4. 
ll"Recruit for SEATO," Tne };conomis·t, GLXXIII 
(Octobe:r 2, l9ti4), 20. - ---~·-
ll3Quoted in the New York Times, .\}J.V 17, 1954. 
----"' 
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As far bacl<:: as 1949, the id.ea o.:f a Doutl1east Ao;ian allian(Jfl 
1·u:1s canva:3sod, bt::tt Ceylon strontty resistbd attempts to get 
her lnto !;ny fOliHll' bloc.UI Both Ceylon and Bllrma f'ollo\v 
Nehru's lead vJi.Hother that lead be valid o.t not. 
Indonoeien. Premier Ali Sa;;; t:coamid ,j(ljo 's dove:rruaent, 
tvhioh d ex :tvb~; :.L te p.r inc~_r;a!__~_9_PP.9_.J:'j:; ____ t);_Q~l ___ ~t __ Na_tio_na1i.:"--t~· r;omm.tUl------
1----------
ist <loal5.tj.on in Parlianwnt, is of'f'icl~'lly on record agoinst 
Only onH gJ:rjup in Indonesia backiJ thd !v1a.nila pact--Hizbullah, 
an Islmnit~ :nganization of fo:rmor gusrillas ;,;ho played an 
impor. taut ro1(l in 1945 1n tho Indonesian stru&;.le 1'or 
independence; at;ainst Dutch colonial rule. ln a formal 
thG 6Gfensive ch&racter of tho pact ::uii termited it a 
peaceful .factor in til(:~ gen£rally serious situution racine, 
soutl1oast Lsir.1. Hizbt::tllah :furth»X condemne\1 "hat it termed 
a.n unxealbt:lc approach to po1ve:r pclit:lcs througtl c11sgui!';ing 
Indomwian Government has incli:rec·:;ly hinted that it tiO<lld 
be interested- in Howe fen; of non··U&;l'iJSd.on pact wJ.th 
• 1<' Gomn1uni.st Ch1 . .na tl ou 
14.!:!£~ Yo:rk Times, October 1'7, 19b4. 
' ' 
l__: ____ _ 
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pakistan. Pnlci:Jtnn ''as tho only nation of the so-
called Colombo pmvars to attm!d th6 Manila Conference and 
come out of ttw·t moot1t1(, a pa:rt;y to DEJITO. 
Th<; importance of this young Moslem nation in over~ 
all strategio cons5.de:rations viiH. continue to be highlighted 
by two relevant facts. 'I'heso a:r:c. Pak:intan •s geog:rapt!j·CI'J.l 
'---------
upon Unit<cld ~;tatds military aid in defiance of h<J:r bigt;;er 
forthrii,:.llt att~:;.cJts on sus;.:x:wted Conmmnist subverslve:J• 
particul,<rly ill ·the count.ry'"' 0asterr1 area. (Incidentally. 
different from past actions of the Indian Government when 
th(lY vie:te deemed to constitute a threat ·to security. 
~rllout>ands ;vere jailed. 
On. account of J:akistDn' s geOgJ.'aph:i.eel poni ti.on, h<:JX 
membership in SEAJ.'O lvot•ld place a pro-l'lestorn <>nclav(1 :Lnside 
neutre.libt India in Pakistan's Pxov1nc:e o:f l:!~ast Bengal~ and, 
as Hobert T:rLUrJJLlll vJziting f:rom tl1e Hanila Conference, stated; 
• • • provides a prospective strategic brid¥;e betl';een 
the t1rw theaters of' ~,'estern defenso agaim,t Ccll!l;:unism. 
':l.'hese thaaters a:;:e southeast Asia and tlli:J li\llddl.e East. 
This ls l1o1t1 Pak:ist;ani deleg<~tos viow their couni~ry Bs 
:role in the drama lmfoldinL; here. 
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Paldstan•s v1este:m I·Jtng acljoms the Middle East. 
The eastern province, which is separated f':rom its VJest 
by about 1, 000 miles of Ind :l.a.>'l ter:citory but yet con-
tains mote than hali' the nation • s population has a 
common bo:rde:r. w:l. th Burma and thc:rcfoxe, can be G.ncom-
past•e<l tc.ctically in the southeast Asian area.15 
l\Joxmally one 1r1ould. not expect Ne;u Delh;i. to be dis-
mayed by ·tho pr'imsnce of a friendly milita1·y bullvf>Ik along 
and Paki<l tan are not fri<Jndly ~md tl!ere appears to be littlEJ 
prospect t;bat tt1eix differences$ particularly over the 
llS to factor number 2-~Pa.kistan 's incr ea. sing alignment 1;;;i. tll 
tt1e Vies t. 
Since Secretary Dtllles 1 M.iddle Eastern an<S Indian 
,journey in 19!\3 there have been major sh:Lfts in .American 
attitudes. ·,;ashington has decided to risk a cooling of 
f'riendship 1rli th Asia 1s largest non-Communist povJe:r, India, 
in order to cement closer tj.es i'liith Pakistan. P<\l'~istan 
has entered into agreements tdtl1 both the United sta.tc:s and 
Tu:dc<Jy. under tho J;J~:rtual .Defense Assistance Agreement vdth 
the Uniteld states the latter will provide military •Jguiprnent 
and ·t:ca:lnitlb io r the Pakistani Armed Forces. It is 
expressly stated, twwevar, that the agreement does net 
----------
15Robert; Trumbull in a di:Jpatcb f'rom Manila dated 
S'lptember 1, 19~~4; in the Nelrl ~f!. '.times, September 2$ 1954. 
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establish a rnili tary allianc:e betwaen ·the: tvJo countries nor 
does :tt involve any obligation on tl1e pa:rt of Palcistan to 
provlde mill ta:ry baseD fox the use of t!m United State!3. 
Both col1nt.r:iJ_l r; agx.~(H; to utatc:.: such B.ction as may be 
n!L1tually ag:r.e<Jd Qpon to elli:dnat.e caLl~Gs o:f int•nuat.:Lcma.l 
tension,••l6 The agreement 1d.ti1 Turl<·SJ' is ~.ven more g<m,;ral 
-------
bctt. it do''" lmpl;y a \\'estern orient.at.ion. Ir.t it trw t~oJo 
cotlntr ies agree to s tw'J.y method n of achiwvino clmHlr 
collabor.ation in pol:Ltical, economlc, ani.\ cultural spheres, 
includir.\"' m.eans of st.rengti1dnhlc; peace and H'lou:r ity in the 
Iraq. •rtlis developmen'c hac> eme:·ed the most veh~1mant ra-
1 ts ne1~ al1:lanc.;is, may take a stiffer line anon t Kashmir. 
!ndi<J a.l::Jo regards j t; as an act of treachery to As.i.a for 
Pal<:istan to alien l tself ~1:t th one of th<J great ]JO\J(~l:' blocs. 
_______ ...._._.,. __ ~"'""""" 
16u£,1utqal Defense Assistance ,,grocrmmt. \~:i(;tl Pald.s'!;an, 11 
Department; of' Bi;ate Bulletln, XX,\ (lVJay l:'>l. 1954). eb0-51. 
• .. .,..,._ ----· I' ~ 
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Paldstan has been Nidened. 
Thcne are s:Lsns 1;twt Pakistan and Ceylon, both of 
"llloll. have a qua:rr el vJi tr1 India, may t;~;~' to coope:r ate more 
alos~lly. ~IS recunt:Ly as April, 19fib, at th-8 eonf(1IEIJ:Hle of 
Nahru 's most lnte:rcsc:t:tog cUftarence of opJ.n:!.on >Ja$ vii th Sir 
of both La<>~; and Gambodia by :flm:ma <md Ceylon. Noi th(n: 
Burma nor Ceylon 11.1ould go to wmila, but their !l!L.J!lf§. 
thotlt;h at presant f_'ollowin::; t.11e !ndlan lead, may be 
attraetacl by the force of' J::llam to s>v:!.tctl Us aJ.J.sgi<"nc"'• 
India may be d.issuaded f:rmn ll(.dc i.nsi:.s tent neutrality :l.n 
the face of its geog:raph:l.e&l VL1lne;ralJili ty ·to ·ttJ.e tlu'"'a t 
of Communi :o t advanct~s Vias t f.:r:om Inrl ochin.a • 
..... _,_.............,,..,.,....__.., .. _ .....,_,_,,, 
---
17Norman G<.msim:, ''ll<J;;ort from J3anctuns," ~ ~urda;y 
P.evietll, EXV:O.l (May Bl, 1955), 8. 
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Formosa. Kore~ and Japan. At the end of the London 
and Paris conversations, Dulles obtained agreement on the 
paragraph in ttw communiques about a f'u tur e mill tary secur~ 
it;y establishm<mt in southeast Acd.a. \"ihile the secretaiy 
has had a c;;ood press in til<:J Utlited St;a1;es 1 the preva.iling 
opinion beifll;~ ttlat tt1o agreement in London and pa;ri;; marked 
an important step fonJard toM:ll'd a uni:fied non-Communist 
front and tov;ard collective security measures in southeast 
·"lsia, thh; evaluation has not been unanimous. Among 
American politicians of bottl parties critical, estimates b<<Ho 
voiced. Semato:i: lti:l.ll:l.am F. Know land, then tbe majority 
south T\o:r<>a, c~hich he said, tmve one m:tllion men under arms. 
'l'he argument tl1at tl1ese ure nlready and absolutely commit~ 
ted again:;lt Communist China >vas mat by ch<>rges that a 
"urrender to Britisil Far rt:ast policy <Jas the <>Xplanation for 
not incli:td1ng them.l8 Both countri<>s t1ave bilateral mlltual 
defense treaties ~~i tl1 the Uni t<:Jd States Government. J>lso, 
the participation o:f Chiang Kai~shek•s Nationalbt Chinese 
forces vias unlikely because Britain recognizes Communist 
Cl11na. Incidentally, this recognition ooes not give Hed 
Chinu a freo hand on Formosa, not <::van on F·ormoHa 1 s cl:1.Gin 
18~ :t:ork Times, April 15, 1954, 
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ot steppine;-stone island defenses in Quemoy and J:<1atsu. For 
on December 2, 1954. Britain revealed that "she had 
formally wax ned Had C.:hina a.sains t attacks on the Nation-
albt•tHlld islands off l''ormosa, '' lvhile at th(? ::>arne time 
urging "moderatlon" on th<~ part of all concernect.19 A 
military contribution of __ SQuth_Kor~a i';also_tlnlikely ____________ _ 
:-------~-
considering South Korea's ovm military problGms and the 
unpopula~ity of the Syngman Rhee regime in some other Asian 
countries, pa:rticula:rly seoul•s attitude tmval'd Tokyo 9 and 
In seeming anticipation of "'hat was to come, 
seoul had said that South Korea '•JOUld not become a party to 
the So:.rti1tHJ.st Ai.;ia defense treat,y <JVen :l.f invited because 
of opposition to Britain and France as members. Th.e South 
Korean spokesman accused the tvJo na t:l.on" of partic:l.pa ting 
in collectiva opposition to Communism for selfish reasons 
alone and not for the betto:nnent of the Asian people. Also, 
he said £;outll Korea opposed tl1u possibility of Jap~<n 1 s 
"1 participation.·~ 
1 9 stockton Hecord, December 2, 1954. 
2~lilliam J. Jordan, dispatch fl'Olll G"oul dated 
April 12, 1954; in the ~ ~ Iimes, April 14, 19G4. 
21 Quoted in ths ~ XQ!k ,Iimes, September 16, 1954. 
,Jap~tn~ on her paxt, kept very close ,.,atch on tm 
Jl.~anila Conference. But h<;r interest was 111ith a closer 
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economic ti<l-Up with .southeast Asia rather than joining 
any :pact that vJOuld entail a military commitm<mt abrcad.22 
Ttle reason is ttlat the area involved in the alli'ance and 
the adjacent__l:18tj_on~ lo_ng __ hav~ _beetl_h(jld _up _i;o .Jap<i,,tl_().S _ 
:-----
too best som~ce of raw material and tt10 bes·c nearby market 
for Japan which must export and import in orde:r to live. 
F.~~! en before the Manila talks o paned • the powerful 
Foreign Policy Committee of the Government's Liberal Party 
under !'r<Jmier Shigeru Yoshida had expressed th<• hope that 
Japan mi5ht ,join in the "economic phases" of ;·;ha·tever agree-
uwnt the Jv;anila meeting might produce. Dulles' statmnent 
soLmded to tho ,Japanese as thougt'l it t;as a plan to bolster 
Asian nutions against Communism by aid calcul&tod to 
improve their economic status.2~; J.f such ~;ere the case, 
much of the needed aid in tho form of manuf<lctured gocds 
for the indus·trial plant of ttld ;southeast .!.sian n&tions 
might be 6}(pe cted to be pur chased in, Japan. Tllis form of 
special procuremen·t <vculd offset tile drop in tt10 purchase 
---·------
22Lindsay Parrott, dispatch frow Tokyo dated 
AUGUSt 25• 19fi4; in the New York '!'irnes, AU~.>Ust 26• 1954. 
23Li,ndsay l'arrott, 
Suptembex 6, 19b4; in the 
dispatch fxom Tokyo dated 
N<l\v York :J:j,mes .september 7, 195'1. 
------' 
,-
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of military sllpplies by the United stattJs in Japan since 
the end of the Korean '~ar. At tl1e time of this >Vl'i tine; 
the Japanese gova:mmant undex Pramie:r Hatoyarna is en~aged 
in trade negotiations with Hed China and Soviet Htlssia. 
Since a i'rt>e Japan is mandatory for United States 
secu:rHy, ttlun: is not thu slighted doubt that the United 
States ••ill stand by Japan in case of attack. 'rhis eon-
cept vH.lS gi w.n formal expression in tho mutual defense 
n. THAUAND, I,f,O,S, GAMBODI!l, AND SOUTH VH.:TNAM 
' 
The clorJeness of the Indochina war to the borders 
of Thhiland l:1as made her one of the most entL.' .. 1siastic and 
certainly the most concerned country of Bouttlaast Asia 
insofar as tile Manila Confc~rence was concerned. In his 
openill5 spaacr1 to the conference. Prince vlan. r;;inister of 
Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of 'thailand • went to sroat 
l<mg·ttt to illustrate the Thai M>y of l:lf'e" vJhich is ohaxac-
terized by a t;:radi tional conception of peace as including 
freedom and ;justice • , • " hith th<~ Pll.ilippines, T!HJ.iland 
~r;as equally determined in llar "desire to fJee a commit-
me nt which in substance, is as near as possible to that of 
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NATo.ui?A £against thEl opposition of all the other delega-
tions Thailand and thG United ,:;tates f·avo:r:ed including 
Gainbodia and I.,t>os tc<.nd free Vie ·t;nam in tho treaty area. To 
be su:re, the desire of tho United States to p:ro·tect thec.e 
three M;sociated .Stutes from f\u:ther Communist advance by 
incorporating them in a collec·cive defense ar :carJt,ement was ____ _ 
the immediate cause for calling the Ntanila Gonference. 
In expr<;ssing his desire for their inclusion in the treaty 
area. Prince Vian sa5.d ~ •1They deservo to be protected on their 
o111n merUs and, as a X<Jp:resentative of Thailand, I should 
say, as neigtlbouxs to my oount:ry.u25 In the end 9 a spHcial 
compromise arrangement \vas arrived by \·Jhich the pal'tias 
unanimously signed a Protocol to the f!~ACDT des:te;natine 
Laos, cambodia, and Free Vietnam for purposes of Articl.;,s 
IV and III of t);HO Treaty. 
III, AUSI'HALIA, NB;V./ ZEALllND, JiND TB$ PHILIPPI Nl~S 
It 1oas no~ed earlier thtlt bilat<>:ral ·trGat:l.es among 
Al<stral:ta, NeN :-3enlan6., the PllilippJ.was an:l the United 
---·-----
24opening remarks of Prince Van V<'aithay~Jkon to t11e 
Manila Conference of 1954; in t'n<j fi_oceedipgs: :;£he ~~ 
~ ~ §Q.!lt_l},~ ~ Colle~Q. J)i:i'fens<l '.l?:r<latu_ ~ 
Protocol tv the S:~:ACDT;_ and tile J?acii'lc Cha:r·ter (lS<Jued by 
the comm:lt'to'(i(in-Publ!oity. Con.:fe:ranoe secretaxia't o:r tlla 
Nanila Conference of' 19ti4, Manila. Phil:lppinesh p. 25. 
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States f'ormed the U<ll•J i"oundations of Pacific security. 
I1'u:rttler mo:Hl ~ ttl~; proxi.mity of Communist China and Indo-
china .makes it a matter of grave and immediate concern to 
ti:l~;se Pacif:l.n natl.ons to associate themselves tn a wider 
networl; of defonse a:nansement for Soutl'Ulast Asia and the 
l·iestern pacific so t;h.ctt l:tnitHd, nol;__llgat;er~, __ 1:t(ll;iol1_l)Jay _______ _ 
-------
be effected to meat cxtE>rwll attacl:l:. Their decision to be 
incLuded among the orig,.i..nal members of ~"l~ITO supplmrents 
the series of b:i.lateral treaties with the United tltates. 
At l;rw time ~3ecreta:ry Dulles n<:Jgotiu ted too hnzus 
Treaty the United i::tates :ref'usad to inv5.te either Britain 
ox France to become part:I.es t.o it becaut:a this J:lould have 
' 
lncluded both Malaya and Indochina. 1rJhich 1r1ere already 
faced vlitil Communist insurrections. It seems that United 
.States' strategy at tho! t time l'Jas to avoid corrllllitments, 
~tJit;l:l the exc<1ptioll of obligations under the United tl!ations 
Gtll'l:l.'ter, on the mainland o:f Asia that might 1nvolve Uni·ced 
GtatiiJS' ground troops. 
The situation has since :rapldly chaflii;tld. B:r:tt;ain 
and France are no11J .full partn<)rs in SEATO, (Bri t1si:l 
participation in 'tile Southeast Asia defense talks vms done 
at a risk& oml that may involve a peXlill'.tnent split \vith the 
Asian Cmr.rnom•Jeal th countries.) 'rhis is :lnevj.table in vieltJ 
,----
of their stakes in th<J ar<;a. Also. let us never forget 
t11at the most important :factor in the "cold tvar" is 
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Fig T.h:ree tmlty. This is tl12 :reason VJh;y the United sta.tes 
stands by :Br;l:tain ln th« l•1iddle J:<;ast today. :l'his is tho 
reason 1"t1y the United states stands b;y France in l.<lo:wcco and 
Tunis:l.a. v.'i thout fn~tmnpting to axgll.e th<:l e tllics or even 
]------------------
tb.(J advisability of sueb. rec<mt moves, lve can only st:J.te 
for our purposes at thd moment that tlw task of' tllE. SEA'ID 
po';Jers is to convince tilc.ir m;i~hboxs tl:nt wllatever China's 
aims, collective security is really more likely to lead to 
peace than a field ;;Jide open to piece meal aggrest>ions. Ten 
men oa.u overcome a thousand 5.f ·th'J thousam1. say that each 
will defend l1im::>elf indivi.dually, for in ttJat cas,,, ttl<-: ten 
do not face a thou sand; they face only one. One at a tirrm. 
Novo that tha problems facing thii nations of Southeast 
.t\sia are also the problems of the VJestex n poNexs • and no1r1 
that the physical c1.istance bet11Jeon America and the South 
pacific shoxes • 1neasured in time, is no longer of great 
consequencfJ, :lt need not occasio11 great HL1Tpr ise that tha·t 
foreign pol ley is ad justine:; itself to x~~ali ty, 'I:he batJ:tc 
theme of' that policy ls cl.>;ar. It accepts tl:le fact ti1nt, in 
the vJo:rds of a polltical scientist: "Communist ag;srE,ssion 
in Europe ancl in soutilaast Asia 1.s insepa:rably linked and 
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that defense against Collllnunism, if :i.t is to be ef'fective
0 
must be suncessful :tn both area. ,,26 
26Joseph s. Roucek. "Southeast Asia and tho United 
States," Q!Jl'1'.!!.!1t £iistor.:l. XXIV (August, 19b2) 9 68. 
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incomnl<at.e if it did not t,e.ke 
' 
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li':rom the time the pact gave promise of ma te:rializing 3 
C'<Oviet spok.esmen attacked it as merely a tool. devised by 
the impel'iaJ.ist ruling cir•cles to preserve 11 coloniali.sm." 
A. statement made by V. M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign MinistEJI'o 
pally at the emerging .southeast Ad.an collect;ive defense 
treaty, contained exceedingly bitter denunciations. The 
statement, directed to th~;; Asian cot.mtrie:>, decla.red in 
part; 
k•t present plans are promoted for a ne~• military 
bloc agaj.ns t thE; peoples of ;.;oui;hoas t 1\sia. 'J:tlis happens 
to be tile main pl'EJoccupation at the present of tt1e 
:rul:i.nc:; dxc:l<lS of somo po1tJars. hee:tded by thd U.uit<:d 
statc:s •••• The main purpose of such military plans is 
to p!:eserve :;;mG perpetuatG by every possible means 
colon:l.al regimes, to curb nations that strive for 
natlonal libe:t'ty and il1dep<mdence. '!hess plarw are the 
expression of thu a!J!;gressive aspiJ:ations cf' ttle ruling 
ci:roltls of certain ~;tates, but they are in colltradiction 
l'llitb 1~11u interests of peace and with t:.he cause of tlw 
national liberation of opl?l'GS(O<Jd nations. , , • Plans of' 
such a natttre a:re motivated by a desi:re to defend in 
e.o~:~theast .M:i.a out\,iorn privilegBs of' non-Asitcn states • 
with wl1ich the peoples of' Asia do not v;ant to r econc:i.le 
themselVtr3s~~ 
I>lolotov tolCl .t.!H:: F'a:t: !Jastm:n Gonf'e:retwe that many in tl1G 
"imperie.list'' camp >verB 
••• dl~c:pl,Jased 1;1 tl1 the fact that; tile peoples o;f 
Asi.a have at 1as1; stood Llp to defend decisively tlleir 
rights and int0rests. But; lt is time to unda:rstand 
that no policy based on a posi t~on of s t:rength can 
turn b:occk tile _.l1eel o:: history. 
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Ha.vlng ctttacked the ''U&;:ressive" nature of BkJ;A1'0 in 
its fol'lJJative roo:iod of development, th<: t:;;oviet Union 
p:roce,~d ed tc pay t.r. :Lbut~o tc tllc compl<~ted Southeast Asia 
Coll<wtivE> Defense Treaty. The ;;ov1ct Union o.fflclally _ 
--- -- - - --- ------------ ---------- - --
denonnced. the pact on rooptemtor 14 as being, directed against 
r,emu ity .in i<sia and ae:.a:i.n.s t the freeclom and national 
indepenclenc:e of the Asian pee ples. 1'his leng·thy castiga-
tion of the, new agxeemerrt and its initiato:rs, especially 
i;ho United Statcw, 1vas deliv<>:red in a statement b;:' the 
1.\f! is kmmm, fo:c ;:H;r<Je.t·al 1aontl:~s Oll t.ho init:tative 
an<i uncl<>r tlH'. pressure of th'- u.s.A. and under ttH> 
pl ~'tc,xt. of defendinc, ttHJ cot.mtxi.:,s oi' Southeast; l!sia 
agttinst eoWJmmism, intensive military prepa:r.at1.ons nave 
been m!lao f'o:c tho formin;,; of''· nmi aggrBssiv& military 
bloc in t;hat area • • • it was prepa:rod • an:l cax ri,Jd 
ol):t; • b;i 1:ieste:m powers be11.ind the backs of lwian coun-
·tries, <lrld tho mtd.n :r:ole ,;as played by the U.U.A. • 
althot~gi1 trw f:rontiers of tt:v;, u.s.A, arc eeveral thou-
sand lr.ilomet;ers a1>1ay fl:'(lm southeast !.'lsia. 
'l'hls fact alone shoV~s sui'fioiantly ch,arly in 1rJ!"lose 
J,ntel.·n~·Jts iJh6 nevJ groups axe being ::Jet upe u 11 ~~ The 
new mi.li tn.ry grouping, in actual fact, rep:r m:.><mts a 
bloc of colonial J:-O'rltJXS base(\ on :Unperi&lintsl ob,jec·· 
tives to maintain thei:r economic and political pos:l.tions 
---·----
21~:xce:rpts from G<m<;va address by v. lvi. J.ijolotov, soviet 
Foreign Min;!.ste:r, at the Gen•ova Conference on l0ay ll$ 1954; 
in the NalrJ Xo:rh:. Time[, !ll;.ay 12, 1954. 
1-
in bs:tn.~ \-··~hors t~o s:l.tun1~1.on hn.z .:t?.ld:lc#.llly ehnn~?;f:1£1 » 
paxticuh,rly in viet'l of tl'k' historic victory o:r the 
~:t!·~.H::d:; Gh.:Lri.CS(; pGoy}lC' o o ,.. 
The" ~:f.Jrtthf&.fit AHi.;\n nountr:l.,ns =sl10l11C thun be th.~1 
suppli<lts of d,;xatEJgil} :ra~1 n~atar1~•1s for the nni ted 
rteft(_;~:' ~ 'dt't;;: j,x:tdt1f>tty and :tts r;a .. :r.trl{;rcs ln ttr:; fl.tlfttlt:tc 
l:l1oc. Thoy a.re to cJccnpy 1 in ttJ.c.; ;ft'l·tul'<;J Ha '"ell. tl:Hc 
.,_-11-:,r;. ... , , ...... f~ ~-•f).r_; ~·_,_,n,k,~,s·-1,·\J ·- , .. , .. ).-.,~..,_ •. )<:1•·•·~: •. ,. ,,.,_,) +-1·.-- "'}'~Oi''~'~"""'"Y ,._.£* ~ ... ,..__( ....... (, ,,..... s. l: .. :~~ l,~o· f.-~-t·;' <~:."'~·"· ·,);l ,;1; i. .· ~;~:;,.~,t. ~od ;;:_~ l1"' '··'"v .. : t~.,... ".t""J','.n ·, .·J, 
thH u,xsHt colonial powers. H~xe. preoi~HJ:Ly, lies l;t1e 
::.'ii.1.tl.·-~~J n:::-· ·~tld o~}Ofl<Jn1.c moil£11J.X e[~ v;h:Lc~h fiX·t::: h'·Blng ntf5-
__________ ;, .. , ent~;tl-flS--o.nf-J--c:!"---t'llt:-J----ta,)lts- of' --tlla --pz:..t:r· tlc;:tpants -in t.ne 
:t. w <"':'l ~~"'' 
, .. ,;, :..>~-'· t~,J-' • 
Iu e;;.ctu~l.l f~M-;t !;I thi:. tr za<l,ty ;31~.ned. l.n Me.nLle. ~ jtU1 t 
as ag:r<ll~m<mts (Jn t1:!<1 G1'11a t:ton o;l.' Q'th":r closed a,.,t;;l',>!'> • 
w'""' .. ,n·•·····1''U '"'"nl'r<·•>••~ ,.<• th•· '·f'''•n t••·•n <\~A l:'l~t"""''u 
,_,.4, lrt: . .J .... _~.>,..J~.J ... u.:.'-w t..:;;.s. ,.., ,r;J)...r-,1<."'\.;,·•~ \.tJ~ ~ l.r-~ .,\li::'J..t\,.. <.~~- ;;-'~"" ::."-\.'::> '~-r.a t..-.... q H.l.,.v 
J.n con t . .:e.dio f;ion ·t;o the lJnj. tad N"htions ob,1•wt:l. vos and 
prj~ncJ..;ql.-.~s¢t e o $ !t is not tht.~~ firs ·t t~.1Jrte ·th.r;.t, ,tn 
ti10 craati.on oj.' militax;y ;;l',lUps ot stat'""~ at.t$mpts t·Ja:te 
wade t~J Jut:hJ.i}y tht:Jm b:_, ra.f'6.t.tlr~ t.o the ir~tli!'ostr of 
uefn<J,;<: ::.~n<l ·to assb;t.ing tt1e "'con orale proc,IBS£' of tho 
p~~c~pl~,:; o:f" _ GO~;<n.t.r:tot~ t.H'l:Leh lVE'r-e b~:~5..ng d;:at1n :into 
suc:h g,X~.iup.i.n~;s. J:t vlan thus :.-1rwn t. t10 lttlt>ntic bloc 
\if1S be Inc (~:r :·_;_r.ttozJ « !t -~-J1'lltS t:ot».l~3 '\llfhc·:n planEJ :C'o.1: ·the 
;f:'ormDt·ti.<Jn cf tk1G nc;J'~4 eclllipEHlid E$ Dtl Go 'tth:1£'0 bt.Llng 
,:_,)laJ.li<J:..;;:;ltti.td. ft. ~.~:~he ~1R.i'l1-~·:~ t;~ b(}:hlz'5 s;f.q:')~tf,,~a 1.n thx) p:c,;;r:H3ntl 
'-'i ease: o ..__. 
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·1~110 Ne1-u York;: 
..... .;!-- ..;,;..,...,._,.,.,._,. 
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Necessarily, Communist China•s attitude fo1lo1s 
HUs<, ia''' • ouly sesmin;;;;ly bolder. On September 3~ PeJ.ping 
:racio denomleed a publist1ed draft of th<: Bou.theast As:i.an 
tantamount to "an ag(;!;ressive alliance tJe>stile to ·the 
peoples of China and various Asian countritm."4 On 
trivct'l by the United States to get Asians fighting i;s:J.ans." 
It te1;'med tb.e trEJaty, "a mili ta:ry bloc opposed to the Ashm 
peoples." Ths ag.:mcy further said. 13<: cr e tc:ry of Et.a to Dtllles 
"openly listed the aggre:,;sive objectives of tt1e Un;l.t.ed 
t:.~ 
states in or,~aniz:tng the southeast As:!.a bloc."" S:!.mila:r 
attaclrs ~o1e:re subsequently :reite.rated alont, 1:1ith 1va:mine,s 
that B:ritaln's support of the Un:lt;,:d states has impa:t:rEid 
London's X:el ations 1fJi ttl Peiping and thrEJats to •lliberate" 
Formosa. 
---
' 
"'Quoted in the Nfl)i xo:rk X!m£fl., September 4, 1954. 
< 0 QiJ,OtGd ln t;tvi ~ X9..t[ f~~lllS S ,...,. ____ ~ t~eptemhex gt 1954. 
I_---
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III, Bfl:liUTATION OF' CHAR GE;S 
These demmciat:lr.:ms came t~ittl poor g:race from the 
stat<3 that had been obstruct1.ng much of th!i 111orl~ of the 
Secqrl ty Go Lll1cll of the Un:l:ted Nat;ions by an unini1ibited 
use of ttl.s veto 0 that l1!'1d :refused to cooperato in .solViJ:ltl 
th.c p:r_o_'bl_GmEJ_o.f'_.the- -C 011 t rol--on-- a-tcr.ni-c---.r.;.rma.mentil--,---- -'ctw. t ----nad 
sponsored the rape of Ch:!.na, and that had been instrumental 
in creatin,; a group o:t' Gommunist dictfltclrsl·l:tps in nBighbor-
lng states. c:,;::, a IJl:opaganda line, nowever, it ma.y have 
defensive by acct<sinr~ t!Hl!ll :repeat~edly of :tmperiroJ.istic 
ing ptwllad to :!.ts ext:reme lj,mH;s in evGry di:rec tion. 
It 3.ppnared to hfW<> little effect on the; line of 
mongering" Nere refuted :repeatedly i:\nCt on :J.ndisputably solid 
grmmc1s by spok.esmon of the United states and by I<:~pxesent-
atives of otll<H treaty nat:l.ons. J~t every s·f~ep in ti:J.e 
for l\nthony Eden at tho i''IaniJ.e. Conference, saic1: "~~here 
is absolutely no reason at all for anyone to he alarmed or 
144 
suspicious ubout the aims of the conference unless they 
are designing to be a.gg:ressive. 11 6 His statement was a 
conside:red, deliberate rebutto.l to the broadcast of ttle 
Pei.;o1ng radio on tile same date. 'l'he mewbers of the alli-
ance v1e:re qu iek to s taud in defense of ~'::'.A TO. At i;he 
opening of the J!1anila Confa:renoe 9 Heading said: 
Our objects are purely defensive. We threaten no 
one. We seek not provocation but prot.ectlon. l.'ie 
desire only to live in prsace vlith our neighbours, and 
to see them live .tn peace wi tl:l one another. 
Ma.gsaysay has b:r:tefly but emphatically said: •0\r.Je are met 
today for no a~;b.:r.ef; si ve ptlrposo." Rlchard G. cas<'lY of 
Australia declared: "This ·:r:reaty hl not c!irec·tsd au;ai.nst 
any nat.:i.on. It is quite simply d.Lre(:ted against aiGgression." 
In refu'cing ti.1e officJ.al sovte t protest, John J!'os tor Dulles 
put it this ~;my: 
The sovi.et Foreign Of'fj,co has jU:3t :i.clSlHld a lengthy 
statement denouncing tl1e Manila l;'hct. It pa:r tic t)larly 
complaino of Article IV. lvhi{)h p.rov.i.des fox united 
:recJis'ctmce to arm~Jd attack and political subversion. 
·rhe eoviet statement says l.;hai; the Grl.i.nesfl communj.sts 
also do not 111-ce the pact. 
___ ...,.. ___ , __ 
6Benjamin \i! elles, dis pa toh from London datml 
Ser)l;e;:lbe:r ;c;, 1954 ,· ;tn ·trw lHl"tl YoXl£ '£in1es. coientembar 4, 1954. 
;. ---- ... 
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T!le Jvianila Pact is d.i.H~ctad against no government, 
against no nation, and against no people, It is 
directed only against aggression. The 1'aot that the 
COirununis ts find that objeot.;onable is traGically re-
veal in~, of their ambitions. 
It 111as in an international atmosphara of this ldnd 
that the rep;l)esantatives of t.hs United states and the 
Chinese Collnnurlists met in Gfmeva in April. 195G. to consider 
---
the "easing of world tensions" especially over the Formosa 
area. Probably no high hopes of rHal aacomplis!llnent <Je:re 
entertained L1 ad ''ance by the participan·&s since no g.roum s 
for optimism existed, and today the sltuation l'eJllElins ·~ense 
1-11 ti1out any sign of relief in tile future. In such cil:ccun• 
stances SJ?.:ATO inevitably will grow in meaning. 
7 Jolm Fos·te:r Dqlles, "The .Manila Pact and tlw Pacific 
Charter," D8P§ItL1<mt of .ctat.e Bulletln, XXXI (Be:t:t ember f~7, 
1954), 433:" -- -------
CHAPJ.'Eil VIII 
IMPLEMl~NTIN G THlii TRFA 'l'Y 
sect ion 1 of' Article IV or th<; southeast Asia 
Collective Def'ense Troaty provides ttw.t. 
Each. Par·ty recognizes that aggression by means of ____ _ 
---ar-med-a-t-tuck--ih--tha----txea ty ----a;r: ea-- agai~rs t--- !illy-----or --th-e -
Parties or against any State or terri tory v•hlch ·the 
Parties by unanimous agreeioont may hereafter desig· 
nate, tvould and anger its own peace and safety, and 
agrees that it tvill in that event act to Jlleat the 
common danger in accord<mce <Jith its constitt~tionaJ. 
processes. 
Ttlis spells the general military commitment. Article I!I 
states: 
The Parties under take to strengthen their free 
institutions and to cooperate vJith one; anottHH in the 
fu:rther devolOplllent of economic m<:asures~ iucludin~; 
technical assistance, designed both to promote e r~onomic 
progress and social 111ell-being and to .further th~> 
individual and collective effor·ts o:f governments tol<~ard 
these ends. 
'l'h:!.s is thc:1 famous economi<: and technical aid provision. 
Article li of t;he TX<>Uty stat'.;S thf~·t, 
• • • in order to mo.re e1'fac·~3.valy achieve the 
objer.:tivas of this Treaty • the Parties, separately and 
jointly • by means of continuous and effac·t;:i.ve self-
l1elp aM mutual aid lrlill maint;ain aml develop their 
individual and collective capacity to :resist armed 
attack and to prevent and counter subve:rsive activi·ties 
directed from without against thlili:r ter:rito:rial in tege 
:r 1ty and poJ.i tical stability, 
'rhis is a par ticula:rly euphemistic Nay of indicating the 
rna). intentions of the r:estern powers of going into the 
T:r·eaty as "Elquais" with the nations in the a:rea. And 
perhaps, the whole Treaty depends substantially on this 
article. 
I, THE 'rR]};Al'Y COONCIL MBE:J.'ING AT J311NGKOK 
147 
Tile fil's.t Council m~Hlting under the Treaty ~Jas held 
at Bangkok, February 2::'l, to February 2fi, 1955, to determine 
What could tle done to implement; the various p:rovisions 
of the treaty, There \vas also need to ,,wrk out more 
detailed and precise undorstandi!ll;;s on ho111 tho ·cerms of 
title treaty 'dll apply ·to p<:rticular situations. As one 
editorial puts it; 11 '1'he Bangkok meeting put the SJJ:£1'1'0 pact 
organization on its feet. It is on its foet and headed in 
the right d1rec·tion."1 Through it there \1ill be military 
staff consultatlons and excht1nges of opinion and intelli-
gence. 1> head quarters (}3angkok), a pernJanent staff 
includinb 1:1 joint military staiT group and anti-subversion 
expo:r ts, a program., and a common approach--th<;se >vera the 
(;> 
solid ach:Levements of -the Bangll:olt conference.'~ 
The three main purposes of the Manila pact have bc,en 
mentloned eurlier: defense a;Salnst open and armed aggression; 
1" The :eangll:ok MeH ting, " conmomrH:~al, LXII (Ic'Iar ch 25, 
1955), 646. 
2"Meeting at Bangkok," Nqtvsc~eel_i6 XLV (l'Jarch 7, 1955), 
1 
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I 
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defense against subve:r sion; an:l the improvement o.f a co nomic 
and social conditions. In this connection, ••we have taken 
decisions •" said Secretary Dulles in his closing statement 
at Bangkok February 25, "Hhich vlill make the Council an 
effective vJorldng body within the thret:l areas dealt "ith 
"/. by the pact.,~, 
on J>\arch B0 1955, secretary DUlles went on tho air 
to report to the American people 'the achievements of the 
council meeting under i5Fil::ro. 4 on this occasion the 
seer etary said: 
.Fox tl:w military defense, we sl:wll rely largely upon 
mobile Allied power >Vhich can strike an a0,grossor vJile:r-
ever tile occasion may demand. • • • The United states 
in pa:rtieular has soa and air forces now equipped 1•i th 
net-! and powerful vJeapons of precision, vlhich can utter-
ly destroy military targets without enctange.ring unre-
1~~ ted civilian centers. 
our Treaty council, after appraJ.sirl€~ the military 
factors, concluded that the available military po11er 
offered solid hope of detening open armed aggression 
against the treaty area. 
In order to br:l.ng our. power to a concerted pitch, 
our military advisers at Bangkok s·l;a.rtHd thei:r \Vo.rk to-
gether. • • • In tllis vJay infbrma.tion will be exchanged 
about the fornes IHlich could be mad.e available, and 
st:rate.;;ias can be a~reed upon. 
_____ ,_ ...... -
3"stater11en~ of Secretary Dtllles at the Close of the 
Meetir.~o." DeJ2a:rtmont g.£ g~ lJ.!&letin, XXXII (Marll 7 • 1955), 
374. 
4Add:ress report of secretary Dulles March 8, 1955 on the 
results of the Treaty Council meetint; held a:t Bangkok, 
Thailand, Fobrua:ry 23-2:'} 1 195f,; in "The \Jay of tile A!%resso:r 
Has Been Made Harder • '' United States ~ f!.lli1 J!:LS!l!!i Hepor!f., 
XXXVIII (!Jla:rcl.l 18, 1955), 69-7l. 
1-------
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Next; on the agenda is the problem of subversion 
which is perhaps the t;;:reatest danger to the area. Said 
Decretary Dulles on this subject in his broadcast report: 
Tt~is danger will, I think& be diminished as it is 
better understood tl:11 t ·t;(le Treaty nations ll~We tile 
po\Hll' and th<; \vill, to strike dovJn an open armed 
ae;;;,resso:r. 
________ ____,t.ro-i-1-lus-t-ru-te---this---oonnection--bf~tween- di-re-ct·--anQ--------------
indinlct ag;gress:!.on I ma.y mention the situation in 
Laos. In two of its provinces there are disloyal 
elements, Sllppo:rted by the Chinese and Vietminh Cormnun-
ists. The Laos Government is seeking to re-establish 
control over :!.t s own t<lr:ritory. But it is ;>orried 
less, if it suppresses tho Communists lflithin 1 it will 
be struck by the Communists from illitrwut. I hope that 
thut "ony is n<nJ allayed by their \)etter understanding 
of the prot<Jctive nature of th~l Manila Pact. 
In other countries also, active subversion is being 
promo·t;ed f:rom \v:l.thot<t. J?o deal "itil this ls in each 
case prinmrily ·the :rsspons:HJ:tlity of the governments 
concernm'l. HovJever • often the nat.ions can tlelp each 
otller by exchangi% information, for exsrnple, abot.:rt 
the movements and activities of internatlonal communist 
agitators. Also, those wtw have dealt successfuly 1dth 
this problem can give advice which 1!iil1 help others of 
lesser experience. The Philippine delegation did this 
at Bangkok. They told ho\'1 their Government had dealt 
decisively v1i th Communis t•inspired revel t of the so-
called d:ults e 
:n-11as 11greed there "ould be meetings of experts to 
:facilitate exche;.nges of vie1111:> ubou t th<.:ise problems of 
su bve:r s ion, 
The Council meetitl;;;> also dealt ;,;i·!;h the third treaty 
task., that of improving economic and social conditions. 
'rhi.s problem divides itself into two parts. F:l.xst is 
general irnprovemGnt of economic oonditJ.ons in ·the a:rea. 
This calls for capital developnwnts • industr ial:tzation. 
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better roads, more irrigation ·works, and imtlroved port 
faoilitios. greater. trade among the countries of' south and 
southeHst .Hsia, and the v:ester.n Pacific. Again quoting 
Gecr<:tary Dulles: 
'J.'his problem of economic improvement goes beyond 
the immediate Treaty area. 'fhe 'J.'reaty a:t:ela is not and 
nevex can l)EJ a self~contained economic tmit. :rhe 
--------;g-x-raa-t-bul-k----of---1t-s---t£a<Je--·ts---~~ith- out·std"<-J ·ax-e-as·-;---- 11ifSJie ___________ _ 
is ne,;d f'ol' pro,~:raJus to develop broe.dly the •>conom:tc 
posflibil:l.ti<Js of all ttw free li•~>i&.n countx:!.es. '£l'le 
Treaty nat:Lons vd.11 stu<ly thei:r prob].(;ms from tl1is 
vie'c;point. 
A i; tho Bangkok confer e nee • I took occasion to ra-
emphasize ·President !Eisentlower 3s desire that atoJnio 
energy should be used to benefit ••• en:l'ich the lii'a 
of' the e,:reat ma::oses o:r· humanity, ••• 1 c1etHlribed our 
programs f'o:r education in this field • and 1 extended 
a special. invitation to the !JlaniJ.a .Pf.ict nations to send 
:reprosentati ves to tlld United States so tllwc they eould 
lJegin to s tu.dy th<J ,; ood uses to 1tJili.Cl:l atomic •m.ar (.;y 
may beput. 
The Sli!Cond pllase of the eoonomicl p:roblem is ti10 
p:robl0rx1 of uu,,,;,ting the cost of more effective security 
forces. 11 
some sort o:r United f3tates troop commitmfmts,. if only l;oken, 
to discou:rago ag,s;ression. 13ecretary Dt~lles a:r.gued that 
southeast Aa:ta 1 s defense was linlced to that o:r I\.o:r.Nl, ,rapan, 
and Formosa. Unitecl Eitrltes forces, therefore, must remain 
highly mobile, But just in case anybody ·thought ttds v;as 
an admission of "eakness, Dull.es declured tt.JLit United :states 
p01rilar in trw pacific is gr~jater novJ than at the heigh·c of 
the second 111o"ld 111ar. His i'it,llres--foL1! hundred vmrships, 
i'i ve di vls.i.ons, and tt1i:rty sql.ladrons of f';!.ghters and 
bombe:rs--t•e:re not too st;u.rtline;; but he meant, of course, 
tncludil'l.t, atomic ;veapor:s. 6 (Britain has approximately 
flfty thousunc1 ground troops in the Far itas t--tni:rty 
thous ani\ of til<1m in sou ti1eas t Asil;l.--plus _abou_t __ ~l:ll'_eo __ 
hundred comba·t aircraft and a. Fa.r Eastern f1.eet based 
aroun.r?. a car.rler and two cruisars.6 !''ranee has been IIlith-
drm-;ing the bul!t of ller expeditionary corps from Indo-
china.) The request tor an l;J.w:;:r:tcan comxnit:ment 1r;as soon 
dropped bLtt there is need of moc1est national forces 11/hich 
are >iell eqt;tippE;d and loyal. which can sLtppo:rt the au thor-
ity of the gove:rnment tru:oueo>hout its tex:ritory and fight 
initial defenzive &Gtions if tllere be attack. from 1rli thout. 
United Gtlcl tss NevJS and \.;orld Hepo:r t quotes an unidentified 
American plmmer in Asia 111ho explains United states 
strategy as folloW> 1 
1iitmt 1•e 1ro aiminc; at :ts to make Oil! allies strong 
enough to :resist infHt:ration and 'to lJoJ.d init:l.ally 
against outside aggression. '!'hat will. give us time to 
deploy our a:l...r and. !11.Wal fo:r.ces to stop or discourage 
the age;X<:Jss:ton by puttint; the ene!¥y 1.:mde:r attacl:';: at many 
points-~and cdth nuclear \1ea}.Klns. 
O"Doutheast Asia: A 
XLV (Ma:r:c:h 7, 19[\5), 39. 
6)3enjamj.n \1olles in 
l\l54. 
the Ne\~ York 'l'imes, 6eptembe:r 3, 
--------
7"l,Jianeuvers :tn Asia," United ;3tates 
Heport, XLVI (February i£;4, l9So5, 17. 
~lhls woti t5~nc:; h€!.!3 r~·l'O vld sd thu iX*(lwbex-;i of t;i:tc Goun(!il 
t-J tttt cJ:·~ o py,or t· . .:tn~,;ey for bx in£J'.ing .£..t1.::i~1ut cJ.osf.rr t~.t tJS 
,,,,~ .. ,., ...... ~·., ... -., o• 1·" •. ,•rn~n"'·•n'·r· ,,., o~J1.<~•r•n·· ·th•1" '"'ftJ"' " ~-,-~Ja\.#"'e~ 1,.!/,.,.~;; .• t~,J, ~ t.<S b'l• t ~·.;.~. kl.n.; b .. .l J..J.Ji. .._:t..,,o J...''-' ".t~t.*:i;j. ·~c,~o.t.Jt~,..h t.:tt,JJ:i !.·.:· .~,.. 
o1Jj fl<1tiv<w and munoues r.mrl'i!:r thlil T.:c "'''t,y. Tlwy hhlieve tht.~t tho 1Aanlltl.~ ~~:rB{lty i.s alxoady axe;ctins t:J. l·;Csi.tiv~.:l 
tn:t::l.U<Hl,~e fox tlv; maint<:nanca of peflOO :tn rou!;twast 
'''""" .. ,,,,, ·•·n, ''("l"h''~<·t 0 ""'' ""'" ~·n·" t'l·"·t '"'11' , •. ,,,,.,,,.,it" itV,J..4., 1;,,..,._.~; . .; Ll t~..- h} ,..., V 'llil,.;:io,J · ~ Q....-.,.A,.~~l"f c.;~"''"i ~ . .jj<,l_ V <:·;; .;.",l'(,,;l,,l.,.J.'>.}.C~·.i .• ~.-) 
o.:e ttw m1.~ml:er nations • nh<l·,;n t<t ttl£: px·asent rn<>•Frt:l.ng. 
<Jill saxva as m1 j.naxeasing:ty po•,l m::t'ul '!<"torrent against 
., " "'' "' "<"' 1·~ ''J '"J'l<'· t''cm"' '-'' 1 '' """"' •>'i1 'o '""'" .,_,.." "Q'l''{!~" •l "'C·' , ~4b{.:.·4~, ... ,,v Vt,<:~- .Jo .,, ..-~<o .. H-4<·-~"-"'·l'.. o~.;.v'-'\o.o'i;;;i""'d,M'f,J;~h ui.ll.~ .• , ' ;:. \;.._..~'-4>$•""a~
dnni;o:;:c to ace uud seoux:l:ty i.n the 'l'noat,y ~,;roo. and 
''H"''''"" ·•·'·1·'· trl''·"''' '''f1'""''lt'' ""'"'' '1· {l'''n~··t4 '"' t" ·t ·>-he, .::~5.,, OW<JU ~}I. >, 1. t} .. t~' ..,.,t;; \h ... ~-r<'~. w J,!l:.tJr\ .. 1~, .t _, ~1.. ll,1:!"·' ),:e... .!.. v .;z ::..t~:i tJlk'i:J
m!!n;\he:;: i;;ov,.u:nments ta\{8 s tnps tel s t;r.ongth<Hl t,f1,, canmon 
dafan::H::) .• 
Al t;hough tt.1e~~ tepxcsent cU .. ,rars?J; n~ti~1n~ ;;:~,n£1. pGop.l~3~1 !)_ 
th<:J me;tlba:rs of tl1e G<lUU<:il W1Ue umm:l.mous ln the b;c;lief 
tiwt th:i.s lll'-'"ti!':l<;'; has ;mabl.::d th<llfl to L1ru1e:r.staud o.nd 
appr<:~cinta the pxoblemu fa.o:i.ll& til# 0 0'IIe:r.rw,;mt,s o:r th<J 
oocmt;xies covered by tha ·ruJuty in t\le common e!.i'oxt to 
ensUHl peace and :H:lOOl':i:ty under the 1'J:Ga-t.y • :J:he; pxo,;,;;oss 
achi<NGd ~l.'l:; this .f ill>t council ;i)EH>i.;:tn:;; p:rovidas <wlid 
i 
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hope for closer coope1:ation among the liJ<arnbe:c g;ovE~:rn~ 
ments for the bOOd o:r the region as a whole. The mem-
bers of' the Council are unit-ed in t.heir conviction that 
the common ef'f'orts of' thaix governments are oon tribl.lting 
positively to the peace and security o:f tlle area. both 
~·or the mei~bex governments and for other free nations 
ln th<3 .reg:ton. 
l?inany. thr,; Coummnique expressed the hope that 
11free nati.ons ~.I.Ul assotdate themselves _j.!}_j;l1e _nea.r future __ ---·-
II, 11 0PE:RA'l'ION J.iiRI'I LINK" 
"Ope:r:ation F.:l.rm Linl:e. '' ·~he first jc:lnt mllitaxy 
lza tion pxodcwed r1eva1'al late -J:a.!l;:,e effects: {1) The Comwun-
even am.on~;;, nHmi .. be:rs of the alliance \~no supported a st:ron;o';e:r 
milita:r y comrai tmont. After the a11ied kJil;r g&ultlS thG "paper 
cl!nvs, (2) ~~he rnil.lta:~;y exorcises demonstrated to the Tllaia 
that a Dl.:';I\'..W foxoe can reach tl1eir coQntry in a hurry 9 
tllereby assuring tl1em thEtt tilEi~l vJill not huve to fight alone 
if real \olt\X comes. It may rHHVe to o.ffsat growing drift 
-------
&r~xceJ.:pts from thB text of a cornr,mniqu.a is;med nt 
Bangkok, ~("m:ilanrJ, on F'ebrtlm:y ;:~5 at the close of tho meet-
ing of thH Council of the s>J~CDT; in the .Q:.J.ll§;rtl.Jl'Ul~ .. 9f .§~ 
Bul.lati£)., XXXI! (!!ja;rcl1 7, 19155) • 371. · 
9uc:r<>aky Tiger," ;J;ime. LX'Ifiii (February 20, 1%6) 9 32. 
i 
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toward "nen t:ra1lsm•1 in TlHJi1anc1 or he:r neighbors •10 
nanstJ.VHXS also gave Ai.iians a pxev:Lon¥ of the modern 
1,;eapons tl18 United s·t.ate~o has ava.ilable to defend its 
allies in the Plld.f.i.o. (4) li'inall)/, the s!10\v t·;as counted 
on to liUderline ·i;he basic valuE; of r:eg:l.onal defense pact~;. 
!t 15 nov1 generally accepted thut the Uni te(J Nations cannot.__ __ 
;--------
an internal takc,•ovnr by tho GoJmnLmists u.n:t"~Jl1o:re in Asia. 
T:lc!Ss:ta ':> 1mto can blocll: a.<Jt:l.on in the Security Council. 
~the "nen'G:rals •" the Arab bloc and i:ha sov:i.et bloc na t:i.ons 
Felix. B. Et;ump, Unlted St.at.es Paci.J:'ic Fleet Commander, 
III. CT~l\TO N'1!IDS A i:.lTHOl\JG l·liLI'.rAl1Y ~ILLJ.iir>!G.E 
Nevertheless, ti'BATO does not yet cax:ry a big stick. 
\1htit follmvs ir> tb.e latmJt size~up of' tho s:i. tuation by the 
United :'Otates Ne<ls and i:'o:rld Heno:rt in its Fob:rua:r.y, ?,A. 
-- -,..; ---·- .... ~-
1956, iSSLV3• 
lO,. Fointz'ld. Maneuve:r:s, 11 ~~!!;_, XI,v:r. (J•'ebxuary 27, 
1955) 0 48s 
P• 76. 
11 Quoted in "Allied .[vJanellveJ:s in Asia," 2.£• £!1., 
i 
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Bas as O.l'(-l few and \llidely scattered in the area. ~rhe 
United States [~avy is st:l.ll building its big ne-w base at 
Subic Bay in the Philippines. It bas only ti:UEl<-l air bases 
in the PhUippines capable of iaandling jets. :Che Br.it:Lstl 
enEJd to include F'o:rm<Jsa 9 ,Japan, arul. Korou, all th•s allles 
except the u:nHed f)tates and trw Philippines cold-"houldm:ed 
le.ft oi' TO • s ground forces: 'l'he H<lpublic of the 
Pklil.ippines has <Ul army of' forty thou1Jand men :tn ttc~o 
divisions; 'i;ho othGr t:rainirlt:: divisions are :ln process. 
Tha:lland has an army of' some ninety 'thousand l11Gn "but 5.s of 
uncertain vvlue." The l:\Xi'i:;ish lu.we r:tbout f'lfty tr1ot1sand rntm 
Hnd the Malayans themselv<lS have a 'ten thousand• 
man Army. '£he French no'iPl have fewex than twenty-five 
i'if't;y ttlotwand about a year ~:tgo. 1\us·tral:la lws a f'o:r:ce oi' 
tNenty-ttuee thousand, and Nev; zee~ani.i, twenty-nirre thousand. 
156 
Pakistan 1s one hundred eighty thousand ground troops are, 
for the most part. pirmad do1rm along the borders \vith India 
and Afghanistan. Bven th'" United states is short of ground 
troops 1n l•sia, It has t>vo divisionl'.l in Korea arx:i oua in 
J!:lphn, but all a:re Uncid' strength. 'l'he:re is an Army 
division stationed in HattJaii, The 'Xllird Marine Division 
has tmits in Japann Okinenva, and Havwii, 
"SIGATO ns sea-pmver • mostly Ameriorul, is far superior 
to an,yttlins the communists have in southeast Asia." Also, 
tomong the ['.i;fl:J.'O partners, the United Staks has the only 
air potver of any consequence in that part of the WOl' ld, 
Guam is back in business as th<l st:rateg:l.c JU.:r Fo:rce •s main 
Pacific base. JIJlost of the United Stat<>S' tactical aircraft 
are in Japan, Okina1va• and Formosa. Tl:le I<ir F'orce has 
si.UTicient mobility to shift 1 ts po~1e:r at tv ill v1herever 
bases are available. The other nations • be wever, have 
little to contribute. 
CHAP'rER IX 
Rl~TROSPECT .AND PROSPECT 
Nations that possess f.:r ea &'ld democratic ins t;i tutions 
and desire to live at peace a:r<J placed at soma disadvantage 
in the \·JorJ.d "hero exist totalitarian s ·bates tvh~se _leadiill:'ll_. __ _ 
concerned 1?Jith their own po1ver and pres·tii;e. are not too 
scrupulous as to th<i methods by which their goals a:re 
<~ttained. Too frequently in this t>Ventieth centu:ry 1~orJ.d, 
the offensive is held by those ;.Jho vJoUld least hesitate to 
employ it in th<? use of fo:ree 1'o:r materialistic reasons. 
The f'ormula tion of defensive pacts by ~l tates app:r el:lensi vc 
of agg:res:cion does not a.lona compensate for the disadvan-
tage. A superior ,,;:J.ll by free peoples to preserve th"ix 
freedom and a lviJJ.:l.ngness to make any sacrifices in t.hat 
cause must help balance the scale of' :relative advantage. 
"Thus the st:rL1~le goes on," to quote the lvords used by 
secretary Dulles in a major address to the ,l<"oxe:!.t;n J?olicy 
Association in New Yor1~ CitJ' ~ February l6t 1955. 
Thus the struggle goes on. We dare not relax 
because ttw moment of relaxation is the moment of peril, 
Treaty declarations must be packed by a purpose tlll•t .i.s 
ever sustained, by un intelli6ence that is 0ve:r alert. 
and by po;;er Which is ever ready and able to punish 
ags;ressors so that aggression will not pay.l 
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Whenever nations that possess free and democratic institu-
tions and desirine;; to live at peace laclt these qualities. 
then that desire to live in peace is in jeopardy. 
To the .free >-Jo:rld, SJ!;I\TO represents anothe:r collec· 
ti ve seour ity pact. anothcH' regional arrangement, another 
deterrent to aggression. There is a Pacific Charter that 
voices certain noble sentiments: self-determina tione 
independence, freedom, For the first ti.nle free nations of 
tb.e I~ast and free nations of the vvest voluntarily join a 
multilateral militaxy pact. It is an advance over the 
previous bilateral deals desi~ned to bxing security to the 
Pacific area--tllough no all-in Pacific pact as yet. It is 
a collective defense a:r:rant;,ement >vith teeth, <wen if th<> 
teeth do not ope :rate aut;omatically. It gave Iitle free 
11Jo:rld tlle diplomatic off'ensive 8 something wt:dch counts a 
lot in psychological •;a:ref'are, especially in Asia. SFiA'l'O 
cvas unquestionably a victory fo:r Becreta;ry of 13tatG John 
Foster Dulles and a badly needed victory at a time when 
lnuulles seeks Risk in Retreats," United states 
~ ~ ~Q.. Reno:r:h XXXVlli (February ~38, 1955). -
1--
, 
1:: -
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his "liberation" and ••massive retaliation" policies had 
raacb,ed a dead and. SEA'l'O >1as W.so a victory for the West, 
wh.ich was also badly in need of a victory, For tt1a loss 
of North Vietnam and the defeat of EDC in th<l French 
Assembly, O(Jming in rapid ~mccession, llad brought V~estern 
prl.wt:tge to a ne~1 lovl throughout the freo_~Jo~lci._ 
Here then axo the major vW.ues of DEA'fO: 
lt thro1r1s the free 1tJorlc!ls :protective~ mantle over 
I,aos, Caml.Jod5.a, and south Vietnam. The C:onununis ts are no~J 
formally vmrned that aggression thore may bring about 
collective retalia t:ton. It skips the thorny issues of 
defense fol' Fo:r.mos~. South Korea. and Japan. T:'lese a:re 
actually provid ad for elset~here in unilateral and bilateral 
' 
ar:nmgements bett<~een the united states and these countries. 
To have d:rac;ged them into the Mani.la tal!~s 1>1ould have 
d:ra""ged out. if not e:t.'.feotively dis:rup·~ed 0 the talks. It 
gives tile :Philippines the substance of 1\.m•>:rioan mil.itary 
sqppor t VJi tl:wt<t t!w lt:c tter t£qa:ranteeins mil:l. ta:ry assistance. 
Jlctually the Phll:l.ppines have this gua:rantles verba~.ly from 
President Bisenhower and formiilly in the United States-
Philippines treaty, so they do not need it in E.1£A TO. CEA1'0 
also makes it clear tl:lnt to the Uni tHd States "COllllllunism" 
is t;h~a enfJmy to be opposed., fought, defeated throtlghout 
Southeast Asia; that \riashington 1 s obligations are confined 
1- --
to Commun:tst-:tnspirml o:r Communist-led agE,ressions 9 and 
hope that the United States will not be committed to 
support French or British colonialism in Sou·theast Asia. 
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m~Am assLu•es the United states Gongress of a voice 
in <:ny fighting tbEtt is to be done in ttH3 Pacific. Without 
tlmt prov:ts ion ."'BA'£0 's chances of' getting congresstonal 
---------------------- - - - ----- -----
approval v1ere nil. in the first place. SE;1 TO is an open-
end &g:reement--tl1a.t is, other nations are free (in fact, 
invited) to join. While tt1ere is little ct!l~nce of getting . 
India or Indonesia to sign uny such (:ollect:l >m sactu ity 
ar:raJ:'Ii;ement, it might be uosstble to inte:rest Gtlylon ana/or 
and secu:ri ty; but i.t enhances 1 ts chance f'o:r peaceful 
existence and independent living. 
:ri1:ron,:)1 NATO. the UnHed states has automatic 
commitments reach:tng across Europe to Greece and 1'urkey and 
tho borders of Iran. Through SE.ItTO :tt no1rJ has another set 
of collllllitmmrts rea.chlng across the Philippines i .r..ust:ra.lia, 
NevJ Zoal!Jnd • on to the contiuen t of As :I. a into 'lhailand 
and nearly meetifl!.; the Nf>TO commitments via Pakistan. 
Because the <Jo:rl<l. is a globe, if one starts :from any 
given point and proceeds far GnoucJ1 in any one dixection, 
he v<ill end up just where he started. For example, the 
United s·tates started 1vi th the probll:lt!! o;J.' its own de fens a, 
drif'ted east to \iiestern Etuope 1 thu Balkans 0 the No:rtl1 Sea. 
the laoob:ddge to the Middle Bast, Southeast Asia, the 
China :road e and now she is back considering her defenses 
in the Far East;. 
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from thG Bast; aga:l.m;t ·che il·es·t Coast o;t' thCl United states 
depEmds upon the holding of' the paoit'ic portion ot' 
Mackinc1er •s ••outer Croscant." 'J.'he:refore, to d afend 
Cat. if or nia, Oregon, and Washington, the United .states has 
to have isl~:Jnd defense outposts thOi.:Wands of miles fJ.•om 
the ·,·,est Goast of the United States. 
The land areas of this pacific region Cfm :rougl1ly 
La divided into two tiers: an inner and outer tiu:r of 
defenses. 'l'b.e inner tier consists. as ~HJ obse:rva a globe, 
of fiustralia. Nelv Caledonia, Indonesia. the Solomons, the 
caroline Islands, the (;la:rianas, the Philippines, Formosa, 
the Bonins, ,Japan, the Kurnes, and thll Aleutian Islands. 
In the m~ter tier ~le can place l\letv zealend, samoa, th(;; 
Islands • ':Jake, HI;:J.W"li.i 1 l\'lid~my, and • a6 ain, the eastern end 
of' the Alou'tians. 
\'then a. geopolitician looks at tt1e CnJscent he sees 
it in t110 diffe:rent lit;;hts 1 if lle is tm American. The 
fi:rst is the role of far-flung outposts of defense against 
invasion from the east. 
I j 
l 
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Any en~a~ements fou6 l1t 1n ttw outer ti<Jl' \Vould be 
pUl'ii'JlY na'\nll ~l1g!'.lgl:>!ilCV.t5 until ttJBy J:tilllCh<:id tb.e c:<:~:>s tt•l 
~~ate:rs o;f the Unitoo. St~cltos; wh.<;J:Ie 1and .. b~1sed ai.r-
c:raft and t~rtillery lM.\Y tal.;:.a p~ltt. l:c7tll;<li;!;~>lll!:lllts ;fought 
in the inn!i:r tim: %o uld be oombitled l!llld 1 sal'!~ bnd air 
f.tc.:;llts i"l'<>m the Vi£il:· y start. our pro l:ll.~J!Il :l.<l a two-fold 
!J.1W; first. to contain the f.ign.t ltJi thin tll<! inna:r "Ci<J.r 
antt ::;<H!cndly 0 to hold tltCJ litlo o! lslands >illich mcd<e up 
ttle 1nncx t~lGr o Ho 1 .. ott-4.S (15 tf:t1H ann be (:;.one, th .. f ¥4ast 
I>Q<H!t. of' •kl'"''' '"''' •··~ct· p,.,,,,,d'·! •! <> q<"<f'K• f"P''j' «t't''·"l<' ~ w <o.;..,:J-.., ..._, iHIY~~· ... f:J. >;;w,.&, 1,;'C,UJ:!.;-< tii. .J,.,,~ ~A'.:.<- .;a,VlA (.:;0-~ f:.,_~ ..... -,... 
cbviou~>ly. L;lltl must do thl'<·~' thine:-~; :tl.r<>tg destr.oy 
our control o:C th0 inner t:!.or; s8contl1y 0 :ro:nHl ·the 
flght into tb;,; nroa of ti.1a OQt<jJ: tit;;:q and th:trdly, 
inva<le mu: <Jest oonst. Inasmuch as this ·whol~• plan 
'l''"'t "t·v;·• "'""lJ· M"'"'·'""' "'t· "''~t~"1 "'''" ''t't"'•"t•, .,,-, M•r·<·rn'l ~ ~""'"" ") ,IQ;,t _,_ ~A.~,)~ j ~.;v~•u.·Jvt-'.«J...>:.i 4'"Y~il .!. v- v.:. }':..;;" ""'""li , -~-· ·'~ ""'"''~"' v,..,..,. """ 
or thH :tnnex ·t:ter"l it is ttl.ls s.:t'flU tn~•t .1.l:i most :Lm;;xa:tanl: 
to t~S f:> t pt·~}fH~H'ltk G.._,,~ 
-;~n. ;)'l'~" .. !f .. ··<:-lk't{~·i.f.\t. "-:::. t~t"'.!E1 s'1 .. -.• ~i1 .... i.Jv """l.".; -/k,'*..,.,..:,."'"" ~· v .. lj;..~ ~ ~•ii;o'•·lf"" 
-----
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that perimeter on the continent of Asia around the borders 
of Thailand and pakistan. 'l'hus the soutl:'ie.rn and of the 
United states defense pe.rimeter has· been sL'!if'ted soma 
t>velve htmdxed miles 1fJestvJa.t'd. In o·che:r •'ords, H'.ld China I t is not> completely :r ingHd to tt1e south and southeast by a 
l defensive alliance of f:reo nations 1r1h,o llJ.lVG __ a):'i~llt to t'-------~ ---
li exy;0ct United L;tutes military assistance in tile avant of jj I an attack. 'l.'n'" one gap in the :ring is Burma. and even 
i,: there an attack: i"JOt:tld undoLlbtedl.y meet with resistance and 
l 
l 
t ] 
I 
l 
evoke a call for help. 
Of course, Sec:r etary Dulles l1as an. "out." since the 
United States does not have to do anyttling in Sou'triiHJ.St 
Asia unti.l Congress acts in the case of any aggression. But 
America's prus'tige is at stake in SEATO~ and vJtlila the 
Congress coL11d .t'~l pudia'ta Dulles and President Eisentlo<mr or 
any futLua administ:ration, it would not only confuse, but 
dismany, United Stt1tes allies :Ln southeast Asia. It <~OUld 
certa.il'lly end any influence v·.asllin?;ton may have wi ttl the 
free peoples of Asia. 
II, TilE f'O.i:.ITlCAL FIELD 
lvtost of \'hat >vill be said :tn the political field vJould 
me:rely be a reiteration of vllwt has been stated previously. 
1. Let it be nailed do1rm once and :for all that the 
colonial exa in Asia is dead. i~e:ricans have recognized it. 
--
l 
J 
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And in their hearts • so have the Br-itish, too French, the 
Dutch. and Portuguese. However. they ara still trying to 
hold on to u few remnants ot their "empires." 1iS long as 
they do, the tGeming millions oi' Asia-.. non-Communist 
Asians~-lvill lmep \Jorryirlg mor. a about oclon:l.alisra than 
Communism, 
To hold that tile main conflict confronting the 
entire •.;o:rld today is the conflict between Democracy and 
Communism is a cJ.iche that must be cleared. Insofar as 
the Uni tod stat,>s is concerned it may be the m2ii.n conflict. 
But for J,sia,. Africa, the Arab ,;orld, t;i1e main probl(:Jm is, 
aside from me:re subsistence, t;ha problem of colonialism. To 
many 11sians, Communism is something abstract, unknoNllo 
Colonialir:wl is knovm and hated. Given the choice man,y 
Lisians win ·take Communism. 'l'he big job is to prove to 
them that the choice is not be tween colonialism and Commun· 
ism but bet1ueen freedom and a nec; kind of' imperialism~-
Communist impe :r:J.alism. 
Tho I•':rench, for o.xmnple, must stop ta:Hdng about 
getting out of :Indochina and get out. Only ·che sight of 
French ships pulling out of Saigon will convince the 
Vietnamese that South Vietnam is independent. True, the 
'"ithdra~!al of the Frencll may cuue:e administrative chaos, 
but it is a l'if3k that l1as to ba taKen. '.!:he same goes for 
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th-e othc:r vestiges of colonialism ~o;hich give the Communists 
such good talking points. 
In tlle Nordings of too Pacific Gh!; rter all the 
si.sna:toriGs dedicate themselves to upl'lolding the pJ: inciple 
o:e self-o,etermina tion, 3el:t'~gov0rnmen t, and independence; 
ancl :tt :ts an historic documt'lnt ti1at pledges_t/:l(O_colonieJ. _______ _ 
------- ---- --------------------------- ----- -- ~ 
poNers to give f'reedom to non-solf-gove;rn:l.ng peoples. As 
such, :lt must be follovJed to the lattet, 
2. 1'his is vi tal politically. To milU.ons of 
hungry, :Llliterate Jlsians, talk of tl.l<J nH.mace of Communism 
is meanitl.;:,lesB. l•iestern propaganda should not be ~;;E:a;;;ed 
exclusively to the id aa of n Communist menace. Eu t the 
menace of old· .. fashioned Chinese ilupe:rialism is somctl:lil1g 
tt1ey do understand. l''ear of' un expanding China has been 
ir>.,sralned in eve:ry Southeast Asian count:ry i'o:r c~mtur:l.es. 
seems to have J"'o:rgottan. 
3. Also on the political f':ront. VJhil<> fighting the 
l.l.dmission of Had China to ths United Nations, the free 
Norld must be r<1alistio ~mough to get plann :ready ll(;!;ains t 
the possibility tL!a t Psiping mcy be voted in within a fmv 
years. Hed China's udmis"ion 1rJOU1d be bitter tea. But to 
pull out of the United Nations if it, happens v1ould be leav-
ing t;hEI o:r,;aniza tion to the Co!lllaUnis ts and fo:r the United 
l 
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Btates to cut its o1~n throat. One solution if Peiping 
gets in is to continue to :recognize Formosa as an irlde-
pendent, sovereign state, Wi'l;h its O'Wn seat in the United 
Nations. 
II!. 'l'Hf ECONO!Vll C !l'!I'LD 
The !'<Jason mucl1. has bean said on tl1e e conomie field 
in ttle; early pages of this paplilr is t.hat toJtw·~ :l.s done 11ere 
may Nell tell tho story for ~;oLltheast !csia. A hungry man 
listens to acybody who promises to fill l1is belly. It is 
as simple as thut: though Amerioa is tired by no1:1 of 
rolling out billions. But if. the t'all of southeast; Asia 
v1ill undermine American seour :l:ty, then the United states 
treasury may have to kGep taking a beating. Ttlis also. 
:l.s one of th<o :responsibilitiGs that goes w:tt.h the. p:rivilege 
of' free \vOXld leaderstlip, Southoast .i1Sia 1S !rldeocu:;ly 
depressed areas present t.he &,reatest cnullenl:!;<> to :tree 
economies, That challenge can be turned :tnto un asset by 
making the :region an economic stwVJ-vJindow, jl~st as an 
independent Phil:i.ppines has become a political sho>v~I,Jindov;. 
~rimes move slowly in Asia, lind a beginning is 
dif'f'i<:lult to achieve. But nothing can 110 gained unless it 
is started, and it has been star·l;Hd. i3:51>T0 is an evo1L1-
tionary step in tho free 1!ior·lc\ •s rElvolut:tonary murch totm:rd 
i i 
J.67 
unity and sGcurJ.ty $ At tL1e tipeed Ht \'llh.ich secu:ri ty a.:n:ange-
monts a.ro o vol ving :~ SEATO could cl:l.ane;o more in ttl~l next 
five year than NATO has in the la:=rt f ve .. Histo:r:y VJill 
show that .i cl':~n ant; as an sff.e cti ve sa..fegue-rd that vu a 
can again more ft-eely on the ear-th vtalk lil{e men secure 
in :right;s that ar~ deare:r than life .. 
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